SCT attempted to have an air carrier aircraft on a visual approach to LAX 25R accelerate and fly a parallel approach beside a B777 ignoring the potential for a wake encounter during the maneuver. The crew refused.
Synopsis
SCT attempted to have an air carrier aircraft on a visual approach to LAX 25R accelerate and fly a parallel approach beside a B777 ignoring the potential for a wake encounter during the maneuver. The crew refused.
Narrative
[We were] on Approach Control frequency. Approach Control called out B777 traffic at 10 O'clock. Captain called visual. Shortly; we were cleared visual approach Runway 25R; and were told to maintain visual separation from the B777 which was on a base turning to final and 3 miles ahead of us. I began slowing to approach speed immediately to ensure wake turbulence separation. Approach Control saw this and told us to speed up immediately as he planned on putting us beside the B777. This is completely unsafe on all counts. I cannot maintain wake turbulence separation while coming up behind another aircraft; with winds blowing across our path from the 777; and then fly alongside a 777; exposing the aircraft to wake turbulence until we move from 3 miles behind until just ahead of his wings. Approach Control told us if we didn't speed up; he would break us off from the approach. Approach Control eventually; in a disgusted voice; sent us to Tower frequency. I maintained minimum approach speed in order to build separation behind the 777 to 4 miles. Several thoughts: Approach Control cannot clear us the visual; thus putting wake turbulence on us; then tell us to speed up to bring us right along side a heavy on closely spaced runways. Where does this come from? This is becoming prevalent by Approach Control; giving pilots visual clearances; then taking away the pilots ability to separate the aircraft with speed. Bottom line -- this Controller needs some counseling on proper approach procedures as well as separation criteria.
Second reporter narrative
We were on the arrival into LAX; cleared ILS 25L. We were slowed from 300 KIAS to 250; then 220. Our sequence was to follow a 757; ahead of a 777. Passing 9;000 FT; SoCal canceled our approach clearance; stopped our descent at 8;000 FT and switched us to the inboard Runway (25R). About 30 seconds later; they asked if we had the 777 insight turning base ahead (at our 10 O'clock position) and Runway 25R in sight. We did; so SoCal gave the following clearance; 'maintain visual separation with the 777; cleared visual approach 25R.' My First Officer was concerned about wake separation because the winds were 220/10 (putting us downwind of the 777); so he requested I set the FAF altitude and called for managed speed; gear down and full flaps. Our approach speed was approximately 130 KIAS. SoCal called and asked for 'our best speed to the marker' and I acknowledged we were doing our 'best speed.' About 30 seconds passed and SoCal asked 'what's your speed?' and I said 130 KIAS. He then complained that he had traffic behind us and had expected us to land essentially parallel with the 777. I asked if his plan maintained our wake separation on the 777? So Cal replied 'yes.' I said we could give him 140 KIAS. We landed uneventfully on 25R. SoCal was quick to hand wake separation and approach responsibility to aircrews; but failed to understand that pilots are then free to maneuver as necessary to for the visual approach and to maintain their separation from the traffic. They can't have it both ways.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.