Local Controller described a loss of separation event when coordination with the TRACON was confused and appropriate phraseology was not utilized.
Synopsis
Local Controller described a loss of separation event when coordination with the TRACON was confused and appropriate phraseology was not utilized.
Narrative
I was working Local Control position. There was a position briefing taking place. There was a Heavy in the IFR practice pattern on final cleared for the option on Runway XXR. A G150 called ready back at the ILS critical area line. I taxied him up to Runway YY with instructions to hold short. Approach Control called with 2 point outs; a Cessna going into a satellite airport on a practice approach and a BE35 about 11 miles east going west bound to another satellite airport. Point out phraseology was non-standard and both point outs ran together. I clarified what the Cessna was doing and approved the BE35 crossing the departure corridor at 5;000 FT. The RADAR Controller called back again to clarify the point out on the BE35 being allowed to descend west of the Runway YY departure corridor. I cleared the G150 for takeoff on a 180 heading. He was very slow to roll and I issued without delay for traffic on 3 mile final to Runway XXR. I noted both point outs to the relieving Controller; but still did not stop the G150 at a lower altitude. My attention was focused on getting him to roll ahead of the Heavy on final. In the middle of the G150 rolling; the TRACON called with a request to give the Heavy a noise turn; which is a left turn to 040. They initiated the noise turn and when I questioned it TRACON said; 'If you can; get him in front of the Cessna.' I denied this because I did not think I could get the Heavy in front of the traffic. I did not think we would have separation if I turned the Heavy. The relieving Controller and I were watching separation at the runway intersection and discussing the possibility of a left turn for the Heavy and I forgot to stop the G150. I think the non-standard phraseology for point outs and turn requests were a distraction. APREQING a turn when you are the one working traffic for the turning aircraft seems like poor planning. Approach vectored the point out directly through the widest portion of our departure corridor; working harder to avoid taking aircraft through there or leaving them at a higher altitude would reduce the chance of errors. My recommendation would be working harder to avoid the departure corridor. Ultimately; I am the one who was distracted and did not stop my departure.
Second reporter narrative
At the time of the event; I was receiving a relief briefing as the relieving Controller for Local Control. During the brief there were two point outs (PO) issued at once. The PO's from RADAR East were highly confusing due to the lack of following the standard phraseology that would normally be used in such coordination. First PO was for a VOR approach into a satellite airport and the second for an aircraft (a BE35) across our departure corridor at 5;000 FT. After a few minutes of sorting out what the actual coordination was for and what they were doing; a G150 called ready for Runway YY. At the time he was holding short of the ILS critical area; we were VFR; and was instructed by the current Controller to taxi up to and hold short of Runway YY. The Controller continued to brief all the while working the traffic. When the G150 was finally holding short they were cleared for takeoff on a 180 heading with no altitude restriction. At the time the satellite airport was cleared for takeoff the PO at 5;000 FT was far enough away that he would never be a factor. The Controller had to stop briefing again to instruct the G150 to use no delay as it had already been nearly a minute or more since he had been cleared and was now quickly becoming a factor or an arriving aircraft to Runway XXR. As the G150 was airborne; tagged; and shipped; the TRACON called with further coordination for the Heavy; asking if we could noise turn him which in the case it would not work. This coordination took even more focus away from the other aircraft. When I had taken position; the event had already taken place; but neither I nor the Controller at the time had noticed any sort of separation loss.Recommendation; most importantly would be going back to the basics. There is a set phraseology for a reason so why would you coordinate otherwise? I feel we could have avoided this whole situation by either keeping the aircraft at or above 6;000 FT or simply having him cross over midfield. Either option would not have taken the pilot out of his way nor cause any undue delay. It would have been a much safer operation and would never have put either the Local Controller or Approach Controller in the situation.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.