DAB controller described inaccurate approach procedure information displayed in the control room.

Narrative

I issued an approach clearance for a PA-34 to proceed direct KESLR for the RNAV Runway 34 approach at DAB. The aircraft was observed navigating toward the fix. Shortly thereafter; the aircraft was observed deviating to the northeast; about 60 degrees off course. I quickly determined that the pilot was having some difficulty with navigating and began issuing instructions for an ASR approach to Runway 34. As a rule of thumb and safe operating habit; I looked up to the backlit overhead which contains various need-to-know information to verify the MDA which is 480 FT for that approach. Another Controller entered the TRACON to relieve me; and I asked him to set up the adjacent scope for that approach so that I could reference it. He also pulled the information for that approach up on the IDS 4 display. Prior to his arrival in the room; I had issued the MDA to the pilot. As I was issuing the instruction for the pilot to descend to the MDA of 480 FT; he observed that the IDS 4 indicated that the MDA was 580 FT. The pilot concurrently reported the field in sight and was instructed to proceed visually. However; upon further investigation; there was at least one other approach that had a different published MDA than what is currently displayed on the overhead charts. So; apparently there is no management control at DAB ATCT to review the published information every 56 days and correct all information sources accordingly. In addition; this is need-to-know information that should be briefed to the workforce. Fortunately; the chain of events allowed for a safe landing. There was and is a potential for loss of life and property until appropriate management controls are put in place to display the correct information.