A320 flight crew reported loss of Green Hydraulic System fluid in flight. The flight crew requested priority handling and performed an alternate landing gear extension; followed by a safe landing.
Synopsis
A320 flight crew reported loss of Green Hydraulic System fluid in flight. The flight crew requested priority handling and performed an alternate landing gear extension; followed by a safe landing.
Narrative
I was Captain operating Aircraft X on DATE. I arrived at the airport on the shuttle at approximately XA:20am local time. I proceeded immediately to the gate and found the FO (First Officer) already on board. We exchanged greetings and confirmed what we had said the previous day that the FO would act as Pilot Flying; PF to ZZZ and I would act as PF returning to ZZZ1. The FO then briefed me that they had completed the power up and receiving check lists. I then took the release and briefed inflight crew. Next; I entered the cockpit to retrieve a safety vest in order to perform the preflight inspection walk around. During the walk around; I found a greenish; somewhat foamy and oily appearing liquid dripping from the APU bay from the space between the two doors of the APU compartment. I further inspected to determine the fluid I noticed could not be from lavatory waste; water or drain masts. It was not from any of the other possibilities and the unknown fluid had formed a puddle of approximate dimensions of a circle of 2-3 ft. in diameter. I then completed the walk around inspection; looked for a member of Maintenance team outside and found no one; then re-entered the aircraft cockpit. I requested the FO call operations and request a Maintenance member to come to the aircraft. The FO said OK and good as we also had a fault that needed Maintenance to clear. In just a short time; Maintenance Lead; came to the cockpit and I told him of both issues. He performed a reset of the fault and said he would go outside to visually inspect the fluid leak. Maintenance Lead returned and told us that the leaking fluid was only type 4 de ice fluid. I questioned that since we do not deice in ZZZ1 if he was certain. Maintenance Lead said that it was not unusual for deice fluid to take a long time to exit the aircraft; but he was certain. I had not made entry in the logbook as no corrective action was required. We finished our duties and departed ZZZ1 for ZZZ. The flight was uneventful; and we landed and taxied to the gate. The preflight walk around for Aircraft X was completed by the FO who stated as soon as they returned that there did not appear to be anything leaking from the APU area. I thanked her and we continued to perform all preflight duties according to SOP. Part of these duties include checking Hydraulic fluid quantities are in the acceptable range; they were. The flight blocked out at XI51 UTC and all duties and responsibilities were performed in accordance with all regulation and SOP. Takeoff and climb were uneventful and the aircraft was cleared to ZZZZZ intersection and to climb unrestricted to flight level 340.At approximately XJ32 UTC; we were presented with a level 2 caution message HYD G RSVR LO LVL. I first stated; 'I am pilot flying.' Then directed for the FO to check there was no QRC including bypass item. She did and stated nothing was found. At that point I told the FO that I have had this very same hydraulic issue in a 'Classic' A320 previously. I added that I could see no reason at this point to [request priority handling] as we did not need priority handling as yet. I further stated at this time that our intent was to continue to destination. The FO said she understood; and I then turned the flying over to her with the statement; 'you have control'. She responded with 'I have control ECAM actions'. I performed the ECAM and reviewed the QRH for the fault. We then discussed how we wanted to make notifications to Inflight; ATC and the company. After good discussions between the FO and myself; we made the decision to tell Inflight via briefing the number one flight attendant face-to-face and they could then tell their crew. Secondly; we would inform the company via ACARS as they needed time to arrange a ground crew to move the aircraft from the runway. We decided that we would let ZZZ1 Approach ATC know when we were directed to speak to them and at that time; we would [request priority handling]. We brought the number one flight attendant into the cockpit to brief them; we also told the number one flight attendant that this would be a [priority landing]; and they asked several great questions regarding the loss of the Green hydraulic system. When all their questions were answered; the flight crew took a restroom break and the number one flight attendant returned to the cabin. I then sent an ACARS message to Operations Control that told them of the problem and our intent to land in ZZZ1. Very soon after I answered a SATCOM call from Operations Control to review the message and see if we wanted assistance from Maintenance Control. I stated they should let us know if there was anything of importance to add; but I have personally been through this same fault previously and I was not concerned. I did discuss at great length with the FO that when I had personally been through this previously; that the hydraulic fluid had drained from a broken fitting in the number one pylon into the number one engine creating a great deal of smoke. I emphasized that my experience was to remain open throughout the conduct of the non-normal situation to expect something unplanned to occur and that we would handle whatever else came up with the same professional adherence to SOP we had with the fault we were given. I went on to tell the FO that I wanted every bit of information they might have to add to the successful outcome; and nothing was to be left unsaid. I