ZAB Reporters described a visual separation application involving a B757 aircraft dispute between ZAB and P50 Controllers/Supervisors; regarding clarification of visual separation in the enroute environment.
Synopsis
ZAB Reporters described a visual separation application involving a B757 aircraft dispute between ZAB and P50 Controllers/Supervisors; regarding clarification of visual separation in the enroute environment.
Narrative
The C560 was filed to SDL but when he came over from ZLA he explained that he was originally supposed to go to PHX but TMU was going to delay him on the ground so he said that he would go to SDL and if we could work it out he would like to go to PHX. We already had three PHX arrivals on the north stream and one from the south stream that was tied with the first one from the north. The C560 was 4 miles behind the first arrival from the north. We called TMU and they said to let the C560 go to PHX. We knew that if we were to let him go that we would have lots of work to do to fit him into the stream. The R-Side trainer decided to let him go and that it would be a great training opportunity. The R-Side trainee vectored the C560 to the south to put him behind the B752. The vector was not enough and it took a long time to get the required separation. When the C560 was turned back toward the arrival we realized that we still were not going to have 5 miles so he was turned 20L. That vector was not going to happen quick enough so we called the traffic and the pilot reported the B752 in sight at 110. The trainee told the C560 to maintain visual separation. My D-Side trainee called the PHX arrival sector and tried to get them to take the hand off and they told us to spin him since we only had 4 miles. My trainee told them that we were using visual and I thought that they said 'RADAR'. After listening to the tapes afterwards; I realized that the Controller just said his initials. We told the R-Sides that they had RADAR and they shipped him to approach. Recommendation; the R-Sides should have fanned out the arrivals more to create the separation faster. We should not have tried to squeeze him into a hole but should have spun him one three sixty and put him at the back of the pack.
Second reporter narrative
I was training on R42 during a PHX arrival push. A C560 was landing SDL and asked to land PHX. After my D-Side coordinated with TMU and received a release my Instructor told me to fit him in the sequence and clear him the PHX. He instructed me to fit him in because the sequence was straight forward and although the easiest thing to do would be to still send him to SDL it would be good for the practice. The B752 was 6.5 miles ahead of the C560 on the arrival and was #2 in the sequence. I turned the C560 to a 120 heading to ensure the spacing because I had the B752 on a heading to go behind the first aircraft in the sequence. I used altitude separation while the aircraft were on the vectors. When I had the needed spacing; I cleared the B752 direct GEELA and descend via the GEELA3 arrival. Then when CRR showed 6.5 miles between the two aircraft; I turned the C560 back direct GEELA and issued GEELA at 110 and 250 KTS. Speeds were the same but I noticed some compression at which time my Instructor advised me to use visual separation. I called the traffic to the C560 and instructed him to advise when the aircraft was in sight. The C560 immediately called traffic in sight at which time I advised him to maintain visual separation from the B757; which the pilot acknowledged. My D-Side called PHX Approach for the hand off on the C560 at which time the Controller advised that visual separation was being used; they replied 'RADAR contact;' and I shipped the aircraft. The Supervisor from PHX Approach called complaining that visual separation cannot be used behind a heavy jet. Both the Operations Manager and FLM were unsure of the rule. Later; it was ruled that it was a Operational Error because I didn't issue wake turbulence advisory. I didn't issue the wake turbulence advisory because we had been briefed that the B752 and B753 were no longer classified as heavy jets. Therefore; a wake turbulence advisory is not necessary. There needs to be a clear interpretation of how and when visual separation can be applied. It is a useful tool that En-route Controllers do not apply because every time it is used it is scrutinized; and deals are pinned on the Controller when the interpretation of the rule is questioned. If we cannot use the rule then it should be removed from the 7110.65. Otherwise; an interpretation must be given so that Controllers can apply the rule and not be scrutinized for being unsafe. The frustration is that even when visual is issued according to the 7110.65 it causes chaos and fingers to be pointed. Also; it needs to be clear whether the B757 is going to be a heavy or a large jet; we have been briefed and a CEDAR memo was sent out stating that the B752/753 are no longer heavy jets; however; PHX Approach is claiming it is a heavy.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.