B757 flight crew describes the circumstances surrounding the decision to refuse an aircraft for an over water flight due to the degraded condition of the fan attrition liner.
Synopsis
B757 flight crew describes the circumstances surrounding the decision to refuse an aircraft for an over water flight due to the degraded condition of the fan attrition liner.
Narrative
Arriving at the aircraft for our morning flight to HNL; I was informed by the First Officer that he had just completed his walk around inspection and found the number 1 engine attrition liner [fan abradable shroud] to be in very poor condition and with multiple holes. He stated that 'he had flown many that were damaged; but that this was one of the worst he had seen.' I went down and personally inspected the engine and found the liner to be in very poor condition; worn throughout the entire circumference; with approximately 6 holes in all quadrants. The vast majority of damage was located on the outboard section at the aircraft 9 o'clock position. I found multiple holes; old patch material that was shedding and very thin and apparently recently shed liner surface material. I was informed that the aircraft was on a 100 hour exemption for attrition liner damage and that 14 hours were remaining with repairs planned after two more flights. The damage was to the extent that I decided to speak with Maintenance Control about the write-up. After describing the damage; I was advised that the holes in the liner were not within limits and that further maintenance action would be required. Local Maintenance informed me that a long delay would be encountered as photos of the damage would need to be taken and sent to engineering for analysis. It was at this point that events began to occur that this report addresses.While informing the passengers and waiting for word from Maintenance on a time estimate I received a phone call on my cell phone from the Chief Pilot (apparently Maintenance contacted the Chief) advising me that several other HNL flights had recently canceled for mechanical reasons and this would be the third in a week. I was told that we would lose our HNL flying in the base if this trip did not go out that day. It was also mentioned that my contacting Maintenance Control was not a good idea in that it took that problem out of our hands. I requested Operations to have the passengers deplaned. I was then confronted at the cockpit door by agent who then began to complain to me that I was responsible for ruining the plans of many people that were already inconvenienced by the previous day's cancellations. She left the cockpit; began deplaning the passengers; and as I was later told by the flight attendants; complained to many of our passengers about my decision.During the next couple of hours; and while waiting for Maintenance; I conferred with my First Officer; and other Captains about the extent of the damage to the attrition liner. It was noted that engineering would only be looking at the pictures of a small area of the liner and would not be witness to the very poor condition and damage of the entire liner. It was also noted that the Maintenance Supervisor told us that the entire liner would require replacement due to its degraded condition. I carefully weighed the advice; reviewed the damage and history on the deferral; noted that only 14 hours were left on a 100 hour deferral; that the deferral was not correct or legal to begin with; the extensive damage to the liner; and that Maintenance had attempted to convince me that I was not accurate in my observations. I made the decision that this aircraft was not suitable for an ocean crossing with no alternates. Upon leaving the aircraft; A Flight Attendant Supervisor was meeting with the flight attendants and told them that the agent had just made a PA throughout the terminal 'that the Captain was to blame for everyone not getting to HNL; that the plane was fine; and that the Captain was refusing to fly and did not communicate with Operations properly; and just canceled the flight.' When the crew entered the terminal; the flight attendants were immediately confronted by passengers wanting to know my name.I only provide this information as a background to the fact that during this entire event I received not a single bit of support from any department at this airline.I was 'pushed;' harassed; lied to; and treated with little to no respect by almost every department involved. I made a very difficult decision; of which I was quite aware of the consequences. I made that decision as a Captain entrusted to the ultimate safe operation of this airline and experienced one of the worst days of my almost 26 year career as a result. I have never been insulted and disrespected to the extent I was by operations and the agent(s) involved; and have never had to deal with such obvious attempts to push a un-airworthy plane and crew into service.
Second reporter narrative
During the preflight walk around on B757 aircraft; I noted damage to the number 1 engine attrition liner. Due to the significant amount of apparent damage; I took a couple of pictures with my phone to show the Captain. Upon completion of the walk around; I returned to the cockpit and completed the preflight cockpit duties. As soon as the Captain arrived on the flight deck; I brought the damaged attrition liner to his attention and showed him the pictures I took. He said that he wanted to go take a closer look and went down to inspect the damage personally. He returned and asked to speak directly to Maintenance in person. I called for Maintenance and made the request for someone to come up to speak with the Captain directly about the attrition liner and the answer on the radio was that it was already in the book and that someone would be up with it shortly to talk to the Captain.Maintenance Control was called and evidently the conditions of the deferral required that any holes in the liner be no more than 4 inches apart. In order for the present condition to be re-evaluated; they asked for pictures and a new measurement of the damage to be done. Shortly thereafter; the Captain spoke with the mechanics who had re-measured the damage and they told him distance between the holes was now about 2 inches apart. As this started to become an extended delay; the Flight Attendants continued to keep us abreast of how things were going with the passengers and were serving refreshments and doing their best to keep the peace. She said that some passengers had started to threaten to sue if they were not allowed to de-plane. Shortly thereafter; a Customer Service Agent did come to the cockpit and was not very pleasant; however the Captain did personally inform her of the exact nature of the delay and how we were working with Maintenance Control on getting the information and paperwork we would need to make a decision on taking the flight and she showed her displeasure as she left the cockpit; making some kind of a comment as she left that I could not hear well; but is was clearly a negative one. About this time; the Captain received a call from Chief Pilot while in the cockpit and related to me; after the call; that the purpose of the call was ostensibly to let him know that if he didn't decide to take the flight and it canceled that we would lose the HNL flying because it had been canceling too often lately. It was obvious to me that this call upset the Captain at a time when he was trying to collect relevant information and to make good decisions about the safety of the flight and that the call had added nothing to that process except pressure to fly. Next; another mechanic came to the cockpit and he identified himself as the person who the Captain had been conversing with on the radio. He brought with him printed information about the original deferral and discussed it with the Captain. He said that Engineering may be able to change the original conditions of the deferral and that; in fact; it was at 85 flight hours of an original 100 flight hours authorized and that at 100 hours (the next 2 cycles) it would need to have not a re-inspection as we previously were told; but rather a permanent repair and that was scheduled to be done. He told us that it was Engineering that makes the determination about how many hours; cycles etc that these types of deferrals can be and that they can be; 5; 20; 100; etc. He informed us that he was going to sign off on the flight and that they were all set to do the repair and that in the past; due to humidity conditions that they have had problems getting liner repairs to adhere and that in one case they had tried 4 times on one engine and eventually they had to just change the engine.The second mechanic came back to the cockpit along with the first mechanic we spoke with; and he had the logbook with him. He explained that Engineering had issued the engineering order that amended the conditions toapprove 2 inch hole spacing and that the aircraft was now authorized specifically for 2 more cycles upon which permanent repairs would need to be made. He said that the logbook was signed off and the flight was now legal to depart and that it was now up to the Captain to refuse the airplane. The Captain called Maintenance Control one more time and spoke to (name) whose name was on the Order. He said that he asked him about what would happen if the liner did come apart in flight and that person said he could not assure him that the engine would not be adversely affected.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.