A C560 and a towplane and glider experienced a ground conflict at an uncontrolled airport.
Synopsis
A C560 and a towplane and glider experienced a ground conflict at an uncontrolled airport.
Narrative
It was a nice clear morning at TRK airport. Pilot Not Flying announced on the UNICOM frequency that we were leaving the ramp and taxiing to Runway 28 for departure. There were glider operations departing Runway 19 and landing Runway 01. All other aircraft were landing/departing Runway 28. Winds were calm. On taxiway 'A'; as we were approaching the Runway 19 intersection; the Pilot Not Flying called out the right side was clear of traffic. I observed and announced to the Pilot Not Flying that there was a tow plane and glider on my side stopped at the end of the runway. The PIC made another announcement on the UNICOM that we were approaching and would be crossing Runway 19 enroute to Runway 28. The tow plane pilot did not reply on UNICOM. I observed that the glider wingtip was resting on the runway indicating that they were not moving. It appeared they were just staging for departure. They were more than a half mile away from the intersection. I decided it was safe to cross the runway. Just as we were crossing the hold short line for Runway 19 ; the tow plane pilot began his takeoff roll and for the first time we heard him on the radio. He asked 'what are you doing? ' adding that 'he was departing and we should stop'. At the same time the Pilot Not Flying was saying 'go;go; go'. Stopping at that point was not a safe option. I concurred with the Pilot Not Flying that it was best to continue across the runway; which we did. This action provided much more separation between aircraft than if I would have stopped. I later noticed that the tow plane and glider became airborne about halfway between the takeoff position of Runway 19 and the intersection of taxiway 'A'. At that time we were approximately 1;000 feet past the intersection of Runway 19 and taxiway 'A'.The tow plane pilot; however; was very upset and unprofessional on the radio. According to him; we were entirely at fault. Neither I nor the Pilot Not Flying heard a takeoff announcement from the tow plane pilot. I had the tow plane and glider in sight; approximately 3;000 feet away. They did not appear to be moving; I decided it was safe to cross the runway. At no time did I feel the safety of our passengers; my fellow crew member; our aircraft or the other aircraft was in jeopardy. Had we stopped when the tow plane pilot started yelling to 'stop' the separation distance would have then been critical. In hindsight; I could have stopped the the aircraft on the taxiway and tried to establish direct radio contact with the tow plane pilot to verify his intentions. However; because of his distance away; from the intersection; I did not deem it necessary. I am certain that the tow plane pilot did not power up for takeoff until after we had announced we would be crossing Runway 19. Perhaps he did not hear our call; otherwise he could have also verified our intentions. Either way; TRK is an uncontrolled airport. Pilots are not required to have a radio or to report their intentions. It is a see and avoid environment. The intersection is designated as Hot Spot 1 on the airport diagram; with a note that pilots departing Runway 28 can not see aircraft departing Runway 19. Therefore; perhaps simultaneous departures off Runway 28 and Runway 19 should be prohibited; particularly since aircraft radios are not even required. Even when radios are used; it is obvious that everyone's intentions are not always understood. Fortunately in our case; when eastbound on taxiway 'A' you do have visual reference to Runway 19. I was able to see and avoid the other aircraft. It would be a much safer airport if everyone used same the runway. The tow plane and gliders were departing Runway 19; then landing on Runway 01 to facilitate their operations. All of the other traffic were using the longer Runway 28 for both departures and landings.
Second reporter narrative
At first the Pilot Flying seemed startled and possibly confused and actually slowed down the aircraft on the runway. He may have done this in response to the voice on the radio saying 'stop; stop; stop'. Since we were already partially on the runway; and the conflicting traffic was still somewhat far away and moving slowly. I say to him in a loud and clear voice; 'Go! Go! Go! - he's taking off!'. He then added power and we taxied clear of the runway.After we arrived at our destination; the Pilot Flying and I talked the matter over. I have to admit that I was angry with him. He flat out admitted that he saw the tow plane and glider on Runway 19 but continued to taxi across. With my head turned to the south; away from the conflict; I did not realize that there was a runway incursion occurring before it was too late to do anything other than power up and get across Runway 19. I found his explanation to be informative and I began to realize that the fault was not all ours. The First Officer stated that when he first saw the tow plane and glider; they were stationary on Runway 19 and the glider appeared to have a wingtip resting on the runway. At this point we were still approaching the intersection; my head was turned to the south and I had yet to make a radio call. Understand that the tow plane and glider appeared to be at the beginning of Runway 19; near the threshold and this is approximately 3;000 feet away from the intersection. So for the Pilot Flying it would be hard to make an exact judgment on whether they were moving or not. He stated to me that he did not think they were taking off or about to. He felt that there was no safety issue and that is why he continued to taxi across Runway 19. Although I found the explanation acceptable; I still believe that we should have held short of Runway 19 until we could ascertain the intentions of the tow plane pilot. So for this reason we are somewhat at fault. I do not believe that we are totally to blame. The fact is that it is an uncontrolled field. It is not unusual for the glider operators to push a glider into position onto the runway and then hook up to the tow plane. All of which is time consuming affair. I can see how the Pilot Flying must have thought that they were still in the process of hooking the glider to the tow plane. I do have a commercial pilot certificate; glider privileges. Although not current; I know that the tow plane does not taxi from the ramp to the runway with the glider attached. The gliders are pushed into position and then attached to the tow plane. So I have no problem believing that the First Officer thought they were not ready to take off and were hooking up. Also; as stated above; I believe that the tow pilot had the obligation to not begin his takeoff roll until he was certain we were going to hold short of his runway. We could clearly see him from our position and there is no doubt in my mind that he could see us taxiing. After all; our jet must stick out like a sore thumb at TRK since this airport is mostly used for light general aviation activities.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.