ZID Controllerand Supervisor describe a RADAR failure event at IND TRACON and the resulting attempts to initiate the contingency plan efforts; noting several operational errors may have occurred.
Synopsis
ZID Controllerand Supervisor describe a RADAR failure event at IND TRACON and the resulting attempts to initiate the contingency plan efforts; noting several operational errors may have occurred.
Narrative
IND TRACON lost their RADAR and we at ZID assumed control of their airspace. During the ensuing hour and a half; we had numerous aircraft waiting for approach clearance to the airport. We suffered a loss of RADAR as high as 8000 FT and even lost radio communications on frequency 132.2 as aircraft began their final descent into the airport. Many things led up to problems we encountered. Controllers from Approach Control were not informed right away that we needed them to help work arrivals in. Our RADAR site at Indy had been released for scheduled work creating great loss of RADAR coverage around the field. Frequencies were inadequate causing us to have [to] make a switch of sector frequencies at a most inopportune time. VFR departures were released with intentions that pilots could pick up their IFR with us. We had no runway center lines depicted until we brought up an almost unusable map setting with a box over it with little quadrants divided in it. We had no open communication or shout line to Indy Tower until the session was almost over. We had no line of communication to Grissom Approach to point-out or hand off aircraft. We had to relay through another sector of our Center. There was designed airspace to allow the Tower to get departures out when the airport became full with aircraft. Recommendation; here is a list of ways we can combat a catastrophic loss of RADAR by the Approach Control. 1. Have an open line or 'shout' line to Tower. 2. Use 119.55 for coverage and not 132.2 as was designated. 3. ILS approach to active runway must be depicted. 4. Lost communications instructions need to be posted and readily available in case of radio failure. 5. Know what speeds are feasible in the approach environment. 6. Have a contingency plan ready and available to allow for departures to 'tunnel' out. 7. Do not authorize VFR departures with intent of pilots to pick up their IFR with us. 8. Dispatch Controllers from Approach IMMEDIATELY! 9. Must have direct communications line accessible to Grissom Approach for point-outs and hand offs. 10. Have a map with runway center line without all the clutter we had on ours. 11. And please send Controllers to Approach and vice verse to be familiar with the other facilities RADAR presentation. 'It would dramatically improve things if controllers would know what they have to work when they are at a different facility'. They will not allow us to 'FAM' (familiarize ourselves) to the Tower and Approach Control. I hope this will open eyes that this is not voluntary but necessary. The Approach Controllers were outstanding but their comprehension of our Data Block Display almost caused a separation error as they did not understand our 'T' altitude or interim altitude.
Second reporter narrative
IND Approach Control lost their RADAR due to planned maintenance outage of the ASR-9 and the failure their Long Range RADAR. This resulted in IND Tower becoming a VFR Tower only and my area assuming Approach Control airspace. I was OSIC (Cab Supervisor) at the time of this happening. I notified the controllers involved of the situation and immediately called for my other FLM (Front Line Manager) to return to the area. I got out the area contingency plan and started to follow it. The outage occurred for almost two hours. During that time; I called IND and asked for them to send us some Approach Controllers; as stated in the contingency plan. Prior to the controllers arriving; we are now aware of two operational errors that occurred. Recommendation; I would have held all arrival aircraft at a single fix and brought them in one at a time.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.