A C680 flight crew failed to program the FLUKY transition when cleared via the TERPZ1 SID from BWI. ATC alerted them to their track deviation which would have taken them through the Washington DC FRZ.
Synopsis
A C680 flight crew failed to program the FLUKY transition when cleared via the TERPZ1 SID from BWI. ATC alerted them to their track deviation which would have taken them through the Washington DC FRZ.
Narrative
While flying the published TERPZ1 departure out of BWI; incorrect programming of the FMS resulted in the aircraft turning off of the departure route. Runway 28 and the TERPZ1 departure was loaded into the FMS prior to the departure but the departure transition was not loaded into the FMS properly. Because the transition was loaded incorrectly the result was the omission of 2 fixes beyond the initial departure fix 'TERPZ'. After passing TERPZ intersection; the aircraft began a turn toward 'FLUKY' which was our transition fix. The BWI Departure Controller immediately called and asked what our heading was and we responded we were turning toward 'FLUKY'. He responded to turn back to the right to a heading of 330 degrees. He stated that we were supposed to proceed to the fixes 'JOCCO and WONCE' after passing 'TERPZ' and that proceeding directly from 'TERPZ' to 'FLUKY' would place us in the Washington DC Flight Restricted Zone. Before we reached the heading of 330 degrees; the Controller issued a heading of 280 degrees. A short time later; we were handed off to the next Controller. As the initial Controller gave us our frequency change he reiterated the need to fly the published departure procedure and also said 'it would have not been good if we had continued in that direction'. The Departure Controller did not berate the Crew; seem anxious;or indicate there would be a 'phone call' required. The flight did not enter into the restricted or prohibited airspace due to the Departure Controllers quick action. The Flight Crew did perform a normal pre-takeoff briefing and also reviewed the TERPZ1 departure (THE INITIAL PHASE) prior to takeoff. The Crew did not perform a (COMPLETE) brief of the departure beyond the initial departure fix of TERPZ. If a review of the (ENTIRE) departure been performed; this would have been avoided. Additionally; the FMS was checked to verify the departure only up to the initial fix. Had the crew reviewed the departure that was loaded into the FMS; and matched that information to the chart; they would have caught the omission of the transition.
Second reporter narrative
The Pilot Flying (PF) who initially set the aircraft up for departure; briefed the Pilot Monitoring (PM) as to ATC clearance and departure instructions as assigned. The PM re-briefed the departure instructions for the assigned runway noting the first fix located in the FMS. It is at this point were FMS programming error should have been noted. The PM should have done a full review of the FMS programming for the assigned departure procedures (TERPZ1) but only noted the assigned first fix and did not notice the omission of two fixes along the assigned departure procedure. Full faith was placed on the PF for the correct set up of the FMS.Upon departure the aircraft was cleared to the first assigned fix. At this point the PM noted a discontinuity and asked the PF if he would like it clear; to which he agreed. The aircraft proceeded to the first fix then upon reaching it; turned to the first en route fix; FLUKY. ATC noticed the early turn and instructed us to turn back immediately to avoid the Washington FRZ. Crew complied with ATC instructions. It is at this point the Crew noted the entire programming error.An additional contributing factor was the use of the new Electric Flight Bag (EFB) which arrived about two weeks before the incident. Both EFBs were on line and programed for the departure but set aside next to each Pilot's arm rest during the initial aircraft climb out. Normally the paper departure would have been in full view during the climb; but the new EFB was used instead and; as noted; were not in view due to being stowed.
NASA callback
This reporter; the First Officer; believes the SID transition route to FLUKY was never entered into the FMS and that the nav error was the result of complacency regarding reviewing the route and map display prior to departure. He commented that because there is no printer on board it is common for the pilot downloading the airways clearance to manually write down the clearance (which often requires as many as three separate screen pages) utilizing whatever short hand is comfortable. Again; once the clearance is received the only easily accessible source of clearance information is the pilot's notes. He believes it likely that no obvious reference to the transition was noted and that the Flight Crew merely noted that TERPZ was the only fix associated with the SID and that FLUKY was the start of their enroute portion. They thus simply agreed to close the route discontinuity that existed between the two; leaving out three (not two as both stated) intermediate waypoints.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.