PWM RADAR assist controller described an event when the routing on an IFR departure was not correctly notated on the strip passed to the departure controller; the reporter questioning the facility's lack of monitoring practices concerning newly certified controllers.

Date: 2010-05 · Aircraft: SR22 · Phase: climb

Anomalies: atc-issue-all-types|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy

Synopsis

PWM RADAR assist controller described an event when the routing on an IFR departure was not correctly notated on the strip passed to the departure controller; the reporter questioning the facility's lack of monitoring practices concerning newly certified controllers.

Narrative

I was working Flight Data/RADAR assist in the TRACON. I was the CIC (Controller in Charge) on the shift. A SR22 departed PWM IFR. When the strip came down the tube; I noticed that the PDR on the strip was lined out; indicating that Tower had issued the clearance 'as filed'. I thought it strange to line it out rather than put the new strip in the strip holder that the Clearance Delivery/Ground Control (CD/GC) Controller would get when suppressing the PDR. The RADAR Controller issued the instruction for the SR22 to 'proceed direct CLOWW' which was the first fix on the 'as filed' routing the strip indicated. The pilot complied without any question. Just to be sure; I printed a flight plan readout on the FDIO (Flight Data Information Operation). It had indicated that the PDR was not suppressed; so the next facility would have had an overflight strip indicating the SR22 was going to be over ENE.V106.GDM; etc. rather than CLOWW..WITNY.HFD. I did an amendment and aligned the flight plan info with the clearance the pilot was issued and was flying. Bottom line; Clearance Delivery issued a clearance that was different from what was indicated on the strip in a way that it would be difficult to catch in-house. It could have caused problems in the next facilities airspace. The Controller working CD/GC was a Developmental Certified on CD/GC. Locally; there is practically no effort to monitor newly certified controllers to make sure they are OK working on their own and don't have questions. Standards for check-out are very low here. We need realistic standards to hold Developmental to and collectively monitor them to ensure success. Also; the atmosphere in the facility is such that correcting someone who is qualified on a position is socially unacceptable.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.