told the FO 'I want to hear the craziest thing you have ever said; which is to say; I do not want you to hesitate to say anything and I value anything you have to say'. We were cleared to descend using the ZZZZZ1 XX RNAV ARRIVAL to ZZZ1 and plan landing south. The arrival and approaches were briefed. On first contact with ZZZ1 Approach the FO also then [requested priority handling]. There was brief discussion on the nature of the emergency and what services we required. The FO passed along that we would require a slightly longer than normal downwind leg to facilitate deploying the gear via emergency procedures and that we would request CFR meet the aircraft after we stopped for a visual inspection; as we had previously discussed. ATC confirmed that this was acceptable; and we performed the longer downwind. The FO deployed the landing gear via the alternate procedure; and we requested to turn in for the visual landing. At approximately 1;000 ft. from landing; the flight attendants called to say that passengers were concerned with a smell of burning hydraulic fluid. I knew there was no time to do anything with that; so I performed the landing as we had briefed to a full stop and CFR conducted a visual and infrared inspection to declare all clear. We then started the APU and when the start was complete; shut down both engines using the SOP for after landing and parking. We did have to customize both checklists as some items could not be completed until we were at the gate and even then; the emergency gear extension handle was required to remain out and not stowed.The aircraft was towed by [Ramp] Personnel to Gate XX in ZZZ1 and the passengers were deplaned. The FO called to confirm our gate assignment and operations asked if we had [requested priority handling with] inflight. I asked the FO to not answer that request as we were still not complete with the flight. All possible checklists and procedures were complied with prior to leaving the aircraft once we were at the gate. The parking checklist was completed except for the emergency gear handle and deplaning was begun. Then someone from Operations knocked on the door and asked to speak to me to ask if I declared a situation to inflight. I asked if we could speak later. I spoke to all Inflight crew to thank them for their professionalism and dedication to customer safety. I reiterated the same to the two members of Inflight management who were now on board. I then called for Maintenance to come to the aircraft for a debriefing. The reply to this request wasto ask if I had declared a situation to inflight; as I knew that this was an open frequency and that it was available for anyone to be listening; I did not answer. I asked again for Tech Ops to meet me at the aircraft. At this time the FO was ready to depart; and I took a moment to sincerely thank them for being such a great professional and told them how I genuinely appreciated them for making my job so much easier. We shook hands and briefly embraced and said goodbye.NAME1 from Maintenance was on board; and I briefed him on everything and asked him if he needed more than my short logbook entry that we experienced HYD G RSVR LO LVL in flight. He replied no and I handed over the aircraft to him. When I arrived in the gate area; the gate agents said I was supposed to wait and speak to Operations on the phone. The Gate Agent dialed the phone and the Operations person asked me if I had declared a situation to inflight. I replied that I was unsure of answering any questions at that time and would be filing all required reports. I then departed the airport and went home.Thoughts: I would like to know where the hydraulic leak occurred.Crew members need to not give out operational information; or ask questions regarding operational issues of emergency or non-normal situations over open radio frequencies.
Second reporter narrative
I was the First Officer operating Aircraft X. I arrived at XA00 local time and began the power up and receiving checklist. The Captain arrived shortly thereafter; checked the logbook; and performed the walk around. He then reported seeing fluid under the APU. We called Maintenance for that issue as well as a reset on the ECAM. The Maintenance Technician assured us that the fluid was deicing fluid and he cleaned it up. He performed the reset. The rest of the preflight was normal. I was pilot flying first leg; and the flight to ZZZ was uneventful. I performed the walk around in ZZZ and took extra time to specifically look for any leaks or fluids. There were none. Takeoff and climb out were uneventful. We were level at FL 340 when we received a HYD G RSVR LO LVL. The Captain was Pilot Flying and called for the QRC. I checked that; including the bypass items. I said 'No QRC'. He then transferred control to me and I said 'I have control; ECAM actions'. We then carefully completed the ECAM; QRH; and discussed our plan of action. Subsequently we spoke with the Lead Flight Attendant; gave her detailed information about what to expect; and told her it was a Code Yellow. We then sent a message to Operations Control; answered a SELCAL from them; and discussed our plan with them. They were in agreement with continuing our flight to ZZZ1. Once on ZZZ1 Approach we [requested priority handling]; gave ATC specific information and requested CFR meet the aircraft to confirm we were safe to be towed to the gate. We followed all checklists to manually deploy the landing gear and stopped on the runway as Nose wheel steering was inoperative. Once at the gate we completed the logbook and debriefed the flight attendants. Once all passengers deplaned; Inflight departed; Maintenance arrived. At this time I asked if the Captain needed me further. He told me I was fine to leave; and I departed.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.