ACR LTT ENGINE FAILURE ON LIFT OFF. EMERGENCY DECLARED. RETURN AND LAND.

Narrative

BOTH ENGS STARTED VERY HOT--THE LEFT 905-910 DEGS AND THE RIGHT 890-900 DEGS C. THE RIGHT ENG WAS STARTED USING A GPU AND THE LEFT WAS A CROSS GENERATOR START. THE OTHER ONLY FACTOR THAT WAS ABNORMAL WAS THE CROSSOVER VALVE RAN THE RIGHT ENG INTO THE 900 DEG RANGE AND MADE THE CROSSVALVE UNUSABLE. THE TEMP W/O THE CROSSOVER VALVE WAS LESS THAN 820 DEGS. TKOF ROLL V1-VR WAS NORMAL. CAPT ROTATED THE ACFT TO A POSITIVE ATTITUDE AND CALLED 'POSITIVE RATE; GEAR UP.' I MOVED THE GEAR HANDLE TO THE UP POS AND CALLED 'GEAR UP SELECTED.' WHILE GEAR WAS IN TRANSIT; A RED ENG OVERHEAT LIGHT ILLUMINATED FOR THE LEFT ENG. I RPTED TO THE CAPT; 'WE'VE GOT AN OVERHEAT ON THE LEFT SIDE.' WHILE REACHING TO REDUCE PWR TO THAT ENG; A LOUD BANG WAS HEARD AND RESULTED IN A YAW TO THE LEFT. I SAID; 'WE LOST THE LEFT ONE;' AND THE CAPT RESPONDED 'YEAH; WE DID; WE LOST IT.' THE GEAR WAS CONFIRMED UP AS WERE THE FLAPS AND AN IMMEDIATE REQUEST FOR RWY 17L WAS MADE TO TWR ALONG WITH NOTIFICATION OF A FAILED ENG. WE WERE GIVEN FREE AUTHORITY TO DEVIATE AS REQUIRED. LEFT TURN WAS INITIATED FOR THE DOWNWIND LEG AND CONFIRMATION MADE THAT WE DIDN'T HAVE AN ENG FIRE. THE CAPT CALLED TO FEATHER THE LEFT PROP. I CONFIRMED WITH HIM AND RETARDED THE LEFT PWR LEVER TO IDLE. I THEN CONFIRMED WITH HIM AND MOVED THE LEFT CONDITION LEVER TO FEATHER. PROP FEATHERED NORMALLY AND THE CAPT SAID; 'RUN THE CHKLIST.' WHILE I RAN THE CLB CHK AND FAILED ENG CONTINUED FLT CHKLIST; THE CAPT MADE A DECISION TO AFFECT A LNDG ON RWY 31R; AS THE ACFT WAS ON A GOOD LEFT BASE FOR THAT RWY. AT THAT POINT I DISCONTINUED RUNNING THE CLB CHKLISTS IN ORDER TO FOCUS MY ATTNS ON ITEMS THAT THE CAPT WOULD CALL FOR IN LNDG. THE ACFT WAS CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 31R BY THE TWR. THE CAPT CALLED FOR GEAR DOWN AND A NO FLAP LNDG. I SELECTED GEAR DOWN AND RPTED 3 GREEN LIGHTS WHEN THEY APPEARED AND PLACED THE GPWS IN FLAP OVERRIDE. AT APPROX 200'; I CALLED 160 KTS; XING THE NUMBERS I CALLED 150 KTS AND AS I CALLED 140 KTS THE WHEELS TOUCHED. IMMEDIATELY UPON T/D THE ANTISKID INOP LIGHT ILLUMINATED. I RPTED TO THE CAPT 'ANTI SKID INOP LIGHT.' THE LIGHT IMMEDIATELY EXTINGUISHED. I RPTED TO THE CAPT; 'LIGHTS OUT;' AT WHICH POINT HE APPLIED MAX BRAKING. WE TAXIED CLR OF THE RWY AND STOPPED THE ACFT AS THE EMER EQUIP ROLLED UP. THE CREW CHIEF OF THE RESCUE SQUAD RPTED WE HAD A LEFT OUTBOARD TIRE FLAT. WE RAN THE AFTER LNDG AND PARKING CHKLISTS. THE