Jet departure from LAX to SMO described a very confused go-around event because of weather conditions and confused ATC instructions; reporter indicated clearer communications on their part may have prevented the event.
Synopsis
Jet departure from LAX to SMO described a very confused go-around event because of weather conditions and confused ATC instructions; reporter indicated clearer communications on their part may have prevented the event.
Narrative
We started with an arduous & lengthy taxi to our departure runway for a quick reposition flight to SMO only to last 15 minutes. With the weather reports provided by the company & available on ATIS; the SMO METARS showed no signs of concern; not even hinting the need for an IMC published missed approach. SMO ATIS indicated 6sm visibility in Haze. Shortly after takeoff from LAX; I gave a listen to the ATIS frequency one more time as part of the 'Short Segment' list of duties. It showed the data indicated above. With a few more keystrokes on the FMS & the setting of the landing speeds in the MFD; the 'Short Segment' checklist was completed. We were vectored to intercept the final approach course of the VOR or GPS-A for Runway 21 at SMO. Upon checking into tower frequency; we were cleared to land on Runway 21; but we were assigned to report the runway in sight. On the final segment of the approach before reaching MDA (just prior to the MAP); we saw the runway & began an aggressive descent (fully configured & stabilized). At approximately 1 to 2 miles out; I reported 'RUNWAY INSIGHT' as required by the SMO Tower Controller. Noteworthy: the ceiling & visibility was less than the VMC conditions advertised on the ATIS. When the descent became too aggressive to satisfy company SOPs; I called 'GO AROUND' & we executed the go-around. When I announced 'WE ARE GOING AROUND'; SMO Tower assigned us left-closed traffic 'with a tight turn south of the field' which inferred visual procedures. However; I replied; 'We are unable to make left traffic because we are IMC.' The SMO Tower controller reiterated 'make a tight pattern south of the field' followed by multiple traffic advisories to which I quickly replied 'we are now above the cloud layer; we are unable to maintain VMC; We need a frequency change to approach control for vectors back around for another go.' The Controller on SMO local tower position became frantic with heading & altitude instructions followed by anxious words like 'NOW' & 'IMMEDIATELY'. It appeared as if we were being radar vectored around close proximity traffic. Being a former tower controller myself; I did not feel comfortable with radar separation being provided by a VFR tower controller. Therefore; I reiterated the need to re-establish radio contact with 'SO-CAL APPROACH' for radar vectors at another go at the VOR or GPS-A. After little more radio volleying; we were handed back to SO-CAL Approach. I asked SO-CAL Approach for 'ALTERNATE MISSED APPROACH INSTRUCTIONS'...to which the controller responded 'JUST EXECUTE THE PUBLISHED MISSED'. I explained to her the conflicting VFR circle instructions given by SMO Tower earlier; but the SO-CAL Controller reassured us IFR separation/protection for the published missed approach procedure should we need it again. We were subject to the same sequence of radar services; but this time to a normal approach to landing on Runway 21 at SMO with the same Tower Controller (this time demonstrating a more professional prowess and radio etiquette. We landed safely. Perhaps if I would have told SMO tower that 'WE ARE EXECUTING THE PUBLISHED MISSED APPROACH' we would have been received a little easier by the frazzled tower controller. We were planning to be in VMC for the approach so 'visual calls' were briefed. When the unlikely need for the go-around arose due to the late sighting of the runway; my 'GO-AROUND' call could have been amended with 'EXECUTE PUBLISHED MISSED APPROACH'. Maybe a calculated VDP would have helped with planning the final approach. In all honesty; we were not ready for the missed approach...despite being fully configured & stabilized up to the final descent point.
Second reporter narrative
1) We could have prepared more on the ground at LAX; but were lulled into thinking we would have more time to prepare for the approach due to the routing plugged into the FMS. 2) The weather at SMO was NOT as advertised; so we both believed we would be shooting a visual approach. 3) The Tower Controller was not planning for a worst case scenario; and was completely caught off guard when we had to go missed approach. 4) Improper phraseology was used when she told us to 'circle south'. I was not 100% sure what she was asking us to do. Did she just want us to circle (hold) until she worked things out; or did she want us to enter a left downwind?
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.