Following a report of a possible main gear fire after landing and difficulty accessing the appropriate checklists for a passenger evacuation in the new QRH; a B767-300 Captain addressed the need for better flight crew training with respect to newly implemented procedures and the accompanying cockpit resources.
Synopsis
Following a report of a possible main gear fire after landing and difficulty accessing the appropriate checklists for a passenger evacuation in the new QRH; a B767-300 Captain addressed the need for better flight crew training with respect to newly implemented procedures and the accompanying cockpit resources.
Narrative
The winds were light and temp about 85F. It was normal approach and on-speed landing. After touch down; during taxi in; I noticed a brake temperature rising. The outboard rear left brake was much hotter than the others. It was reading 8 units and the others 3-5 (I now believe it was a stuck brake). I was alerted by Ramp Control that another aircraft saw a small brake fire. CFR responded; quickly assessed the brakes; and thought that an emergency evacuation was probably not required. I agreed and decided to defer an evacuation pending more info. They applied air to cool the brakes and extinguished the fire. We were towed to the gate after the brakes were cooled.My biggest concern; however; was the fact that when I thought I might have to evacuate; I reached for the old [Quick Response 'Checklist'] (QRC) on the glare shield. My muscle memory and 25 years of training at the company unconsciously brought me there. Fortunately; the event did not escalate into a full blown emergency. If it had and had I been in a heightened adrenalin state; I would most likely have had an even harder time finding the proper checklist. It was; of course; in the [newly introduced] [Quick Response 'Handbook'] (QRH) which is located in the flight bag. I was taught that once; in training conducted on a computer screen!Even after remembering the change; I still did not instinctively know where to go for the right page and the handbook format did not make it clear in which chapter I would find the appropriate checklist. Even after reviewing the new QRH periodically I had no real or simulated hands on experience with the handbook.My major point is that the recent training I received was grossly inadequate due to the lack of simulator training with enough repetition to counter years of muscle memory to build new habits and reactions. I now feel it is unquestionably dangerous to use web based training to train for such situations. The consequences could have been disastrous had it been a true emergency and I could not get to the checklist in a timely manner.
NASA callback
The reporter was passionate in his desire to discuss; at length; issues associated with the disparate; but conjoined flight crew cultures at his airline which had recently merged with another. He is currently considered 'non-qualified' to fly for his airline; because after he flew his first trip using the procedures and SOPs for which he received about 50 minutes of online training; he refused to fly until he was; in his opinion; trained adequately to perform his duties safely. He believes between one and two dozen other pilots have felt strongly enough to choose that expensive (unpaid status) form of protest -- although he was unable to document any number with certainty. He believes the event in this report is only a harbinger of potentially more serious events whose negative outcomes may be exacerbated by a lack of flight crew facility with procedures and inflight resources for which they have received inadequate training.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.