A B747-400 EICAS alerted HYD QTY 4 LOW and FUEL IMBALANCE 2/3 at gear retraction. An emergency was declared; fuel dumped and as an emergency return was planned the flight attendants called about fuel fumes in the cabin.
Synopsis
A B747-400 EICAS alerted HYD QTY 4 LOW and FUEL IMBALANCE 2/3 at gear retraction. An emergency was declared; fuel dumped and as an emergency return was planned the flight attendants called about fuel fumes in the cabin.
Narrative
Flight was delayed with maintenance issues :50 at the gate. GPS left failure and NO RVSM EICAS message appeared. Also emergency exit light switch guard was broken. Maintenance repaired all items. Status message #4 fuel pump was shown in computer but could not be erased by Maintenance. Just at gear retraction on climb out Fuel Imbalance 2/3 and HYD Quantity 4 LOW EICAS message appeared. Aircraft climbed to 27;000 FT and checklists were accomplished. Dispatch and maintenance were notified then Captain declared an emergency. Aircraft dumped 64;000 LBS of fuel. Flight attendants were notified for a return to the departure airport. During the return flight attendants contacted Captain about fuel odors coming from the right side of the aircraft. Dispatch was again notified and prepared for a possible emergency landing at a diversion airport now 80 miles ahead. Aircraft continued to the departure airport with and emergency landing. After landing flight went immediately to the runup pad and was met by fire personnel for an inspection. There was slight fuel dripping from the right-hand wheel well and picked up on the fire personnel test equipment. Maintenance and the Duty Manager were contacted at the gate. Gear monitor status message appeared on the status page. 391 SOB on the aircraft. All checklists were accomplished as normal as published; but checklists and training on these hydraulic emergency procedures are non-existent on a PC or PT. Information in the B747 manual about emergency landing distance lengths are not specific. Dispatch was not able to provide landing distance lengths for departure and diversion airports because of the performance computer programs and had to be guessed with and figured by the Captain. During the running of the emergency procedure checklists and dumping fuel an ACARS message appeared showing that the crew was to deadhead on a flight leaving in 2 hours. This was a very improper procedure and caused additional stress while the crew was trying to handle an emergency action.
Second reporter narrative
[Narrative #2 had no additional information.]
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.