LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION WHEN A CLIMBING ACR-WDB IS ALLOWED TO CONFLICT WITH AN OPPOSITE DIRECTION ACR-MLG DEVIATING FOR WX.

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ZLA D-33 CTLR ACCEPTED A POINTOUT FROM ZDV SECTOR 37 ON MLG X AT FL350; 30 MI SE OF BCE (REFERENCE POINT) DEVIATION S FOR WX; THEN DIRECT BRYCE CANYON. THE D33 CTLR (MYSELF) JUDGED INCORRECTLY THAT MLG X WAS NOT TFC FOR ANY ACFT UNDER SECTOR 33'S CTL AND WOULD NOT ENTER 33'S AIRSPACE. THIS DECISION WAS BASED ON HOW THE PREVIOUS ACFT HAD DEVIATED; SINCE THE RADAR WAS NOT DEPICTING ANY WX AT ALL. I FELT IT WAS LOGICAL TO ASSUME THAT THIS ACFT WOULD DEVIATE THE SAME WAY. CONSEQUENTLY I NEITHER ALERTED THE R33 CTLR TO THE POINTOUT; NOR DID I START A TRACK. 4 MINS AFTER ACCEPTING THE POINTOUT I WAS ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER SECTOR; JUST PRIOR TO THE OCCURRENCE. SECS BEFORE THE OCCURRENCE ZDV SECTOR 37 CALLED THE R33 CTLR; WHO WAS NOW 'ONE HOLED;' AND WANTED TO KNOW IF HE WAS TURNING WDB Y (A LAS DEP FLASHING HDOF TO ZDV; CLIMBING TO FL370 GOING DIRECT PAWNEE CITY); WHO WAS OUT OF FL352 FOR FL370; AND IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH MLG X. AT THIS TIME THE R33 CTLR NOTICED THE LIMITED DATA BLOCK AND ISSUED A 30 DEG TURN TO WDB Y. THIS ACTION WAS NOT ENOUGH TO MAINTAIN THE REQUIRED SEP. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR'S EXPERIENCE LEVEL AND PROX OF ACFT WAS DETERMINED. RPTR STATED THAT SHE WAS UNAWARE OF A REQUIREMENT FOR HER TO POINT OUT THE TFC TO THE RADAR CTLR AND TO START A TRACK ON ALL POINTOUTS. SHE KNOWS NOW AND STATED THAT SHE LEARNED A GREAT DEAL FROM THIS SYS ERROR. THE KEY MISTAKES MADE WERE NOT SHOWING THE POINTOUT TO HER RADAR CTLR AND NOT STARTING A TRACK. IF SHE HAD DONE EITHER ONE; THE LTSS INCIDENT WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED.