Enroute Controller described an alleged loss of separation event when RADAR contact was lost between two IFR helicopters that were appropriately separated prior to the RADAR loss; the facility determination indicating that non-RADAR separation was needed immediately.
Synopsis
Enroute Controller described an alleged loss of separation event when RADAR contact was lost between two IFR helicopters that were appropriately separated prior to the RADAR loss; the facility determination indicating that non-RADAR separation was needed immediately.
Narrative
Aircraft X & Aircraft Y where 2 of 3 CH47's en route IFR at 050. They were RADAR separated and both under RADAR control and in trail; estimating around 8-10 miles in trail. When they got Southeast of ABC VOR we lost RADAR on Aircraft Y because of limited RADAR coverage in the area. We advised the aircraft that RADAR contact was lost; advised Aircraft X that he could expect the same thing and decided to climb to 070 for better RADAR coverage. We later picked up Aircraft Y back on RADAR. I came in the next day; and before the end of the day my Supervisor advised me that Quality Assurance considered what had happened as an Operational Error because the 2 aircraft were not 'non-RADAR' separated and I needed 10 minutes or 20 miles between the two the instant Aircraft Y dropped off RADAR coverage. If this is considered an operational error; then my recommendations would be to put every single aircraft we work on that sector below 7;000 FT on a non-RADAR route and non-RADAR separated regardless if we have them on RADAR or not.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.