Despite the approval of Dispatchers; Maintenance personnel; and a Chief Pilot regarding a confusing MEL procedure; the flight crew of an MD11 was instructed to do an air turnback when a Maintenance Supervisor determined they were all wrong and the aircraft was not legal for flight.
Synopsis
Despite the approval of Dispatchers; Maintenance personnel; and a Chief Pilot regarding a confusing MEL procedure; the flight crew of an MD11 was instructed to do an air turnback when a Maintenance Supervisor determined they were all wrong and the aircraft was not legal for flight.
Narrative
After I Reviewed L1 Cabin Entry Door deferral I contacted the Dispatcher requesting clarification on limitation section of MEL which requires two life rafts to be on board for overwater flights. Maintenance Control advised that manual emergency operation of the L1 Cabin Entry Door via the girt bar would still deploy the slide/life raft and therefore satisfied the MEL requirement for a second life raft to be on board. In addition; Dispatch contacted the on-duty MD11 Chief Pilot who agreed with Maintenance Control that the MEL was properly referenced and all associated limitations were met for our flight. We then departed. After being airborne a little over an hour we received an ACARS message instructing us to return to the departure airport. A Maintenance Control Supervisor advised that the L1 Cabin Entry Door/Slide should have been deferred entirely. Our aircraft was unauthorized for overwater flight. We returned and dumped approximately 35;000 pounds of fuel in order to land below max allowable landing weight.
Second reporter narrative
Arrived at the aircraft and reviewed a deferral; which talked about the door/slide could be deferred but in the limitation section of the deferral it stated that 2 liferafts must be onboard for extended over-water flights. The write-up in the logbook was the pneumatic air bottle for the L-1 door was low. It was deferred several days ago. Decided to call Dispatch to discuss whether the Pneumatic bottle being low would still allow us to use the slide in the L-1 door. We were told by Maintenance Control that the manual girt bar operation of the door would allow us to use the slide and the deferral was correct. Forty minutes later I received a call from Dispatch regarding the language 'door/slide' and whether that deferral was deferring the slide as well. The Dispatcher said he would call an Assistant Chief Pilot and get back to me. I didn't hear anything back from him so I called him. He said a MD-11 Assistant Chief Pilot said that Maintenance Control's interpretation was correct and we could operate the flight using the manual girt bar to activate the slide. We departed for an oceanic flight. About an hour later we received an ACARS message stating we needed to call Dispatch ASAP. We did and were notified that the Maintenance Control Supervisor said that we should NOT have departed with this deferral. We received an air return notice and returned to our departure airport. We had some questions about the MEL so we called Maintenance Control who is supposed to have the answers. We involved an MD-11 Assistant Chief Pilot for a objective view and we were told it was OK to go. An hour into the flight we hear otherwise. At some point we have to trust someone. When things don't make sense we are taught to ask questions. On arrival we hear from the maintenance person that the entire door should have been deferred. To make things worse we were told that aircraft another aircraft has the same deferral and the entire door is placarded inoperative.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.