B767 flight crew diverted from NAT TRACK without clearance and without changing altitudes for medical emergency. The First Officer advocated descending 500 FT in compliance with the Atlantic 1/2 diversion panel.
Synopsis
B767 flight crew diverted from NAT TRACK without clearance and without changing altitudes for medical emergency. The First Officer advocated descending 500 FT in compliance with the Atlantic 1/2 diversion panel.
Narrative
About an hour after departure we requested our Oceanic Clearance via ACARS. Shortly thereafter we received clearance on NAT C at FL350. Oceanic entry was normal. The first indication that we had that anything was amiss was a phone call from the relief pilot; from the cabin. He alerted us to a possible medical situation with a passenger in the cabin. We then contacted the Purser and got preliminary information that there was a younger male passenger complaining of great pain and swelling in his legs. At this time I directed the First Officer to monitor the service interphone for further information from the Purser. I contacted Dispatch and asked for a 3 way with MD. Shortly thereafter communications was established via SATCOM with dispatch and MD. The Relief Pilot re-entered the cockpit. Further information was received from the cabin that the swelling was increasing; and the passenger could no longer move his toes. This was relayed to MD; and at this time MD stated that in his opinion the passenger needed to be taken to the nearest suitable airport. Discussion between the flight crew and Dispatch agreed that ZZZZ was the nearest suitable airport; and dispatch agreed to start working on ground facilitation. I contacted Gander and declared a medical emergency stating we would be making a right turn direct and maintaining FL350. Gander instructed us to report 60N; which was the northern boundary of the NAT Tracks; Track A. At the time of the turn to ZZZZ; we were at 58N; on Track C; about 31W. First Officer was still on service interphone with the cabin. Before starting the turn to ZZZZ; I made a blind transmission informing other aircraft of our emergency and intended diversion; and asked for all positions and altitudes. We received several replies; and I was able to determine there were no traffic conflicts at FL350 and initiated the right turn off NAT C to ZZZZ. F/O advocated a descent to FL34.5. I considered this; but decided that since there was a report of an aircraft at FL340 and none at FL 350; maintaining FL 350 would be the safest course of action. By this time; First Officer was back in the loop on air to air; and I was in discussion with the Purser; who was now in the cockpit. First Officer informed me that there was another crew; on VHF common; that was strongly suggesting that we initiate a descent to below the NAT Tracks. I firmly believe that would have been the worst thing we could have done and compromised safety; inasmuch as we still had to cross NAT B and NAT A; and there was much traffic behind and below. I reported 60N to Gander; clear of the NAT Tracks. About 300 NM from ZZZZ I contacted center; made a position report; and stated our emergency. He was expecting us; as he had been alerted by Gander. Center issued us an ATC clearance direct ZZZZ; maintain FL350. Shortly thereafter; we were in radar contact. We had to take a delay vector and dirty up early in the pattern at ZZZZ to get below maximum landing weight. First Officer made an uneventful landing in good VMC conditions. The passenger was deplaned in ZZZZ. We were on the ground a short time for servicing; then made an uneventful departure. In closing I would like to add one statement. We spend much time in training on how to depart the NAT Tracks during an engine-out situation with drift down; and the procedure is pretty cut and dried. Little to no discussion is given to departing the NAT Tracks with a perfectly good flying airplane; yet medical emergencies are our greatest cause of oceanic diversions. I firmly believe our crew executed the diversion in the safest possible manner!
Second reporter narrative
I was about 10 minutes from finishing my break when I heard the flight attendants twice make PA's asking for any medical personnel on board. I got up and started to inquire about the situation. No one knew any details and could not tell me if the cockpit had been informed. I then called the cockpit from the mid galley and asked the captain if they were aware of what was transpiring in the cabin and he responded with a very surprised 'no we're not'. I relayed what little info I had obtained. The captain asked me to stay in the back and obtain more details while he contacted dispatch. It had been at least 10 to 15 mins since the event had started and the cockpit had not been informed. There were no medical personnel onboard except a medical student. I spent the next 15 minutes or so assessing and relaying the condition of the ill passenger to the first officer via the mid cabin interphone. They had contacted and were talking to the on call physician through Satcom. I was told to get the passenger's blood pressure; heart rate; and see if there was a pulse in his ankles. As I went back once again to the passenger I felt the airplane turning. After receiving the requested info from our medical student helper I once again called the cockpit from the mid galley. I relayed the info to the first officer. She informed me that we were diverting and to come back up to the cockpit. Upon entering both pilots were very busy and could not immediately brief me. The Captain was talking to ATC on VHF 1 and the First Officer was broadcasting on 123.45 on VHF 2. We were at FL 350 proceeding direct. I was able to pick up that we had a clearance and were waiting to get in radar contact with Center. We proceeded to ZZZZ without incident. On the leg from ZZZZ during the First Officer's break the Captain and I had a discussion about the divert. I commented that the book says we are supposed to change altitude. He once again supported his decision to stay at FL350 for the previously stated reasons. During the Captain's subsequent break the First Officer and I also discussed the divert. She once again stated that she had advocated changing altitude and the Captain did not want to. I told her that I would have advocated changing altitude also. I asked her how they had obtained clearance to leave track C and she responded that originally they were not able to.The Captain had decided to divert after his discussion with the physician. He had reached up and put her in heading select and turned her to towards ZZZZ; while he broadcast their intentions and worked on a clearance. Had I known this; I would have told the Captain that I might have waited for a clearance before leaving Track C when he asked me what I would have done differently.
More incidents for this aircraft family →
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.