An A319 ECAM alerted AIR ENG 1 BLEED LEAK after the thrust reduction to climb power; so the ECAM procedure was completed; an emergency declared and the flight returned to the departure airport for an overweight landing. The flight's Dispatcher also reported that management pilots interfered with his control of this Captain's decision process.
Synopsis
An A319 ECAM alerted AIR ENG 1 BLEED LEAK after the thrust reduction to climb power; so the ECAM procedure was completed; an emergency declared and the flight returned to the departure airport for an overweight landing. The flight's Dispatcher also reported that management pilots interfered with his control of this Captain's decision process.
Narrative
[We] received AIR ENG 1 BLEED LEAK ECAM after thrust reduction to climb power. Had First Officer perform ECAM actions followed by COM procedures. [I] advised ATC that we had a BLEED issue on the left hand engine and that I wanted to stay on routing; but stay at 9;000 MSL until issue resolved. ATC accommodated. Called Maintenance and Dispatch on company frequency and advised them of situation. Decision was made to do an air return. At first I thought a large international airport due to being 'overweight' (and the fact that the same airplane the day before had landed at that same airport 'overweight'); but after computing ACARS landing performance and QRH landing performance (with added 15% for the overweight landing) it was determined we could land safely at the departure airport on Runway 31 overweight. I declared an emergency with ATC for the overweight landing and landed on Runway 31. Descent rate was normal; touchdown smooth and roll out normal with reverse. Turned off runway assessed situation and advised ATC that all was normal and we needed no further assistance. [We] taxied to the gate; wrote in logbook all discrepancies and the fact that an overweight landing had been performed. Even after the ECAM procedure; there still showed a bleed leak. I controlled the aircraft and took over radio 1 with ATC while my First Officer took over ECAM actions and COM procedures as well as computing landing data for via ACARS.
Second reporter narrative
The flight called on the air to ground radio after departure to report to Dispatch and Maintenance Control that they had an ENG 1 BLEED LEAK fault. This was the same aircraft yesterday with the same exact problem. Initially I told them that they should plan on diverting to a nearby large international airport due to the use of shorter runway at the departure airport. While conversing with the crew; upper management from down the hall barged into the room and began loudly interfering with operational control. The Chief Pilot and his assistant did not introduce themselves and started thumbing through books and then got on the air to ground radio with the crew. They began giving the crew instructions while not saying a word to me. Neither one of them would answer my questions as to what they were doing. I overheard the Chief Pilot saying that the AIR ENG 1 BLEED LEAK approach procedure penalty did not apply. He said he looked it up somewhere. I'm not sure what that means. The procedure says to increase landing distance by 1.35 on a dry runway as per the cockpit operating manual. Further; the quick reference manual (landing distance calculation) states that if the aircraft is overweight; the actual landing distance is determined by adding 15% to that value. The chart in the cockpit operating manual has a chart that is open to interpolation that was used by the Chief Pilot and assistant. It may give some guidance; but no actual numbers. Dispatch does not have the ability to run actual numbers. I radioed the crew and stated that they need to run the numbers and report back that they had enough distance to land Runway 31 at the departure airport before I would concur that it was suitable to use. The crew radioed back and said the aircraft required a total landing distance of 5;877 FT. Runway 31 has a total landing distance greater than that. I said I concurred. Then the crew asked if the Chief Pilot concurred and he said yes. Clearly he is not a Dispatcher and has no authority to concur with this situation. The crew did declare an emergency and landed safely. This all took place while the FAA stood by and observed non dispatch personnel take over operational control. It makes me wonder what they do when the FAA isn't here. The Operational Control Center needs to have restricted access. Operational control is jointly held between the Captain and the Dispatcher only. The FOM states under operational control that managers and other sources can offer their expertise. This did not occur. They took over my desk. I couldn't get a word in and I was completely ignored. This kind of behavior compromises safety. This is supposed to be a safety sensitive room with restricted access; but everyone in the building passes through; further adding to the problem.
More incidents for this aircraft family →
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.