NEAR COLLISION BETWEEN SMT AND SMA WHILE SMT WAS ON VISUAL APCH.

Date: 1988-03 · Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Recip Eng

Anomalies: conflict-nmac

Synopsis

NEAR COLLISION BETWEEN SMT AND SMA WHILE SMT WAS ON VISUAL APCH.

Narrative

INBOUND TO HHR ON AN IFR FLT PLAN FROM PSP; CLRED FOR (AND ACCEPTED) A VISUAL APCH TO HHR RWY 25 AT 1500'. VECTORED S OF THE HHR VOR APCH COURSE BY LAX APCH IN VERY HAZY AND MARGINAL VIS CONDITIONS. SUDDENLY WAS COMMANDED BY LAX APCH TO 'CLB IMMEDIATELY TO 2000! OPP DIRECTION TFC AT 12 O'CLOCK; LESS THAN 1 MI; TYPE AND ALT UNKNOWN.' INITIATED STRAIGHT AHEAD CLB AND OBSERVED TFC EMERGE FROM HAZE ABOUT 500' AHEAD; TO THE LEFT AND BELOW MY ACFT. SUBSEQUENTLY; APCH VECTORED ME E AT 2000'; BUT I WAS FORCED TO CLB TO 2200' TO AVOID NBOUND TFC AT OR NEAR 2000' WHICH WAS UNREPORTED. RETURNED TO 2000'; ACCEPTED; CLRED FOR AND EXECUTED THE VOR APCH TO HHR RWY 25. THE ENTIRE SITUATION WAS A CONSEQUENCE OF BAD JUDGEMENT ON THE PART OF LAX APCH FOR GIVING ME THE VISUAL APCH IN SUCH MARGINAL CONDITIONS; AND MY LESS-THAN-GOOD JUDGEMENT IN ACCEPTING IT. A SINGLE ENG SMA HAD; JUST BEFORE MY APCH; EXPERIENCED GREAT DIFFICULTY LOCATING THE ARPT AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE POOR VIS AND THE FACT THAT THE SUN WAS DIRECTLY IN THE EYES OF ALL ACFT APCHING FROM THE E. THE JUDGEMENT ERROR IN STIPULATING A VISUAL APCH WAS CAUSED; ACCORDING TO LAX TRACON'S SUPVR WITH WHOM I SPOKE BY TELEPHONE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE NEAR COLLISION; BY THEIR DESIRE TO MAXIMIZE TFC FLOW INTO LAX; AND THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE HHR VOR APCH BE INTERSPERSED WITH ARRIVING LAX ILS TFC. IN FACT; ALL APCHS TO LAX WERE FOR THE ILS APCHS. ADDITIONALLY; THE INEXCUSABLE DELAY IN REACTIVATING THE HHR LOC 25 APCH (THE LOC HAS BEEN OTS FOR ALMOST 8 MONTHS!) IS A DIRECT CAUSE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE VISUAL APCH BY LAX APCH; EVEN IN CONTINUING MARGINAL CONDITIONS: ON 3/TUE; ONLY 48 HRS LATER; WITH VIS RPTED AS 5 MI; BUT WITH CONDITIONS VIRTUALLY THE SAME; I WAS AGAIN GIVEN A VISUAL TO HHR 25! THIS TIME I REFUSED TO ACCEPT IT AND REQUESTED AND WAS GIVEN THE VOR APCH AFTER A MINOR DELAY. I WAS; HOWEVER; PRESSURED BY APCH TO FLY THE APCH AT A HIGHER THAN NORMAL IAS. BOTH ON SAT; WHEN THE NEAR COLLISION OCCURRED; AND ON TUE; THE ARPT WAS SIGHTED AT A DISTANCE OF 2.0 MI; ACCORDING TO OUR LORAN C. HHR WAS RPTING VFR CONDITIONS IN BOTH INSTANCES; SO CLEARLY THE SUN WAS CAUSING THE REDUCED VIS. FINALLY; THE EXTREMELY POOR JUDGEMENT OF LAX APCH IN THE COURSE VECTOR MUST BE MENTIONED: WITH HHR VFR; USING RWY 25 AND A LEFT HAND PATTERN; ANY DOWNWIND DEP (THE COURSE BEING TAKEN BY THE ACFT WITH WHICH I NEARLY COLLIDED) WOULD PUT THAT ACFT S OF HHR; E OR SEBND; CLBING OUT OF PATTERN ALT. GIVING ME; AN INBOUND TO HHR; A COURSE S OF THE LAX 081 DEG R; AT 1500'; PUTS ME ON A NW COURSE; INTERSECTING WITH THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED E OR SEBND TFC. HAD I BEEN ON THE VOR APCH; HHR WOULD HAVE HAD TO HOLD ITS DEPARTING TFC ON THE GND; VECTOR IT AWAY FROM ME; OR ADVISE LAX APCH TO DO SO. THE SYS DID NOT WORK SIMPLY BECAUSE OF THE PRESSURE ON THE CTLR TO EXPEDITE ARRS AT LAX; AND THE MISTAKEN BELIEF THAT THEY COULD SQUEEZE ANOTHER VISUAL INTO HHR. THAT THIS ATTITUDE AND MINDSET STILL CONTINUES IS EVIDENCED BY THE REPETITION OF THE APCH INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED FROM LAX APCH ON TUE.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.