A B767-300 executed a go around and completed appropriate checklists to correct a TE FLAP DISAGREE EICAS message received during flap extension. A normal 30 flap landing ensued although ATC declared an emergency on their behalf. The Captain expressed concern about the numerous questions directed to them by ATC immediately following their go around that effectively removed the First Officer from his pilot not flying tasks.
Synopsis
A B767-300 executed a go around and completed appropriate checklists to correct a TE FLAP DISAGREE EICAS message received during flap extension. A normal 30 flap landing ensued although ATC declared an emergency on their behalf. The Captain expressed concern about the numerous questions directed to them by ATC immediately following their go around that effectively removed the First Officer from his pilot not flying tasks.
Narrative
On short final the flaps stopped between 15 and 20 with a TE FLAP DISAGREE warning light. There were no unusual controls feel issues. I executed a go around at about 1;000 AGL and the First Officer announced our go around to Tower with a comment that we were flying the published missed. Tower gave us a heading and altitude and then began '20 questions' about the go around. What was the reason? How long do you need to hold? How many people on board? How much fuel? These questions; although important; were very distracting and took the pilot not flying out of the cockpit at a critical time. As we leveled at FL50; we ran the appropriate checklist and the light was no longer illuminated. We reselected 20 flaps with no problem; lowered the gear and requested a new approach. We had a minimum of 20 flaps now for landing and were in good shape. The Relief Pilot kept the fight attendants and the passengers informed. The First Officer advised the Tower that we were not declaring and emergency. Landing was normal using 30 degrees of flaps.It would appear that Tower declared an emergency for me. The next day the Purser told me that an on board supervisor called her and asked if there was an evacuation with slides. That was the first I had heard of a possible issue. I received no information from Flight Operations; but a Flight Manager later informed me upon our return that he did not want to wake me during my rest period.I later asked the mechanic who worked on the flaps what he found and he said there were no faults on the flap computer and after exercising the flaps several times; the aircraft was put back into service. He thinks that the timing of the flap extension was too slow and the computer stopped the extension.
NASA callback
The Captain advised that the 'disagree' message disappeared almost immediately upon initiating the go around when the First Officer reacted to the standard go around call out of 'takeoff thrust; flaps 20; gear up' and moved the flap handle--which; technically; should not have been done until directed by the flap disagree QRH. As a result; although committed to the go around; the abnormal condition for which the emergency was declared had essentially gone away and the flight crew didn't even bother to inform the flight attendants or passengers as they completed the QRH and normal checklists and were vectored back for a completely normal landing. They entered a log book item; advised maintenance and went downtown for a layover.He also made it very clear that performing an unexpected go around due to an aircraft anomaly almost always results in a 'confused' and somewhat disorderly cockpit environment in which rapid decision making and task prioritization become intertwined. Although fully understanding ATC's requirements for information; the distractions involved in responding to information requests directly impacts timely problem resolution. He believed finding a means to address that task conflict would be of great value...particularly if the problem needing resolution was of greater import than the instant case. He also recognized that the flight deck confusion caused him to fail to recognize the potential value of the relief pilot to relieve some of that stress in a timely fashion.The Captain; although understanding that ATC had declared an emergency by virtue of the 'classic' questions and the fact that CFR was at the runway for their arrival; was; nonetheless a little shocked to hear from the purser following the layover that word had gotten to their company in the U.S. and that they had called asking the Purser for particulars of an event he/she wasn't even aware of at the time. He believed the Captain of a flight involved in such an event should; at the least; be advised as to what and to whom information regarding ATC's declaration would be distributed.
More incidents for this aircraft family →
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.