FOD damage of the #2 engine on an MD-80 aircraft occurred when a Mechanic inadvertently left his flashlight at the inlet causing major damage to the Fan blades and Inlet cowl.
Synopsis
FOD damage of the #2 engine on an MD-80 aircraft occurred when a Mechanic inadvertently left his flashlight at the inlet causing major damage to the Fan blades and Inlet cowl.
Narrative
MD-80 aircraft arrived with an inbound EPR problem. I [Mechanic-A] was assigned with Mechanic X to move the aircraft from the gate to the center of the hangar and to work on the aircraft with other mechanics on after-shift overtime. I pulled the 30-day [maintenance] history on the engines and found the aircraft had a long history of repeat discrepancies. After reviewing the history I determined the problem was with the PT2 EPR on the right engine [# 2]. So I planned on removing the right engine nose bullet to look at the PT2 tube under the bullet. After arriving at the aircraft I was informed Aviation Maintenance Technician (AMT) (Mechanic X) was not working overtime and was replaced by AMT Y who brought with him a Maintenance Manual Card # 77-92-11 EPR troubleshooting. Both of us then proceeded to open the lower and upper engine cowls on the right engine while AMT Z was doing the Periodic Service (PS) Check on the aircraft. After discussing the discrepancy with AMT Y; he wanted to see the inbound PIREP and talk to Maintenance Control. He went to the maintenance room to call Maintenance Control while I was inspecting the engine EPR lines and inlet nose bullet on the right engine for signs of leakage or obvious damage. When AMT Y returned to the aircraft; I was getting tools ready to remove the nose bullet. That's when he told me that Maintenance Control wanted us to run-up both engines and to take engine parameter readings at different power levels and to report back to them our findings.I and other AMTs proceeded to close-up the engine cowls and prepare to move the aircraft out of the hangar to taxi the aircraft to the run-up area. I performed the MD-80 Ground Handling Checklist; including a visual walk around of the aircraft and inspected the engine cowlings and inlets from the ground as per the Checklist. We started the engines and taxied to the airport run-up area on double Bravo. After idling [engines] for several minutes and recording our initial parameter readings; I started to bring the engines up to the Part Power EPR rating when I heard what sounded like a compressor stall. I then immediately brought the engines back to idle and after discussing the sound I heard with other mechanics; we decided to shut the engines down and do an inlet inspection to verify we didn't suck something into the engines.I and AMT Y went and inspected the left engine first and found no damage. We then looked at the right engine and saw major damage to the fan blades and inlet cowl. That's when I realized I had left my flashlight in the inlet when I was inspecting the nose bullet. I was upset at myself so I told AMT Y to taxi the aircraft back to the hangar and after returning back to the hangar we informed the Manager of what happened to the right engine. I told Manager that it was human error and that I had a mental lapse and I forgot about the flashlight I had left in the inlet and that it was my intention to return and remove the Inlet Bullet; but when I went to get more tools I saw and talked to AMT Y and he told me that Maintenance Control wanted us to run-up the aircraft. This change of course led me to make my mistake of forgetting about my flashlight that caused damage to the engine. I want everyone to know that I followed all written paperwork procedures and that there is no procedure in place to document the verification that the inlets are clear of tools or debris prior to starting engines after completing all work on the engines. I'm filing this report now because I want my Air Carrier to understand my error and maybe come up with a procedure that can be put in place to prevent someone else from making the same mistake that I made.
Second reporter narrative
I was assigned to an MD-80 aircraft after AMT X could not work overtime. I went to the center of the hangar where I met Mechanic A; who informed me of the EPR problem. I assisted Mechanic A in opening the engines cowls when Mechanic A said he was going to inspect the EPR lines for leaks. I told Mechanic A I was going to talk to Maintenance Control to see if they could pull up the Trouble Shooting Manual on the engines to determine whether the PT2 or PT7 was leaking and on which engine the problem was on. Maintenance Control told me they couldn't pull up the manual and they wanted me to run both engines and to record all parameters and at different power levels for both engines and to report the info back to them. I went back to the aircraft and saw Mechanic A and I told him what Control wanted us to do. So Mechanic A; I and AMT Z closed up the engine cowl and prepared to run the aircraft. AMT Z said he wanted to taxi the aircraft so I said OK and Mechanic A did the Ground Handling Checklist while I prepared to push the aircraft out of the hangar. We started the engines with all parameters indicating a normal start; we then taxied to the aircraft run-up area where we started recording the engines parameters; when we brought the engines up to Part Power EPR we heard a compressor stall; so AMT Z brought the engines back to idle where he stabilized the engines; after a few minutes of discussion between myself; Mechanics Z and A; we decided to shutdown the engines to inspect the inlets for FOD ingestion or damage due to the compressor stall. Mechanics A and Z went outside to inspect the engines and when they returned; Mechanic A told me he forgot his flashlight in the right engine inlet and the engine was badly damaged; he was very upset with himself and he asked me to taxi the aircraft back to the hangar. When we returned to the hangar all three of us went into the Maintenance Office to tell the Manager what had happened. Mechanic A told the Manager that he erred and that he just forgot about leaving his flashlight in the inlet because his intentions were to go back into the inlet and remove the nose bullet.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.