A B767-300's fuel quantity indicating system failed after takeoff. Because of past failures Company maintenance requested that the aircraft return to land. While dumping fuel the FWD EQUIP VAL EICAS alerted. An emergency was declared but later cleared after the alert ceased with the fuel dumping completion.
Synopsis
A B767-300's fuel quantity indicating system failed after takeoff. Because of past failures Company maintenance requested that the aircraft return to land. While dumping fuel the FWD EQUIP VAL EICAS alerted. An emergency was declared but later cleared after the alert ceased with the fuel dumping completion.
Narrative
Departed gate early; taxi and takeoff were normal. On climb out; right fuel quantity indicator and fuel totalizer both went blank and 'Fuel Configuration' EICAS message illuminated. Radioed Maintenance Control to advise and asked if the airplane had a history for this problem. They advised there were 'multiple write-ups over the last thirty days' and instructed us to return to the departure airport. Advised ATC of our intentions and the need to dump fuel and hold for weight reduction and received a clearance to dump. Since this was not an emergency we opted to reduce to landing weight rather than land overweight. Began descent from FL 280 and turned back toward the airport. I advised the First Flight Attendant and made a PA advising of the precautionary return; fuel dumping; and holding. After reviewing the procedure we started fuel dumping and immediately the 'FWD EQUIPMENT COOLING' EICAS and 'NO COOLING' light both illuminated. We followed the emergency procedure for this event which states in part; 'No action is possible...Avionics and electronic equipment and displays NOT powered by Standby Buses are subject to IMMINENT failure'. We now had a real emergency on our hands. We updated ATC and requested an immediate return to land and planned for an overweight landing. To reduce weight as much as possible prior to landing we continued to dump. I updated the First Flight Attendant on the situation and advised that we expected a normal landing and not to plan on an evacuation at this time. I then made another PA to advise of our immediate return. Upon completion of the fuel dumping we restored the system and the Fwd Equipment Cooling and No Cooling lights extinguished. Since we no longer had an emergency we decided to enter holding at 10;000' to reduce our weight to max landing. I updated the First Flight Attendant again and made another P/A. After approximately forty minutes of holding at flaps five and speed brakes deployed; we proceeded in for a normal landing. Landing weight was approximately 318;000 pounds. On touchdown the 'FWD EQUIP VAL' EICAS AND 'VALVE LIGHT' illuminated. We taxied to the gate and shut down the airplane. The ongoing fuel quantity problem appears to have never been corrected. However; had we not had this problem we may never have discovered that the equipment cooling system valves were not sequencing correctly and the prospect of an electrical system failure over water is quite daunting. We had excellent CRM. All three pilots worked very well together. Suggestions were offered and discussed; duties were delegated and completed. Things got very busy and the non-emergency to emergency to non-emergency required a lot of shifts in thought processes; prioritizing; and communications. Having the IRO there to handle company communications; read checklists; and be an additional resource in the decision making process made the job much easier and less stressful. After the flight the First Flight Attendant commented that he thought communication between the cockpit and cabin was very good and keeping him in the loop allowed him to do his job more efficiently.
Second reporter narrative
After a normal landing; the 'FWD EQUIP VALVE' EICAS message illuminated. We accomplished the QRH procedure but the valve light remained illuminated; indicating another malfunction of the equipment cooling system. After shutdown; I went downstairs to speak with the mechanics and observed that the overboard exhaust valve was indeed closed; even though it should be open on the ground - and especially since we had selected equipment cooling to STBY. My primary comment here is that this event illustrates the importance of carrying the IRO on our international flights. Were we to repeat this scenario in foreign airspace (where communication is such a challenge); even in ideal weather and with no further complications it would be exceedingly difficult to manage the workload without the third pilot in the cockpit to handle ground and cabin communication - not to mention assisting whichever pilot is running the QRH while the other pilot manages the FMC and ATC. My second comment is that when the forward equipment cooling fault is identified; I urged Maintenance to consider inspecting the rest of the 767 fleet for that same condition. This was the first time I've used any equipment cooling mode other than 'AUTO;' and we observed two malfunctions.
More incidents for this aircraft family →
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.