RJ FLIGHT CREW REPORTS GETTING TOO LOW DURING VISUAL SEGMENT OF RNAV RUNWAY 17 APPROACH AT VLD. IT IS NOTED AFTER LANDING THAT NEITHER THE RUNWAY LIGHTS NOR THE REIL'S ARE TURNED ON.

Date: 2008-11 · Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng · Phase: approach

Anomalies: deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|inflight-event-encounter-cftt-cfit|inflight-event-encounter-weather-turbulence

Synopsis

RJ FLIGHT CREW REPORTS GETTING TOO LOW DURING VISUAL SEGMENT OF RNAV RUNWAY 17 APPROACH AT VLD. IT IS NOTED AFTER LANDING THAT NEITHER THE RUNWAY LIGHTS NOR THE REIL'S ARE TURNED ON.

Narrative

THIS EVENT OCCURRED WHILE ON SHORT FINAL APCH TO RWY 17 AT VALDOSTA REGIONAL ARPT (VLD). I WAS PF. WE HAD BEEN CLRED DIRECT CUVGA AND CLRED FOR THE RNAV (GPS) RWY 17 APCH. AS WE WERE IMC AND IT WAS QUITE BUMPY; I SLOWED AND CONFIGURED THE AIRPLANE A FEW MI EARLY AND COMMENCED THE APCH. ONCE PAST CUVGA; WE DSNDED TO 1800 FT AND IMMEDIATELY LOWERED THE GEAR; WENT FLAPS 30 DEGS; THEN 45 DEGS AND WERE ON SPD AND CONFIGURED CORRECTLY AS WE APCHED 0.3 NM PRIOR TO ZURAR; THE FAF. AT 0.3 NM PRIOR TO ZURAR; I ROLLED IN 800 FPM ON THE VERT SPD WHEEL (AS WE HAD PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED); AND BEGAN A STABILIZED DSCNT TO AN MDA OF 830 FT; AS PER CANPA PROCS. AT APPROX 1100 FT MSL (900 FT AGL) WE BROKE OUT OF THE CLOUDS. AT THIS POINT I BRIEFLY LOOKED UP AND MENTALLY NOTED THAT WE HAD NEITHER THE RWY NOR THE ARPT ENVIRONMENT IN SIGHT. WE CONTINUED ON DOWN TO THE MDA (830 FT) AND AS THE ACFT ANNOUNCED 'MINIMUMS' I SIMULTANEOUSLY LOOKED UP AND ASKED THE CAPT IF HE HAD THE RWY. HE HESITATED FOR ABOUT 2 SECONDS AND THEN REPLIED 'YES; IT'S RIGHT THERE' AS HE POINTED TO WHERE IT WAS. ALTHOUGH IT WAS A BIT HAZY (3 NM VISIBILITY; WHICH IS ABOUT HOW FAR WE WERE FROM THE RWY); I CONCURRED THAT THAT WAS INDEED THE RWY AND CONTINUED THE DSCNT TOWARD THE RWY. APPROX 5 SECONDS LATER; THE TWR CTLR ANNOUNCED 'ALT ALERT; ACR X; CHK ALT.' THE CAPT ANNOUNCED THAT WE WERE IN THE CLR AND THAT WE WERE LEVELING OFF. AT THIS POINT I WAS A BIT SURPRISED THAT WE HAD RECEIVED SUCH AN ALERT AND REMEMBER SPECIFICALLY NOTING THAT THE SNOWFLAKE WAS EXACTLY CTRED AND THAT WE WERE AT A COMFORTABLE DISTANCE ABOVE ANY OF THE SURROUNDING TERRAIN. THE CAPT SUGGESTED THAT WE LEVEL OFF FOR A BIT TO WHICH I CONCURRED AND CONFIGURED PITCH AND PWR ACCORDINGLY. IT WAS AT THIS POINT THAT THE PAPI CAME INTO VIEW (IT WAS NOT INITIALLY DUE TO THE HAZY CONDITIONS); AND SHOWED 4 RED. AS WE COULD CLRLY SEE THE RWY AND THE TERRAIN BTWN US AND THE RWY; I ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE APCH AND KEPT THE ACFT LEVEL UNTIL WE RECEIVED 2 WHITE AND 2 RED ON THE PAPI. THE REST OF THE APCH AND LNDG OCCURRED UNEVENTFULLY. AFTER LNDG; THE CAPT NOTED THAT NEITHER THE REIL NOR THE RWY LIGHTS WERE TURNED ON; EVEN THOUGH CONDITIONS WERE BELOW VFR WX MINIMUMS. THE TWR CTLR ASKED US FOR A PIREP TO WHICH THE CAPT REPLIED WE BROKE OUT AT 900 FT AND HAD A BIT OF DIFFICULTY SEEING THE RWY SINCE THE LIGHTS WEREN'T TURNED ON. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT AT NO TIME DURING THIS APCH DID WE RECEIVE ANY TYPE OF AURAL TERRAIN WARNING FROM THE GPWS. IN RETROSPECT; THIS EVENT OCCURRED PRIMARILY BECAUSE WE REACHED THE MDA SOONER THAN WE SHOULD HAVE. AFTERWARDS; I REMEMBERED THAT SOMEWHERE NEAR THE FAF AT ABOUT 1800 FT MSL; WE HAD A QUARTERING HEADWIND OF OVER 40 KTS. ALTHOUGH THE WIND ON THE GND WAS ONLY 10 KTS GUSTING TO 17 KTS; WE SHOULD HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT HOW THE 40 KTS WOULD AFFECT OUR GND SPD AND THUS OUR PLANNED DSCNT RATE. HAD WE DONE THIS; OUR DSCNT RATE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ONLY 500-600 FPM; WHICH WOULD HAVE PUT US AT THE MDA (830 FT) AT A POINT WHICH WAS CLOSER TO THE RWY; THUS MAKING IT EASIER FOR US TO SEE THE RWY ONCE WE REACHED THAT POINT. ADDITIONALLY; HAD THE RWY LIGHTS AND REIL BEEN TURNED ON; AND HAD THE PAPI BEEN TURNED UP BRIGHTER; WE MIGHT HAVE IDENTED THE RWY AND PAPI SOONER AND THUS COULD HAVE LEVELED THE ACFT PRIOR TO THE TWR CTLR'S ALT ALERT. ADDITIONALLY; BECAUSE IT WAS HAZY; THE PERCEIVED SLOPE TO THE RWY WAS DISTORTED; CAUSING US TO THINK THAT WE WERE ON THE CORRECT GLIDEPATH; WHEN IN FACT WE WERE LOW. ALTHOUGH I DID NOT SPECIFICALLY FOLLOW THE SNOWFLAKE AFTER HAVING REACHED THE MDA; I DO THINK THAT THE FACT THAT WE WERE ON THE SNOWFLAKE WHEN WE RECEIVED THE ALT ALERT MADE THE SITUATION ALL THE MORE CONFUSING; AS WE WERE GETTING CONFLICTING PIECES OF INFO. THIS TYPE OF SITUATION COULD BE PREVENTED IF WE HAD CORRECTLY CALCULATED THE APPROPRIATE DSCNT RATE FOR THIS CANPA APCH.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.