MD11 CAPTAIN REPORTS GEN #3 NOT COMING ON LINE AFTER ENGINE START. MAINTENANCE IS CONSULTED AND THE FLIGHT DEPARTS WITHOUT DISCONNECTING THE IDG AS MEL COMPLIANCE WOULD REQUIRE.

Date: 2008-11 · Aircraft: MD-11 · Phase: taxi

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-less-severe|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-mel-cdl

Synopsis

MD11 CAPTAIN REPORTS GEN #3 NOT COMING ON LINE AFTER ENGINE START. MAINTENANCE IS CONSULTED AND THE FLIGHT DEPARTS WITHOUT DISCONNECTING THE IDG AS MEL COMPLIANCE WOULD REQUIRE.

Narrative

AFTER PUSHBACK AND ENG START; GOT A 'GEN 3 OFF' LEVEL ONE ALERT. GEN 3 ELECTRIC SYNOPTIC SHOWED GEN 3 WITH NORMAL VOLTS AND FREQS; BUT DISCONNECTED FROM THE BUS. COMPLIED WITH THE QRH. 1 GENERATOR RESET ATTEMPT. GEN 3 REMAINED OFF LINE. SPOKE WITH MAINT AND LOOKED THROUGH THE MEL. QRH PROC LED ME (THE CAPT) TO BELIEVE THAT WE WERE DONE WITH THE EVENT (QRH SAYS: 'IF RESET ATTEMPT IS NOT SUCCESSFUL; CONTINUE FLT WITH GENERATOR INOP.') FO AND I COULDN'T FIND MEL THAT EXACTLY CORRESPONDED TO WHAT WE WERE SEEING. WE SPOKE WITH MAINT AND CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT WE WOULD WRITE UP THE PROB AND WERE GOOD TO GO. WX CONSIDERATIONS WERE MADE; TAKING INTO ACCOUNT DEGRADED APCH CAPABILITY DUE TO 2 VERSUS 3 GENERATOR OPS (WX NOT A FACTOR; WELL ABOVE CAT I MINS). UNFORTUNATELY; I LET MYSELF BE MISLED BY THE DIFFERENCES IN WORDING BTWN THE QRH AND THE MEL; AS WELL AS BOTTOM-LINE RUSHING TO RESOLVE THE PROB AND CONTINUE OUR TAXI FROM THE RAMP. IN RETROSPECT; I CLRLY MADE AN ERROR. THE APPROPRIATE MEL; WHILE SOMEWHAT AMBIGUOUS; DOES DIRECT US TO DISCONNECT THE GENERATOR. I FOUND THE MEL TITLE SOMEWHAT CONFUSING WHEN COMPARED TO THE ALERT WHICH IS TITLED INTEGRATED DRIVE GENERATORS VERSUS GEN OFF. ADDITIONALLY; THE TEXT OF THE MEL CONTAINS THE PARAGRAPH 'CONFIRM WITH MAINT THAT IDG SHOULD BE DISCONNECTED.' THIS SEEMS TO SUGGEST THAT THERE IS LEEWAY AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE IDG MUST BE DISCONNECTED; WHEN THE REST OF THE MEL SUGGESTS THAT IT IS NOT AN OPTION. I SAY IN RETROSPECT; BECAUSE IT SEEMED AT THE TIME THAT WE WERE NOT REQUIRED TO DISCONNECT IT AFTER CONSULTATION WITH MAINT. BESIDES OUR OWN HUMAN FACTORS THAT PREVENTED US FROM COMING TO THE CORRECT CONCLUSION; I THINK THAT IF THE MEL WORDING MORE CLOSELY MATCHED THE WORDING OF THE QRH AND THE ALERTS PRESENTED ON THE SYS DISPLAY DU; FINDING THE CORRECT MEL WOULD BE MORE CERTAIN. I ABSOLUTELY UNDERSTAND THE RELATIONSHIP AND APPLICABILITY OF THE QRH AND THE MEL; UNFORTUNATELY; I MISAPPLIED THE INFO THAT I SAW. WE HAD NO FURTHER PROBS WITH THE ACFT DURING FLT AND GEN 3 SEEMS TO BE A RECURRENT PROB WITH THAT PLANE. THE FO AND I WERE BOTH TIRED. I HAD BEEN FLYING ALL WEEK AND HAD FLIPPED MY CIRCADIAN RHYTHMS AND SLEEP TIMES SEVERAL TIMES IN THE PAST WEEK. I WAS AVERAGING 5 HRS OF INTERRUPTED SLEEP ALL WEEK. WHILE I FELT 'CAPABLE' OF FLYING; I WAS VERY TIRED. COMBINED WITH SELF INDUCED PRESSURE TO GET OUT OF ZZZ2'S GND'S TFC AND TIGHT FUEL LOADS AT LNDG; I LET MYSELF MAKE WHAT IS NOW OBVIOUSLY A HASTY DECISION. WE SHOULD HAVE PULLED BACK INTO THE GATE; LET MAINT RESOLVE THE GENERATOR MEL; PUT ON AN EXTRA 1000 LBS OF FUEL; AND THEN CONTINUED TO OUR DEST.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.