Tower Controller providing OJT described a 'departure prior to an arrival' loss of separation event when failing to intervene early enough as the student was not keeping up with the traffic.
Synopsis
Tower Controller providing OJT described a 'departure prior to an arrival' loss of separation event when failing to intervene early enough as the student was not keeping up with the traffic.
Narrative
I was providing OJT on LC1 (LC2 was combined; which is normal); with moderate traffic and the developmental was struggling. I was pushing the developmental keep up with the traffic. However; there were a number of tasks that needed to be completed in a timely manner (extending one aircraft's downwind; sequencing; etc.); but I was trying to allow the developmental an opportunity to demonstrate his ability. The developmental cleared Aircraft X; a PA46 for take off on Runway 29R with Aircraft Y (C340) just inside a 3 mile final. At this point; I sensed an overload was about to occur; and I took over; clearing Aircraft Y to land and advising him of the PA46 departing. C340 responded that he had the departing 'traffic in sight' and I turned my attention to other matters. However; at this point I became distracted from 29R; and was scanning to find the position of Aircraft Z exiting onto D Taxiway; South of 29L. Multiple other aircraft were calling inbound as well. I was concerned about Aircraft Z (student pilot; solo) because she was very challenging to work; and her radio ability/technique sounded quite questionable at times. Just a couple minutes earlier; on the second attempt; Aircraft Z correctly read back that she was cleared to land Runway 29L. However; as the OJTI; I observed the aircraft roll out on final for 29R. The developmental did not see this; and I took over as the instructor; instructing Aircraft Z to turn left to line up/land on 29L as assigned. The pilot apologized; corrected and complied. However; after Aircraft Z did not acknowledge exiting instructions on the developmental's first transmission; I was concerned with what she might do next. Aircraft Z did read back instructions on the second transmission and exited 29L. As a result of all of the factors involved; I believe too many things needed to be accomplished simultaneously and I was not watching runway separation closely enough on Runway 29R. Though I saw Aircraft X turning the corner onto 29R; I speculate that Aircraft X stopped on the runway before starting take off roll. Next; I observed Aircraft X upwind near A4; with Aircraft Y touching down on the runway (thus I believe I had 3000' and airborne; but not the required 4500'). There were no complaints made by either pilot; and Aircraft Y taxied to parking without incident. Recommendation; this event was frustrating because my initial plan; had I been working the position alone; was to have Aircraft Y change to Runway 29L for landing as soon as he came on frequency (thus balancing traffic flow between the two runways; managing my workload; and allowing plenty of time for multiple 29R departures). However; the developmental is so far along in his training that he needs to demonstrate he can dig himself out of a hole; and thus I was trying to maximize this training opportunity by allowing him to work himself out of his situation. This was a strong reminder for me as an OJTI of the importance of balancing providing good training; while ensuring I preserve safety and service by not allowing a situation to exceed my capabilities. I believe that after Aircraft Y reported 'traffic in sight;' I wasn't watching that situation as closely as I should have; and may have assumed somewhat that Aircraft Y would then adjust his approach. This event is also a good example of different standards/expectations between pilots and controllers. In this case; Aircraft Y's concern might have just been keeping Aircraft X in sight and ensuring he was satisfied he would not collide with the other aircraft. But even if the separation was acceptable to the pilot; the higher standard of 4500' and airborne must be met in this case.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.