A300 Captain reports being dispatched under MEL 36-11-01 for one engine bleed system inoperative. During descent with wing anti ice on; the remaining bleed valve repeatedly faulted. The crew elected to start the APU and use it as a bleed air source; with good results.
Synopsis
A300 Captain reports being dispatched under MEL 36-11-01 for one engine bleed system inoperative. During descent with wing anti ice on; the remaining bleed valve repeatedly faulted. The crew elected to start the APU and use it as a bleed air source; with good results.
Narrative
I request that the safety team look into the applicability of dispatching A300 aircraft under MEL 36-11-01-1 or -2 (Engine Bleed Air Supply Systems - Flight operated in Known/Forecast Icing Conditions). This deferral covers dispatching with an engine bleed valve deferred in known/forecast icing conditions. The MEL under 'Operations Procedures'; step 3; B; instructs crews to turn one air conditioning pack OFF if operating with the Wing Anti Ice ON. We were operating icing conditions and therefore had the wing anti ice ON and the appropriate pack selected OFF. During descent in this configuration the operating bleed system repetitively faulted with an associated ECAM warning. The fault would reset and appeared to me to be related to the known A300 issues with using single pack operations with wing anti ice ON. The repetitive bleed faulting with associated warnings was very distracting during a busy phase of flight in IMC. I instructed the First Officer to start the APU and turn on the APU bleed air. We had no further issues with the APU supplying bleed air. I think dispatching into known/forecast icing conditions under this MEL should be re-evaluated due to the adverse impact the repetitive warnings have on crew situational awareness; and workload in the terminal area.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.