Background
A scheduled FedEx cargo flight from Fort Worth Alliance Airport (AFW) to Tulsa International Airport (TUL) involved a Boeing 757. The crew consisted of a captain and a first officer who had not flown together before. The captain was the pilot flying, and the first officer was the pilot monitoring.
Flight History
The crew began their duty day in Ontario, California, and flew to AFW. After a brief rest, they departed AFW for TUL around 0330 Central Daylight Time. The flight climbed to flight level 310 and began descent about two minutes later. The captain briefed a visual approach to runway 18L, backed up by the instrument landing system (ILS), with a Vref speed of 123 knots. They planned to roll long due to the parking position at the south end of runway 18L.
The flight transitioned from air route traffic control to TUL approach control at about 10,000 feet and was given a heading of 360°, routing west of the airport. The crew reported being in instrument meteorological conditions until exiting the base of clouds. The first officer saw the airport beacon and the captain saw runway 8/26 lights. The flight was cleared for a visual approach and to land on runway 18L.
During the turn to final, the autopilot was disengaged and the aircraft was configured for landing. The first officer noted the aircraft appeared low and that the PAPI lights indicated below the glidepath, but the glideslope appeared normal. The captain adjusted the descent rate based on the PAPI. About 2.8 miles from the runway, the Runway Awareness and Advisory System (RAAS) announced "Approaching 18R," but neither crewmember recalled the callout. The aircraft touched down on runway 18R at approximately 0413. After landing, the captain applied brakes and asked the first officer if they were on the correct runway. They informed the tower controller they had landed on runway 18R, and taxi instructions were provided.
Crew Information
The captain, aged 57, held an Airline Transport Pilot certificate with type ratings including the Boeing 757/767 and had over 10,000 total flight hours, with 790 as a captain in the Boeing 757. He had flown into TUL at least a hundred times. The first officer, aged 50, also held an ATP certificate with type ratings including the Boeing 757/767 and had about 4,500 total flight hours, with 739 as a first officer in the Boeing 757. This was his second operation into TUL with FedEx. Both crew members provided accounts of their sleep patterns in the 72 hours before the incident, but the source does not link fatigue to the event.
Air Traffic Control
At the time of the incident, the tower was staffed with one controller on duty and one on break. The controller combined all radar and tower positions, which was normal for the mid-shift configuration. The controller cleared FedEx 1170 (the incident flight) for the approach and landing to runway 18L, confirmed the crew had the airport in sight, and then diverted attention to provide taxi instructions to another aircraft. She did not observe the aircraft again until the crew reported they had landed on the wrong runway.
Runway Awareness and Advisory System (RAAS)
The RAAS, hosted within the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System, provides aural advisories based on the RAAS database runway details, not the intended runway. A simulator evaluation by the Operational Factors/Human Performance group showed that when the aircraft was aligned with runway 18R, RAAS announced "Approaching" that runway regardless of the selected ILS frequency. On the incident flight, the RAAS callout was recorded but not acknowledged. The aircraft's flight instruments displayed the ILS localizer for runway 18L, but the localizer was not captured because the aircraft was not aligned with that runway.
Fatigue Risk Management
FedEx operates a Fatigue Risk Management Program (FRMP) that uses predictive, proactive, and reactive risk modeling. The program incorporates biomathematical scoring such as the Karolinska Sleepiness Scale (KSS). For the incident flight, the KSS score was 6.39, which is below the threshold of 7 considered high risk. The program assumed a 30-minute nap during hub turns lasting 2.5 hours or more, but this assumption was not conveyed to crews. Crew members could call a duty officer if they felt fatigued, with potential mitigations including slipping the flight, sending another crew, or canceling the flight.