ABQ Controller voiced concern regarding multiple and inaccurate runway distance briefings resulting from lead-in light installation projects and other airport construction projects; alleging safety is being compromised.
Synopsis
ABQ Controller voiced concern regarding multiple and inaccurate runway distance briefings resulting from lead-in light installation projects and other airport construction projects; alleging safety is being compromised.
Narrative
We were notified by Management in February that the first 1;500 FT of Runway 8 and the last 1;500 FT of Runway 26 would be closed in February for lead-in light installation. 1) We were briefed that departures on Runway 8 would be from Taxiway A3. This is in the closed 1;500 FT of the runway. Numerous Controllers informed management that the departures would be from a closed portion of the runway. Management talked with the Airport Manager and we were then briefed that only 1;000 FT of the approach end of Runway 8 would be closed; so the Runway 8 departures would be legal. For Runway 26; the last 1;500 FT is still closed. 2) After we were briefed that the first 1;000 FT of Runway 8 would be closed; the briefing item had a pen and ink change made to show 1;350 FT. This was done after many of us had initialed the briefing item. After the closure; the SIA showed 1;250 FT closed. It took until the 5th day after the runway closure for another briefing to be issued with the correct distance of 1;250 FT. 3) Aircraft landing Runway 26 are turning off the runway at Taxiways A2 and A3; which are in the closed portion of the runway. Some are told to expect these taxiways while they are airborne. The closed portion is available for taxiing aircraft. However; the landing aircraft are not being asked to report taxi speed before entering the closed portion. I feel this is in violation of regulations and a potential safety issue. 4) Taxiway C and a portion of Taxiway A on the terminal ramp have been closed for construction since the first of the year. The new closure forces some aircraft to cross active runways 2-3 times; when they should not have to cross any. Our Management advised us that FAA Airports Division forced the airport into doing this before the other construction was completed. We were told that the Airports Division did not care about any safety implications from the added closure; that the lead-in light project had to be done immediately. While the lead-in lights are needed; a 6-8 week delay until other construction was completed would have been much safer. It appears that neither Albuquerque Airport Management nor our own FAA Management had the courage to challenge the FAA Airports Division about the increased workload; numerous additional runway crossings; and overall safety issues this has created.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.