CAPT LEFT THE FLT DECK TO INSPECT THE ACFT LEAVING ME AT THE CTLS SINCE WE HAD THE RIGHT ENG RUNNING TO PROVIDE AIR CONDITIONING TO THE PAX. THE CAPT RPTED TO ME THAT BOTH LEFT MAIN TIRES WERE FLAT AT WHICH POINT I CALLED OPS ON COMPANY FREQ TO NOTIFY THEM TO SEND BUSSES FOR THE PAX. I THEN NOTIFIED DFW GND CTL THAT THE ACFT WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO TAXI AND THAT BUSSES WERE ON THE WAY FOR OUR PAX. NOTES: THE TKOF CLRNC RECEIVED FROM THE TWR WAS FOR AN IMMEDIATE TKOF WITH NO DELAY; TFC ON FINAL. AS IT WAS A VERY SHORT TAXI FROM OUR PARKING SPOT TO THE RWY; WE WERE STILL RUNNING BEFORE TKOF CHKLISTS WHEN THE TKOF CLRNC WAS RECEIVED. THIS INTERRUPTED MY NORMAL FLOW OF PROCS FOR SCANNING OF INSTRUMENTS DURING INITIAL STABILIZATION OF THE TKOF ROLL. SHORTLY AFTER INITIATION OF THE TURN FOR DOWNWIND AN ACR ACFT RPTED TO THE TWR; 'YOU GOT A GRASS FIRE OVER HERE OFF RWY 17L THAT MAY HAVE SOMETHING TO DO WITH LTT.' THIS CAUSED CONCERN ON BOTH OUR PARTS AS TO WHETHER WE DID IN FACT HAVE A FIRE OR NOT. A PAX RPTED TO THE CAPT THAT HE HEARD 3 POPS WITH RELATED PUFFS OF SMOKE AND THEN A LOUDER BANG JUST BEFORE THE ENG QUIT. (RPTED TO CAPT AFTER LNDG.) THE AUTOCOARSEN FUNCTIONED NORMALLY BUT THE ACFT PERFORMANCE APPEARED TO IMPROVE AFTER THE PROP WAS MANUALLY FEATHERED. THE CAPT AND I LATER DISCUSSED THAT THE THOUGHT; 'WILL THE OTHER ENG CONTINUE TO RUN?'; CROSSED BOTH OUR MINDS. OUR COMPANY OPERATES 16 LTT ACFT; THE OLDEST ACFT HAVING BEEN ON THE LINE FOR 15 MONTHS AT THE TIME OF THIS INCIDENT. IN THAT TIME WE HAVE CHANGED 31 ENGS AND THE PLT GROUP AS A WHOLE HAS LITTLE CONFIDENCE IN THIS ENG. THE LTT ACFT IS EQUIPPED WITH A TKOF INHIBIT FUNCTION. THIS FEATURE IS DESIGNED TO PREVENT WHAT THE MANUFACTURER CALLS; 'NON EMER FAILURE LIGHTS' FROM BEING DISPLAYED TO THE COCKPIT CREW. WITH THE TKOF INHIBIT FUNCTION ACTIVATED; THE ONLY WARNINGS THAT WILL ILLUMINATE ON THE COCKPIT WARNING SYS ARE LOW OIL PRESSURE (ENG OR PROP); ENG FIRE; TAIL PIPE OVERHEAT; AVIONICS SMOKE; LAV SMOKE; CARGO SMOKE; PROP BRAKE; OR CONFIGN. THIS MEANS THAT DURING TKOF ROLL ANY FAILURES OF ELECTRICAL; HYDS; OR PRESSURIZATION SYS WILL NOT ACTIVATE THE VISUAL AND AURAL WARNING SYSTEMS AND PROBABLY GO UNNOTICED UNTIL THE TKOF INHIBIT DISENGAGES AUTOMATICALLY WITH YOUR RETRACTION. THE ACFT IS ALSO EQUIPPED WITH A RED ENG OVERHEAT LIGHT FOR EACH ENG. THESE LIGHTS ILLUMINATE SHOULD THE ENG TEMP GO ABOVE 934 DEGS C. IN 3/88 WE WERE INFORMED BY MAINT THAT THE OVERHEAT LIGHTS ARE ALSO DISABLED BY THE TKOF