A319 First Officer selected a positive vertical speed on the MCP when issued a descent clearance and error went unnoticed by both crewmembers while approach briefing was given. Aircraft climbed 1300 FT before both crew and ZLA noticed the error.
Synopsis
A319 First Officer selected a positive vertical speed on the MCP when issued a descent clearance and error went unnoticed by both crewmembers while approach briefing was given. Aircraft climbed 1300 FT before both crew and ZLA noticed the error.
Narrative
We had been issued a descent from FL380 to FL370 for the arrival. I was the pilot flying. While level at FL370; I was preparing to brief the approach when we were issued a descent to FL340 and a turn 30 degrees right for spacing. I selected the heading; set the altitude to 34000 and selected 1000 FPM vertical speed on the flight control unit (FCU). I then stated 'vertical speed 1000; heading; 340' while looking at the flight mode annunciator (FMA) and pointing to the primary flight display (PFD) altitude indicator. The Captain confirmed the altitude selection by stating '340' and pointing to his PFD. As the aircraft began to turn I transferred control of the aircraft to the Captain and began the approach brief. During the brief; I noticed the vertical speed display on the PFD was indicating a 1000 FPM climb just as the center controller asked us if we were descending to FL340. We were climbing through FL380 when I disconnected the autopilot and initiated a descent. I had inadvertently selected a 1000 FPM climb instead of a 1000 FPM descent on the FCU (FCU Selection Error). I had not verified the aircraft was descending prior to transferring control to brief the approach; trusting the Captain to monitor the descent as the pilot flying (Poor Timing of Flight Duties; Improper Monitoring of the Automation). When I transferred control to the Captain; my focus was on briefing the approach rather than monitoring the aircraft (Poor Monitoring). We were given a phone number to call on arrival. The Captain was told there was an altitude deviation of 1300 FT and a conflict with another aircraft of 4.5 NM lateral distance and 600 FT vertical distance. Our courses were diverging; so the TCAS did not issue a traffic or resolution advisory. We were unaware of the conflict with the other aircraft when the deviation occurred.One of the first things I noticed when I transitioned from the Boeing 737 to the Airbus 319 was the lack of visual indications on the flight deck of what the aircraft was doing. Specifically; the thrust levers do not move when the engines accelerate or decelerate and the side-stick does not move when the aircraft turns; climbs; or descends. It took a while to adjust to that and I have not given it much thought since. Perhaps that's why I did not 'sense' the aircraft was climbing while I was briefing the approach. I followed procedure in setting and verifying the altitude change. I made the standard callouts of the FMA mode changes. I verbally transferred control of the aircraft to the Captain and he acknowledged control of the aircraft. So; how did I overlook the vertical speed selection error? Maybe; after thousands of mode selection inputs on the FCU; I was accustomed to the aircraft doing what I expected it to do. In the future; I will verify all FCU inputs are correct and solicit confirmation of the setting from the pilot monitoring. I will insure a correct input via the FMA. I will make sure the aircraft is doing what I intended before I divert my attention to another task. In addition; I will be vigilant when transferring control of the aircraft. When I transfer control; I understand that I become the pilot monitoring and that briefing an approach is secondary to the role of monitoring the aircraft. When I accept control; I will monitor the automation and confirm the aircraft is doing what it should. I am committed to incorporate these procedures in my daily routine and feel that I am a better crewmember as a result of this deviation.
Second reporter narrative
In the years I have been on this aircraft I have never seen this mistake; even during IOE. I admit that I have gotten a little complacent with the PFD callouts after having made thousands of them. I cross checked that the proper altitude was set and that vertical speed had indeed been selected but did not look at the fine detail of that rate being positive or negative. Similarly on takeoff; with a flex power setting; most if not all pilots confirm 'Man Flex' but do not confirm the flex temperature displayed. In the instance of this altitude deviation; if the altitude change had been requested before or after the brief had taken place we would have immediately noticed the mistake because we would have been in the 'monitoring mode' instead of having immediately diverted our attention elsewhere. Of course; we need to be alert to possible mistakes at all times and if we confirm the actual rate along with the descent mode we can catch a mistake even if it happens only once in a great while.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.