B737 flight crew reports landing inadvertently with flaps up due to a rushed approach and a failed flap drive motor.
Synopsis
B737 flight crew reports landing inadvertently with flaps up due to a rushed approach and a failed flap drive motor.
Narrative
On arrival; the Captain; although near to glide path; was a little hot. I noted a tailwind at altitude (about 10-15 KTS); and he acknowledged this. In order to slow down and prepare for landing; he lowered the gear. At this point a normal landing could have been made. At flap 5 placard speed; he called for flaps 5; and I moved the handle to 5. He slowed and when we reached flap 15 placard speed; he called for flaps 15. I moved the handle to 15. At this time the energy was high and I was focusing on airspeed waiting to lower the flaps to 30. As we approached 1;000 FT; he leveled off to slow down and called for flaps 30. I moved the handle to 30. At this point; with a good picture outside and on glideslope; I focused on airspeed. Passing 1;000 FT; I did not call go-around; although I did state the airspeed was fast. Once we started down on glideslope; VVI increased to about 1;500 FPM and I called 'sink rate.' Captain called for the Before Landing Checklist. I started to read it; but was distracted by the airspeed and GPWS Too Low Terrain alert. I read the checklist cross-cockpit and the Captain responded to the first and second items. At this point; I was too uncomfortable with speed; the GPWS alerts; and knew the checklist had not be completed and therefore called 'go-around' cross-cockpit. I put the checklist in the slot because in my mind we were going around. The Captain did not acknowledge my call and didn't go around. When a go-around was not started; I had more to process. At this point; we were below 500 FT on glideslope and about 20 KTS fast on a very long runway. Rather than trying to take the aircraft at a low altitude; I did a quick look at the green Speed brake light; the green Landing Gear lights; and allowed the landing. Unfortunately; I did not look at the Flap gauge. Besides being fast; landing and braking were normal exiting at a normal turn-off about half way down runway. On rollout before we cleared the runway; I noticed for the first time the flap indicator read 0 with no green lights and the flap handle was at 30. Upon clearing the runway; when the Captain called for flaps up; I showed him the malfunction that we had missed and why the plane was difficult to slow down. All other systems looked normal and had worked normally on the previous three legs. On taxi in we tried to cycle the flaps with no success. Although the handle moved up and down; there were no flaps (leading or trailing edge extended). While debriefing; the Captain stated he didn't hear my go-around call and would have gone around if he had heard it. In the heat of the moment and the distractions listed; I failed to crosscheck flap movement with each change. GPWS did not issue a Too Low Flaps alert; which at the time we were unsure why not. Contract Maintenance was called. It was the last leg of the day and after Captain made required phone calls; I went into crew rest.1) Inability of Captain to hear my cross-cockpit calls was a critical factor. This was the first day of us flying together and we didn't know each other's flying patterns and habits yet. Since the -300 did not have hot MIC; he asked if I would use the IC switch for us to communicate so that he could hear me. I stated that I was uncomfortable with this and would rather talk cross-cockpit like I always do in a -300/-500. During the day; I needed to repeat a few calls due to me not speaking loud enough for him to hear. My Company noise canceling headset failed that day and was turned in for repairs. Therefore; I used the old headset. I can't remember ever being told to speak louder with other pilots; but perhaps I was speaking more quietly than normal due to using a different headset. Hot MIC operation is superior to cross-cockpit in every situation and would have prevented this event.2) Excluding CAT III incapacitated Captain training; I have never had to take the aircraft from a Company Captain (especially at low altitude). Perhaps training on this for both Captain and FirstOfficer would be helpful. Steps of intervention may need to be reviewed. As I look back with hindsight 20/20 vision of the last 30 seconds of our flight; I should have just yelled go-around a second time.3) Captain continued with the Too Low Terrain because the FOM allows this since it was day VMC and terrain impact was not a factor. We must have been a few knots above the Too Low Flaps trigger speed so this alert did not come on. Perhaps the exception of day VMC should be removed and we just go around on a Too Low Terrain alert (or add 'and confirm flap and gear setting' to the bullet; which allows us to continue).
Second reporter narrative
I was flying a visual approach on the last flight of the day. We had a tailwind for the initial portion of the approach; so I led with the gear at 230 KTS and placard speed called for flaps 5. At flaps 15 speed; I called for flaps 15 and realized we were not slowing as I expected. My first thought was that I had forgotten to disconnect the auto-throttles and I quickly realized we were in a -300; so I figured it was the tailwind; which was now decreasing. At 1;000 FT AGL; I waited for flaps 30 placard speed and then called for flaps 30. At this point we were on glideslope with the gear down and the flap handle in the 30 position. The First Officer called out that my airspeed was 20 KTS high and I believe we missed the 1;000 FT call. I called for the landing check and was thinking about getting the speed lowered by 500 FT. We accomplished the first two items (speed brake and gear) when we got a 'Too Low Terrain' call; which confused me (we never got a 'Too Low Flaps' call). We were very close to the glideslope. Day VFR and the terrain was not a problem. I knew something wasn't quite right and I considered going around; however; we were now close to the ground and had a long runway.I rechecked the gear down indicators and everything looked good so I made the quick decision to put the aircraft on the ground. Apparently; the First Officer told me to go around because of the terrain call and the airspeed was still high. I never heard him. Had I heard him I would have gone around. I believe the First Officer came to the same conclusion as me about landing and did not take the aircraft from me. Had he thought we were in a dangerous situation; I have no doubt he would have taken the aircraft. Upon pulling off the runway; we discovered that although the flap handle was in the 30 position; the flap gauge read zero. In my mind; I thought we had completed the landing check; but in reality; we had only completed the first two items. I wrote up the flaps; called Dispatch/Maintenance and was told they would request transient maintenance. I then called the Hotline. I waited for Maintenance to arrive. He couldn't find a reason for the flaps not moving so Company Maintenance was called. I then went into crew rest. As I'm writing this; I found out the flap motor had frozen; which doesn't give a Warning light.1. The -300 has a very noisy cockpit and I would have gone around if I had heard the First Officer. A better cockpit communication system (hot MIC option) may have helped to break the chain of events and save the situation. On the first flight of the day; we talked about using the lower rocker switch position to communicate (which I like to do in the -300); however; the First Officer was not comfortable with this and preferred cross-cockpit communication. A more thorough communication briefing may also have helped. 2. I like the option of being able to use my judgment when receiving a 'Too Low Terrain' call in day time VMC with no visual terrain conflict. However; in this case it added to my decision to make the landing. 3. It might be a good idea to occasionally do a no flap landing in training to familiarize pilots with the higher pitch picture; which in this case didn't register in my brain.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.