A Contract Maintenance Mechanic reports that assumption and complacency were factors involved in his maintenance errors. He installed only one lockout pin at each Thrust Reverser half on a B737-800 aircraft and did not collar a pulled circuit breaker during an MEL Reverser deferral.

Date: 2011-12 · Aircraft: B737-800 · Phase: ground

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-critical|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-mel-cdl|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far

Synopsis

A Contract Maintenance Mechanic reports that assumption and complacency were factors involved in his maintenance errors. He installed only one lockout pin at each Thrust Reverser half on a B737-800 aircraft and did not collar a pulled circuit breaker during an MEL Reverser deferral.

Narrative

Air Carrier X's; B737-800 aircraft on flight from ZZZZ to ZZZ; returned to gate in ZZZZ. I was [Contract Maintenance] and called to address a left Thrust Reverser (T/R) fault light illuminated on the overhead panel. I went to the cockpit; verified fault and attempted reset on the Engine Accessory Unit (EAU) in the Electronics Equipment (E/E) compartment. The fault [did] reset; but re-appeared with an attempt to cycle the thrust reverser. Air Carrier's Maintenance Control was then contacted to advise of the situation and to get instructions for disposition. I was told that we would place on MEL and asked if I was familiar with the procedures; to which I responded to the affirmative. I was then instructed to accomplish the procedures and call back for the numbers for the logbook upon completion. I reviewed the [Flight Deferral] Manual provided to me by the First Officer and proceeded to comply. All went smoothly except for an illustration that showed locations for four [Reverser] Lockout Pins to be installed; but there were only locations for two pins; one on either T/R sleeve. Upon review of MEL procedures with the crew; and the First Officer physically checking the T/R; we concluded that the illustration was for another configuration; but the T/R was locked out. By my recollection; I was only familiar with T/R's with that [two lockout-pin] configuration. I pulled the circuit breaker in the cockpit; there were no collars in the [Fly Along] bag in the cockpit; so none was installed. The MEL numbers were attained from Maintenance Control and the MEL details were reviewed with the [flight] crew and the aircraft dispatched. The Company called later and advised that there were errors made in placing the system on MEL: 1) There were indeed four locations for the [Reverser] lock-out pins. 2) The Circuit Breaker was reset at some time since. I feel that there should have been follow-up to verify that there were indeed just two locations for 'lock-out' pins with Maintenance Control and not relying on past experience. I should have had Air Carrier X; fax copies of Maintenance Manual (M/M) instructions to verify applicability of illustration. I should ignore the issue of length of delay and not have allowed the aircraft to leave without a collar on circuit breaker. Carrier X should [provide] detailed procedures with Technician step by step; prior to issuance of MEL.

NASA callback

Reporter stated the MEL errors described by Air Carrier X's Maintenance Control to him three days later; involved the two items he mentioned in his narrative. But the problem was compounded by the fact the B737-800 aircraft did not have further troubleshooting accomplished in ZZZ later that day as expected; when the aircraft arrived from ZZZZ. Although ZZZ is a Maintenance Base for Air Carrier X; the aircraft continued to fly several more routes where someone pushed-in the un-collared Thrust Reverser Circuit Breaker that was still on MEL.Reporter stated that assumption and complacency were issues on his part because he thought the reverser lockouts were the same on the B737-700/800/900 NexGen aircraft compared to the Classic B737s he had worked on for many years.

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.