Dispatcher related his discomfort with the pressures from his managers to dispatch a flight to EWR intended to land on Runway 29 with heavy winds and wind shear warnings.

Narrative

The forecast for EWR was winds 270 degrees at 27 KTS gusting to 36 KTS and EWR was using Runway 29. Runway 29 was only 6502 FT for usable landing length and there was serious potential for LLWS and there were several AIRMETs out for turbulence; as well as a SIGMET for severe turbulence from 8;000 FT -surface which included EWR. I was not comfortable with dispatching a DC8 to EWR under these conditions. I did not feel it was safe to dispatch this flight. Yes; we do have performance data for EWR on the DC8 for Runway 29; but it would not have been a safe operation. However; I felt from the moment I stated I was uncomfortable dispatching this flight to EWR with these conditions; I received nothing but pressure to make this operation work. The initial response from the Supervisor on duty when I told him I was not 100% comfortable with dispatching this flight was; 'well the winds are right down the runway.' I even went so far as to call the DC8 fleet engineer to get his opinion on the Operation. After telling him the forecast weather and runway configuration at EWR; he stated he would not be comfortable operating a DC8 into EWR under those conditions. Although that was very useful information to me; it was still going to be the final decision of the Captain and Dispatcher as to whether or not the flight would operate. However; I don't think that even our managers understand FAR 121.533. When Mr. X did not like what he heard regarding my comfort level with dispatching this flight; his response was something to the effect of; 'we'll just wait and see what the Captain decides.' I immediately informed Mr. X that the decision was between the Captain and I; the Dispatcher. The DC8 Chief Pilot called me and stated he would be comfortable with operating this flight into EWR. First off; I am not sure who contacted him or told him to call me; but he then went on to say it's the Captain's decision. Again; company is conveying to me that there is only one person in the decision making process which directly contradicts FAR 121.533. After that; Mr. X proceeded to tell me that the fleet engineer I talked with; who told me he would not be comfortable operating the flight into EWR; now had changed his mind. Mr. X stated the fleet engineer did not hear me correctly about the runway length and he had 2 hearing aids and could not hear very well. Mr. X also said had the fleet engineer known it was a 6;502 FT runway length; he would have said he was comfortable operating this flight into EWR. This also contradicts what the fleet engineer told me as he stated he would not be comfortable with a runway length less than 7;000 FT. To me; this was just another one of the things that was said to get me to make this unsafe operation happen. Mr. X also told me he didn't see the problem with going since just the night before; we operated the DC8 with LLWS and occasional severe turbulence and lots of wind out of the west. I immediately informed him this is not a valid comparison since runway in ZZZ is over 1;000 FT longer than Runway 29 in EWR. Again; I felt right there Mr. X was trying to talk me into going to EWR in telling me that we ran the 'same' operation the night before and nothing happened. That kind of attitude is going to cause an accident and I think people need to take notice of my warning. And; it reminded me of the hundreds of videos I have seen about accidents and how they happened. After my conversations with Mr. X informing him that this decision was not his; the fleet engineer called me back and advised me he had changed his mind after talking with Mr. X. So; if the Dispatcher is supposed to be the point of contact for the Operation; can someone tell me why Mr. X is calling the SME without my knowledge? Also; it appeared to me that Mr. X somehow convinced the fleet engineer that this was a safe operation so therefore the fleet engineer changed his tune. I asked the SME why he now thought it was a safe operation and his answer was; 'I did not know this was a scheduled operation...I thought it was a hot flight.' So; now the fleet engineer thinks it's safe because it is a revenue flight and packages have to get to their destination? But if it was a hot flight it would not be safe to operate? I don't follow that logic. Again; this is just another example of people trying to now convince me that this would be a safe operation. Finally; I spoke with the Captain who agreed with me that it would not be a safe operation and we did not operate the flight to EWR. In the end; I felt very; very pressured to get this flight to operate. Mr. X even told me at one point that I said I was comfortable with operating the flight and so we would wait to see what the Captain had to say. Never did I say I was comfortable operating this flight and never in my nearly 8 years of dispatching have I felt so pressured to get the job done in an unsafe situation. This is a situation in my opinion that has to be addressed before an accident happens. The pressure to get the job done from Mr. X was too much...I felt it crossed the line. I just finished going through recurrent training seeing videos about LLWS and turbulence and showing that as causes of several plane crashes. I am sure that was legal to dispatch too but was it safe? Probably not. I was told several times by my Manager that this was a legal and safe operation. I feel the incident of February 2009 needs to be examined thoroughly so the pressure put on me as a Dispatcher by my supervisors or managers; does not cause an accident. If a Supervisor or a Manager is going to question a decision; ask questions! Do not tell me it is a safe operation; and do not tell me it is just the Captain's decision. I suggest that our managers read FAR 121.533 to make sure they understand who has joint authority over the safety of a flight. Also; this cannot be taken seriously enough. The people in our office not jointly responsible for the safe operation of a flight need to understand that in no way will pressure on the dispatchers or crews force me to compromise safety. They need to understand the seriousness of their actions and words when questioning us about issues with our flights.