An air carrier flight crew rejected their takeoff when they noticed the #1 start valve had opened early in the roll.

Narrative

This problem arose when an engine start valve failed to operate and a logbook/maintenance procedure was overlooked by myself; my crew; line maintenance and dispatch. A number of maintenance issues; both ongoing and new; were a distraction on this flight. Primarily; the APU was inoperative which created a hot cockpit; unstable/intermittent external power supply and minimal pneumatics for our pre-flight and initial engine start. To facilitate the APU inoperative start; we had to start an engine at the gate using external power; pneumatics and air conditioning; transfer same to ship's sources; and then pushback onto an active taxiway to cross-bleed start the remaining engines. And this ramp limits engine operations at the gate to 5 minutes max. Engine #1 was selected to start first; but the start valve failed to operate. (No rotation with start valve open). I discussed this abnormal with the crew and line maintenance and decided to start engine #4 first instead; thinking that the #1 engine may start normally on ship's power and pneumatics. At this point; I should have stopped the departure process; entered the faulty starter in the logbook and given the aircraft to maintenance instead of trouble-shooting the malfunction. Engine #1 was eventually started using a manual start valve override procedure. This was coordinated with maintenance and dispatch to amend our release. Unfortunately; I had directed my 'team' toward the wrong goal line and an incident ensued: upon application of takeoff power; the #1 start valve indicated that it opened. Knowing that an open start valve could lead to an engine fire and/or failure; I aborted the takeoff. The abort was initiated in a low speed regime at approximately 90 KIAS on a long; dry runway and we returned to the gate after having fire and rescue inspect our main tires for damage and brakes for overheat. This event would have been avoided if the APU had been operative for departure. Other opportunities to prevent this incident were human performance issues; including: 1) closer adherence to SOP when the starter failed the first time; 2) more attention to and scrutiny of the MEL with respect to the deferral of an inoperative start valve; and 3) the perception that we the crew; dispatch; and both line maintenance and Maintenance Control were in the loop and in concurrence with my decisions. At no time did myself or my crew intentionally deviate from SOP or any maintenance procedure.