A Mechanic and Inspector report about their involvement with the reconnection and inspection of cannon plugs under the floorboard of a jump seat at cabin door 1-right on an A300 aircraft. An FAA Inspector noted the lack of any reference to an operational check having been accomplished for the electrical systems affected.
Synopsis
A Mechanic and Inspector report about their involvement with the reconnection and inspection of cannon plugs under the floorboard of a jump seat at cabin door 1-right on an A300 aircraft. An FAA Inspector noted the lack of any reference to an operational check having been accomplished for the electrical systems affected.
Narrative
I was tasked to re-assemble some wire bundles and disconnects that had been disconnected to facilitate other maintenance on an A300 aircraft. I re-secured four wire bundles into their respective sponge clamps and re-connected four disconnected plugs onto their respective receptacles. At the time I reconnected the plugs; the jump seat area was still disassembled; the jump seats were still removed; and most of the upper deck area above the structural repair was still disassembled. The aircraft was parked in the run-up area with no power available and in no condition for power; so systems operational checks could not be made.I updated the aircraft logbook to reflect reconnection of the four plugs. It was later cleared by another supporting shop and a required inspection item (RII) performed without mention or documentation of systems operational checks. This was discovered three days later and the aircraft was [grounded] for systems operational checks. I believe that the original item to remove the four plugs to facilitate the structural repair should not have been made within the discrepancy of the structural repair; but as a separate item in the logbook. Entering the action to include other maintenance within the structural repair discrepancy caused a communications gap between multiple specialty shops; thus the assumption that operational checks were accomplished. Separating the action for [the electrical connectors] would have kept the action within the same supporting shop; keeping a constant flow of communication; preventing confusion as to which operational checks have been accomplished.I recommend a separate logbook entry for each item not specific to the intended repair. Also; the Airbus SWPM is not clear about required operational checks for general installation of circular connectors. It is; however; clear in the electrical inspection section. This may have caused the lack of communication/documentation that checks were required. I recommend that the Airbus SWPM be amended to specifically note the requirement of operational checks in both locations of chapter 20-44-10 and 20-52-10.
Second reporter narrative
I was called to the Structures Shop for the RII final buy-off of a fuselage major repair of an Airbus A300 write-up; at frame 11a; just below the floor line between stringers R26 and R28; due to an out of limits dent.The scope of my buy-off was for the final closing action in the electronic logbook for this major repair. I reviewed the actions taken within the text of this work release discrepancy. All structural repair steps appeared to have been properly signed-off by the Aviation Maintenance Technician (AMT) and inspectors involved in the repair.At issue is the fact that the avionics entry for disconnect and reconnect of cannon plugs was signed-off inside the body of the major repair maintenance release. Although I thought that this entry should have had a separate work release; I verified that a closing action had been accomplished.The maintenance action of disconnecting and reconnecting cannon plugs are not RII buy-offs unless specifically called out in a work card or other maintenance instruction document. It is my belief that the avionics sign-off referencing the A300 SWPM covered the operational check required. If there were unaddressed items left to be checked after the reconnection of the cannon plugs; then separate electronic logbook entries should have been documented by the avionics AMT; reference the general manual (GM).Reference also the A300 SWPM 20-52-00 inspection/check and tests (Airbus):DESCRIPTION AND OPERATION1. GeneralThis chapter gives general rules for electrical inspection/check and test.2. Structure of the chapter.A. Electrical inspection/checks (reference chapter 20-52-10).B. Electrical test (reference chapter 20-52-20).3. RulesEach time a wire or other electrical item is added; repaired; replaced; disconnected/reconnected; before you do the close-up:• Do an inspection/check of the electrical items.• Do a continuity test.• Do an integrity test of the related system(s) if applicable; reference AMM 05-51-43. If there is no integrity test; do an operational or functional test of the related function(s).At the time this major repair was closed; there were also several other open discrepancies relating to this work release.
NASA callback
Reporter stated the Airbus Standard Wiring Practices Manual (SWPM) has two locations within the SWPM involving electrical connectors. The first section; SWPM chapter 20-44-10; has instructions for 'locking in place' and 'locking down' of electrical connectors; but nothing about any required operational checks after connectors are re-installed. Removing of and reconnection of cannon plugs without any required operational check is very common. The second section of the SWPM chapter 20-52-10 is for inspection to verify reconnection of electrical connectors and paperwork that has the proper sign-off for the work accomplished. No reference in the first section to an operational requirement noted the second section. Because he had signed the write-up off as accomplished per SWPM chapter 20; the assumption was he had also accomplished the operational check.Reporter stated the fuselage had frame damage caused by either strong winds that blew the A300 into a stationary crew entry stand or a portable crew entry stand that blew into the right side of the aircraft just below the right forward entry door. The jump seat on the aft side of the cockpit; at door 1-right bulkhead; was removed and the electrical plugs that were reconnected involved reading lights and audio for the jump seat.Reporter stated the aircraft was grounded at a different station; the operational checks accomplished; and the A300 was released. He has requested a publication change to the first section of the Airbus Standard Wiring Practices Manual (SWPM) chapter 20-44-10; to include a reference to the second section; chapter 20-52-10; to help other Avionics Technicians avoid the same situation.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.