A Captain and First Officer report they unknowingly flew a MD-11 aircraft with an FMC status message: AFQGS-FAIL that was not covered under an existing fuel quantity MEL 28-01-3. Maintenance Control had assured them the item was included in the MEL. Both pilots question whether Maintenance Control acted in a deliberate manner to dispatch the aircraft.
Synopsis
A Captain and First Officer report they unknowingly flew a MD-11 aircraft with an FMC status message: AFQGS-FAIL that was not covered under an existing fuel quantity MEL 28-01-3. Maintenance Control had assured them the item was included in the MEL. Both pilots question whether Maintenance Control acted in a deliberate manner to dispatch the aircraft.
Narrative
During preflight duties and while reviewing the flight paperwork the following MEL 28-01-3-2 item was noticed. After arrival at the aircraft and while performing normal preflight checks the First Officer (F/O) noted the following FMC Status Message: 'AFQGS - Fail'. As the MEL item and this message were both related to fuel quantity I asked the F/O to contact aircraft Maintenance for investigation and clarification as to the appropriateness of this message and the aircrafts' current status. Due to the fact that aircraft Maintenance was working a number of different maintenance procedures related to the current MEL on the aircraft; along with another item I had placed in the Logbook; it was not long before they came to the cockpit. During discussions with Maintenance Control (MC) which were overheard by us in the cockpit; we were told by Maintenance Control through the Line personnel that the status message was a part of the current MEL on the Fuel System and it was OK to proceed without further action by us or delay. Upon arrival in ZZZ1; both the F/O and myself wanted to check into this further because during the flight we began to think the answer we were given did not make sense. We pulled up and printed from the Flight Operations website the entire MEL procedure and read it fully. No where in this procedure did it verify the information we were given by ZZZ Maintenance Control. I immediately upon arrival at the aircraft put the item in the aircraft Logbook; and reported it to ZZZ1 Line Maintenance. Immediately upon contacting ZZZ Maintenance Control (during the same shift cycle and presumably the SAME personnel) we were told by ZZZ1 Line Maintenance that the aircraft was grounded and was not airworthy; there was no relief under the current MEL or it's DMP Procedure. In talking with the ZZZ1 Maintenance Supervisor; I asked about the earlier decision by ZZZ Maintenance Control to tell us what appeared at that moment to be a total falsehood in order to get the flight out; and his comment back to me was that he was not concerned with that and did not wish to discuss those details with me. The aircraft was ultimately grounded and the flight canceled. Subsequent to these events transpiring; a Flight Crewmember sitting Reserve at the ZZZ1 gateway; contacted me and told me he overheard gateway management personnel talking about this issue; and that they had been told by ZZZ prior to our arrival of this problem and the instructions given to us to fly the aircraft out of ZZZ. They also overheard this person say that they were waiting to see if the flight crew put it in the Logbook before saying anything about it. That to me in retrospect seems like a deliberate attempt by them to say nothing to rectify this problem unless we said something first; and continue to provide faulty guidance and compliance with the FAR's to insure the aircrafts airworthiness! Thankfully we were diligent in digging deeper into the problem and finding the discrepancy on our own. It is impossible to be an effective team member; and operate in a safe airline environment; when you cannot trust that when you ask for answers to safety related questions that you will be given full; complete and accurate answers to those questions. When I; as a Line Captain; ask a question I must have the full confidence that my questions will be answered truthfully and accurately at all times. If not then I have no recourse [but] to submit all queries and concerns to the Logbook so that my questions will be answered in writing and for the record. Airline personnel must be made to understand the full implications to performing in a manner such as this. To continue to perform in such a reckless manner will only further erode that trust and place the safety of this airline fully in jeopardy. As for this Captain; I can say but one thing; from this point forward I will no longer take any Line Maintenance; Maintenance Control; or other flight Operations management personnel's 'word' or other personal assurances [as] adequate for assuring me of the airworthiness of an aircraft or other FAR compliance; without first putting all of my questions or concerns in the aircraft Logbook. At that time they can assure me of their confidence and compliance by signing the logbook themselves and certifying it in writing.
Second reporter narrative
While in Operations and reviewing the paperwork; the Captain pointed out several MEL items including 28-01-3-2. I printed the MEL items off the computer and we reviewed each procedure before heading out to the aircraft. While preflighting the aircraft in ZZZ; a sensor fault appeared. Being new to the aircraft I asked the Captain if he was familiar with the error code. He said he wasn't and to call Maintenance. Just as I called Maintenance on the radio; a Mechanic walked into the cockpit. I explained the concern and went back to my preflight duties. The cockpit was chaotic and extremely hot. The aircraft had not been provided with conditioned air when we first arrived in spite of the Captain calling Maintenance several hours ahead of time. We went back into Operations to speak with an Assistant Chief Pilot (ACP) and the air was not turned on until 15 minutes prior to our second arrival. The outside air temperature was 35 C (95F degrees) and the interior cockpit temperature was over 130F degrees. The aircraft was being loaded (with significant quantities of dry ice) when we first arrived at the aircraft and the packs were not on. As two mechanics worked the sensor fault message; as well as a couple of other items; one Mechanic was on the phone with Maintenance Control. He was not familiar with the error code either and someone within Maintenance Control was walking him through how to check maintenance status messages on the # 3 MCDU (Multifunction Control Display Unit). After several minutes of trying to clear the error message Maintenance Control told the Mechanic that the error code was caused by MEL 28-01-3-2. This sounded strange to us as the MEL for 28-01-3-2 listed several warning messages that we could expect to see; but did not list this sensor warning. But we had not reviewed the procedure and felt we had to trust the Supervisor in Maintenance Control and did not want to delay the flight any further to double-check ourselves. Either the Maintenance Control Supervisor intentionally told the Mechanic on the phone incorrect information in order to move the aircraft; or a serious breakdown in operational procedures happened that allowed an unairworthy aircraft to operate. If this was the first time this type of situation had happened I would feel it was an egregious error that should be dealt with appropriately; but unfortunately this is not the first time a Maintenance Supervisor has given wrong information to a Mechanic and/or pilot via phone/radio resulting in an unairworthy aircraft flying. This type of behavior will only result in the destruction of any trust between the Flight crew and Maintenance management if not addressed immediately.
NASA callback
Reporter stated a fuel MEL 28-01-3 had been applied to the MD-11 aircraft that also required maintenance procedures be accomplished prior to departure. One of which was a requirement to 'Stick' (fuel drip stick) the right main fuel tank to verify fuel quantity; because a sensor was unreliable. Reporter stated the cockpit was over 130F degrees when they arrived; because Line Maintenance was instructed not to use the APU while the MD-11 sat on the ground. But that policy has created over temperature failures and auto shutdowns of the aircraft's FMC's; up to the point of having to replace FMC's due to internal circuit failures. He thought that perhaps the AFQGS-FAIL status message might have been triggered by the excessive cockpit temperatures. Reporter stated he and his First Officer were told by Maintenance Control the 'AFQGS- FAIL' FMC Status Message the First Officer (F/O) had noticed during his preflight; was part of and included in the original MEL 28-01-3 that was being applied. But he and his F/O realized enroute to ZZZ1 that was not the case and they had in essence departed with an 'open' Logbook item that was not part of the MEL.Reporter stated after he made a Logbook write-up about the AFQGS-FAIL status message after he landed in ZZZ1. His outbound flight back to ZZZ was canceled and the MD-11 was grounded for three days until the cause of the status message was repaired.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.