INHIBIT FUNCTION. THIS DEPRIVES THE FLT CREW OF A READILY VISIBLE WARNING SYS DURING WHAT IS POSSIBLY THE MOST CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT. WE ARE REQUIRED BY OUR COMPANY AND BY THE FAA APPROVED CHKLIST TO USE THE TKOF INHIBIT FUNCTION FOR EVERY DEP. IF THE FLT DATA RECORDER (WHICH WAS PULLED FROM THE ACFT AFTER THE INCIDENT) SHOWS THAT THE ENG OVERTEMPED BEFORE V1; THE RED OVERHEAT LIGHT WOULD HAVE IMMEDIATELY DRAWN OUR ATTN TO A PROB WITH THE LEFT ENG WHICH WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN AN IMMEDIATE ABORTED TKOF. MY RECOMMENDATION WITH REGARD TO THIS SYS IS THAT IT BE READJUSTED SO THAT THE OVERHEAT LIGHTS FUNCTION NORMALLY DURING THE TKOF WITH TKOF INHIBIT SELECTED OR THE TKOF INHIBIT FUNCTION NOT BE USED SO THAT ANY FAILURE OF ANY SYS OR COMPONENT WOULD ACTIVATE THE VISUAL AND AURAL WARNINGS OF THE COCKPIT WARNING SYS ALERTING THE CREW TO THE FAILURE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: COMPANY RECENTLY COMPLETED CONFERENCE CALL WITH ENG AND ACFT MANUFACTURER AND THEY ARE STILL RESOLVING CAUSE OF FAILURE; BUT AT PRESENT TIME APPEARS CAUSED BY BEARING FAILURE AND HIGH TEMP WAS PROBABLY RESULT OF FAILURE NOT THE CAUSE. THE TERM AUTOCOARSEN IS EUROPEAN TERM FOR AUTOFEATHER WHERE PROP SEEKS BEST POS RATHER THAN TO FULL FEATHER IMMEDIATELY IN CASE PARTIAL PWR BEING SUPPLIED. DETERMINED REASON TIRES DEFLATED WAS LNDG IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF WITH NO TIME TO COOL AFTER LONG TKOF RUN. ADDED HEAT FROM BRAKING MELTED FUSE PLUGS. NOTHING WRONG WITH ANTISKID. COMPANY HAS HAD ONLY 2 OR 3 ACTUAL FAILURES OF ENGS. REST ARE PRECAUTIONARY REMOVALS DUE TO HIGH TEMPS. ENG MANUFACTURER WORKING ON PROB ACTIVELY WITH OPERATORS AND MANUFACTURER. RPTR FEELS TKOF INHIBIT SHOULD NOT BE ON ENG OVERTEMP LIGHT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 92567: ITEM OF NOTE; AS THE CONDITION LEVER WAS MOVED TO THE FEATHERED POS AN ADDITIONAL YAW WAS FELT AND THE ACFT PERFORMANCE IMPROVED APPROX 20%. THE F/O RPTED SEEING 1300 DEGS ON THE ITT AFTER THE ENG FAILURE. THE ACFT HAD A HISTORY OF HIGH TEMPS BUT IT WASN'T INCLUDED ON THE ACFT LOG. THIS IS A DIRECT FAILURE BY THE PLT GROUP TO WRITE UP INFORMATIONAL ONLY GRIPS ON THE YELLOW SHEETS (LOGS). IT'S ONLY BECAUSE OF THE STATE OF THE ART EQUIP; THE AUTOCOARSEN (AUTOFEATHER) FEATURE THAT I AM HERE WRITING THIS RPT. THE FAILURE CAME AS A COMPLETE SURPRISE AND ACTUAL FLT TIME; LESS THAN 2 MINS; WAS FILLED WITH MANY THOUGHTS AND ACTIONS AS THE RPT STATES.