Commercial transport flight crew flew a minimally briefed NDB approach that resulted in a go-around; because of high wings and unfamiliarity with the procedure.

Narrative

Let me begin by telling you the background situation that occurred prior to the NDB approach. We arrived at the airport to begin our day. When I arrived; I was introduced to a must ride jumpseater; a dispatcher. The operations people had weight and balance problems because we had a crew of 3--1 and only 2 passengers. We also had to wait for the fuel truck. We finally got everything figured out and departed 20 minutes late. The First Officer was the pilot flying so when I completed the descent check; I advised the arrival station that we had a must ride jumpseater and to call Load Planning to start working the numbers to calculate how much ballast we would need. Upon arrival; we again encountered further problems and an additional delay due to weight and balance. ATC cleared us direct ZZZ. I was the pilot not flying. I got the ATIS and the surface winds were 210 degrees at 7 KTS. We planned to do the LOC Back Course 19. I told ATC we had the weather and would like the LOC Back Course 19. They told me to expect that approach. We were ready to get our initial vector for the approach when the Controller told us that the LOC had just gone down and was out of service. I remembered the NOTAMS from the previous day saying that the LOC was out of service but today it was back up and there was no NOTAM of it being out of service. The Controller asked us what our intentions were and I told him to stand by. I looked at all the other approaches into ZZZ. There was an NDB and a GPS. The NDB 1 was our only option. I had the First Officer check to make sure we could do this after I calculated the tailwind component using the chart. It was a 6 KT tailwind component. We determined this was acceptable and informed ATC that we would like the NDB 1 approach. ATC cleared us directly to NDB and said 'Descend and maintain 3;100 FT until established; cleared NDB 1 approach.' We were not ready for the approach; as we had planned the LOC Back Course 19; so we decided to hold at the NDB to get set up (approach brief; checklists; 3;100 FT). The First Officer wanted to use the FMS to navigate to the NDB; but I felt since we were in the approach phase and not authorized to use the FMS for approaches we should just navigate via the RMI. I told him to use the RMI. In hindsight; I believe this command may have confused him; although he did not say anything at the time. We began tracking to the NDB which was not easy given the fact that the wind at 3;100 FT was out of the southwest at approximately 70 KTS. (I do not remember the exact velocity; but we had a very strong wind.) I tried to help him track; as initially it appeared to me that we were homing. We flew to the NDB; entered a hold; and completed our checklists. We had a very large wind correction angle just to stay in the hold and stay within the 10 miles of protected airspace. We then proceeded outbound on the approach again we had a very big wind correction angle. We turned the procedure turn outbound and then when we turned procedure turn inbound we had a 70 KT quartering tailwind. I advised the First Officer of this and told him things were going to happen fast. By the time we completed the procedure turn inbound we had been blown through the course and turned to re-intercept our inbound course. We got reestablished inbound and continued the approach. Upon reaching the MDA; there was a cloud deck and we were still IMC. We executed the published missed approach and went and held at the ZZZ VOR. I notified ATC that we were missed approach and entering the hold. They said advised what our intentions were; and I told them I would get back to them. I notified Dispatch that we were missed approach and holding and proceeded to run the fuel numbers with them. We hold 3;000 LBS of fuel and time to determine our next plan. While in the hold; another aircraft was attempting the NDB 1. They gave us a PIREP that they encountered a cloud deck at 900 FT and then went down to the MDA 700 FT and broke out. With the winds being so strong; the cloud deck was moving rapidly. I spoke with the First Officer about the wind on the NDB approach and how we must anticipate the corrections. I considered taking the plane and flying the approach myself; however; I believe that would have been a huge distraction for the First Officer having me take the plane from him; especially in front of a jumpseater. I believe; had I taken the plane; the First Officer may have mentally shut down and then I would have been single pilot. Instead; I decided to talk him through every aspect of the approach. We completed the approach; the cloud deck had moved out and we landed without further event. We picked up several more passengers in ZZZ and again had the same previous problems with weight and balance and fuel. Our departure station had fueled us through ZZZ1 with 3;500 LBS of fuel but after 2 holds and 2 approaches we landed in ZZZ with 2;600 LBS of fuel and our release for ZZZ-ZZZ1 required 3;200 LBS. We again waited 20 minutes for fuel. We finally departed ZZZ at XC20L instead of the XA40 scheduled departure. We arrived in ZZZ at XB48L without further event. Supplemental information from ACN 823492: This would be my first experience with someone in the jumpseat. I realize that he was only a Dispatcher observing the flight; but I feel that having his presence on the flight deck added an element to this scenario that made it more difficult than it needed to be.