TUL TRACON controller receiving training experienced loss of separation event when traffic approaching final to parallel runways failed to intercept final course; incorrect scratch pad information and less than complete relief briefings were listed as causal factors.
Synopsis
TUL TRACON controller receiving training experienced loss of separation event when traffic approaching final to parallel runways failed to intercept final course; incorrect scratch pad information and less than complete relief briefings were listed as causal factors.
Narrative
I took the position with my instructor to work RE/RW/FE/FW combined. It was very busy before we took the position and probably should have been split off but we did not request this. We had four military trainers and several air carriers inbound; as well as military fighter arrivals and various departures. The trainer pilots spoke broken English or were barely readable and I had to make multiple say again requests. Military X was approximately 15 miles to the northwest and Air Carrier Y was approximately 18 miles to the northeast when I took the position. I was briefed that Military X was on a 90 degree heading to 3500 ft; and Air Carrier Y was on a 270 degree heading descending to 3000 ft. I took the position and stopped Military X's decent at 5000 ft and Air Carrier Y at 4000 ft to ensure vertical separation as they were on opposing bases descending out of the same altitude. I turned Air Carrier Y to a 220 degree heading and turned Military X to a 150 degree heading. Military X's scratch pad said RE and GPS. I was vectoring him for the GPS for 18R due to sequence and aircraft position reference final. I was unaware he had been told to expect 18L. I pointed out the airport to Air Carrier Y and he reported it in sight. I cleared him for the visual approach and told him about traffic inbound to the parallel from the northwest. I then looked at the intercept angle for Military X and decided I needed a little more angle to the east so I instructed him to turn to 140 degree heading and expect to join final and then informed him about traffic inbound from the northeast to the parallel; he said he had the RJ in sight. Military X was about half a mile from the final for 18R when I turned him to a 150 degree heading descended him the 2500 ft and cleared him for the GPS 18R approach. As Military X was reading back his instructions a flight of two military fighters called on UHF frequency and stepped on Military X's read back. I told the fighters to stand by and told another aircraft and instruction. I then noticed that Military X had gone through the final approach course and I asked him to verify that he was correcting back and that he had traffic on his six o'clock. He said he was cleared for the left runway. The instructor keyed up and told him to cancel approach clearance; climb to 5000 ft now and turn right heading 270. The Air Carrier Y said he had the trainer aircraft in sight for 18R. He read it back 18R and turned on the approach. I had a flight of two Military Fighters inbound for the overhead for 18L restricted above the ENJEP. ENJEP said he had a request and then said he wanted 18L. I told him he was cleared for 18R and he said he did not have the approach plates for the GPS 18R so I broke him out so as not to lose separation with the Fighters. I then asked Military X if he had the approach plates for GPS 18R and he said he did not. Another Military Trainer; who had just flown the GPS for 18R said he did not have the approach plates as well. This was the first time that we were informed of this. Recommendation; I believe that better communication whether through scratch pad entry or better relief briefing might have prevented this from occurring.
Second reporter narrative
I was providing OJT (on the job training) on Radar West; with Radar East and Finals combined. We had just taken the position with several military trainer aircraft on vectors for practice approaches; along with a few air carriers and a couple flights of military fighters; all inbound to Runway's 18L and 18R. Military X was 15 miles northwest of TUL descending to 5000' on right base for GPS 18R approach; Air Carrier Y was 15 miles northeast of TUL at 4000' on left base to Runway 18L expecting a visual approach. Air Carrier Y was turned toward final and cleared for visual approach Runway 18L; traffic was issued on Military X inbound to Runway 18R from the northwest. Military X was then turned towards final and traffic issued on Air Carrier Y. Military X was subsequently cleared for the GPS 18R approach; their read back was blocked by a fighter checking on frequency. My Developmental noticed Military X going through the Runway 18R final and started to correct them; at that point I took over and instructed Military X to cancel approach clearance; turn right immediately and climb to 5000'. It wasn't until later that we found out Military X was told to expect Runway 18L from the previous Controller. The scratch pad showed RE; for a RADAR east miss; and GPS; meaning a GPS approach no specific runway. The previous couple of trainer aircraft had been sequenced to Runway 18R and based on the speed; heading and altitudes of Military X and Air Carrier Y we had no reason to question which runway Military X would be sequenced to. Shortly after this incident my Developmental instructed three separate trainer aircraft to expect GPS 18R approach due to traffic inbound to Runway 18L. All three pilots then informed us that they did not have the approach plates for GPS 18R; this was the first moment we were made aware of this. Recommendation; if the scratch pad reflected what runway they were expecting; this incident would not have happened. Additionally; even though we did not ask to split positions the reduced workload and extra set of eyes would have been helpful.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.