A B737 departed with the FMC programmed for PDX's Runway 28's HRMNS 2 RNAV but actually departed on Runway 10L after the distracted Captain did not verify the route entered by the First Officer.
Synopsis
A B737 departed with the FMC programmed for PDX's Runway 28's HRMNS 2 RNAV but actually departed on Runway 10L after the distracted Captain did not verify the route entered by the First Officer.
Narrative
Our clearance was to depart the HRMNS 2 RNAV Departure off of 10L. I was the pilot flying. We had completed our preflight duties and the Captain called for the Before Start Checklist. After the Captain completed his briefing; I began with the departure briefing reading off each fix and crossing restrictions from the chart. During that time; the Agent dropped off the load sheet and began to thank the Captain for helping with wheelchairs. When calling for push; Ground said to expect Runway 10L at Tango. I got the new numbers after push and we then completed the Before Taxi Checklist. Once airborne; LNAV disengaged so I called for LNAV at 400 FT and the aircraft started directing a right turn toward PEGTY; the first fix off of the 28's. I noticed shortly after that that we did not have the correct points in front of us. I realized that the FMC had the waypoints for the 28's programmed instead of the 10's. The Captain tired to input the next waypoints; but we had already passed each of the fixes he entered. Tower asked us where we were going and that we did not follow the appropriate course. He asked us to contact Departure and we were then given direct HRMNS. I do believe I checked the route and LEGS page before push; because I normally do. While I was reading the departure briefing; we were distracted by the Agent. The Captain may have missed crosschecking the points with the FMC. Whenever distracted; I should start whatever checklist or briefing over again.
Second reporter narrative
I helped the flight attendants and Agent handle a large number of checked bags during boarding. The First Officer (pilot flying) began the departure briefing for HRMNS 2. I noted on the chart the RIVRR; COSUG; and LEZLI points. As I was about to crosscheck the FMC; the Agent came in handed us the load sheet and thanked me for the assistance with the bags. In retrospect; I believe I allowed this distraction to prevent me from actually confirming the points on the LEGS page. The First Officer began a right turn and; after about 20-30 degrees; we both realized this was not correct so he rolled out. We set speed and I went heads-down to enter RIVRR. By the time we cleaned up and got RIVRR in; we were past it. I then tried to enter COSUG and messed it up the first time. By the time I got it in; we were almost abeam. It would have taken a 60-degree left turn to go to COSUG followed by a 120-degree turn to proceed to LEZLI so we decided to hold heading and re-intercept the departure. At this time; Tower asked us where we were going. I told them that we had a LNAV problem and were off course. They said that was obvious because we had not gone to any of the points on the departure and directed us to contact Departure. Departure Control cleared us direct to HRMNS immediately upon contact. When I explained to Departure what had happened and asked if we had created any conflicts; he said no that Tower was upset because we had not followed noise abatement procedures. The rest of the flight was uneventful. This whole event was a result of two errors. First the First Officer did not program the correct runway for departure. Second and most critical; I; as the pilot not flying; failed in my duty to confirm the RNAV fixes in the FMC. I know why this occurred; however; that is not a valid excuse for its occurrence. Flight Operations has emphasized how important it is to not allow distractions during briefings and I allowed one to happen. The other mistake I made was not directing the pilot flying to just fly back to the river as it was VMC. We would have had time to clean up and then go heads-down to enter COSUG. First; I have to make sure that I do not allow any distractions to occur during briefings. I think I have learned that lesson the hard way. Second; I am going to add greater emphasis on the initial climb instructions to the departure brief. I think if we had reviewed them more thoroughly; even with this FMC mis-programming; we would have turned back to the tracks described in these instructions.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.