TEB Controller described a conflict event when an aircraft assigned the DALTON DP failed to adhere to departure restrictions conflicting with EWR arrival traffic; the reporter indicating the procedure could use a review and possibly revision.

Date: 2010-07 · Aircraft: Learjet 60 · Phase: initial_climb

Anomalies: atc-issue-all-types|conflict-airborne-conflict|deviation-altitude-overshoot|deviation-track-heading-all-types|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy

Synopsis

TEB Controller described a conflict event when an aircraft assigned the DALTON DP failed to adhere to departure restrictions conflicting with EWR arrival traffic; the reporter indicating the procedure could use a review and possibly revision.

Narrative

I received a release on Aircraft X from N90 Departure Control off of Runway 19 on the Dalton Departure procedure. This is a VFR to IFR departure out of TEB that allows aircraft to depart under VFR conditions initially and then upon receiving a climb clearance from the Departure Controller their IFR flight plan is activated. This is designed to allow aircraft to depart Runway 19 without having to be sequenced with traffic overflying TEB on the ILS RWY 22L approach into EWR. The Dalton Departure requires that pilots maintain VFR at or below 1;300 FT and complete a right turn to heading 280 within 4 DME of TEB. I cleared Aircraft X for takeoff on Runway 19 and reiterated to fly the Dalton Departure; which is standard procedure at TEB. Approximately 1/2 mile off the departure end of the runway I instructed the pilot to contact New York Departure; he complied. I then noticed the aircraft continue on what appeared to be runway heading and climb to 1;500 FT. The pilot did not start turning westbound until approximately 6-7 miles south of TEB which caused it to get too close to traffic on final into EWR. I am unsure of the type aircraft that was on final into EWR at the time; but the aircraft was at approximately 1;800 FT. EWR Tower called me on our 'shout' line reference the departure and I told them that I was not talking to him and that he should be with Departure Control. I saw the RADAR target of Aircraft X turning westbound approximately 6-7 miles south of TEB and cross in front of the EWR arrival by about 1.5 miles and less than 500 FT vertical separation. I am unsure if N90 took any action against the pilot regarding a deviation. In my opinion it was a Pilot Deviation and there was a loss of separation. Recommendation; the Dalton Departure procedure in my opinion has potential to be unsafe. It allows aircraft to depart with lower separation standards than usual due to being 'VFR' for the first few minutes of flight. Although the VFR/IFR separation of 500' vertical is there; there is no room for error; and if pilots incorrectly fly the procedure in the slightest way there is a great chance separation will be lost. Additionally; a lot of the time the EWR traffic overhead will be a 'heavy' jet which brings in a wake turbulence factor; which is something that we must monitor and issue advisories to aircraft departing on this procedure. It is a 'double-edged sword'; because this procedure allows us to depart Runway 19 without having to create gaps in the EWR final in order to get our departures out. It is essential in eliminating delays when we are forced to use Runway 19 as our departure runway. I'm really not sure how the procedure could be altered or if that would help at all.

Second reporter narrative

Aircraft X departed Teterboro airport on the Dalton 19 procedure. Aircraft X checked in on Departure Control on the wrong beacon code and altitude looked to be 1;500 FT; 200 FT above required. Aircraft X did not turn right as necessary and by not turning entered the Class B Airspace and airspace delegated to Newark Tower. By the time Aircraft X did turn he was in the Class B westbound directly under an E145 on final approach to Newark Airport (ILS 22L). Aircraft X was at westbound at 1;300 FT and the E145 at 1;400 FT with targets about to merge. Aircraft X never saw the E145; nor do I think he recognize the seriousness of the situation. This procedure must be terminated before it is too late.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.