ATR 72 Flight crew reported an in flight shut down of the #1 engine because of high torque indications. The flight crew made a precautionary landing at destination airport.
Synopsis
ATR 72 Flight crew reported an in flight shut down of the #1 engine because of high torque indications. The flight crew made a precautionary landing at destination airport.
Narrative
Reduced PL (Power Lever) to FI in descent. #1 Torque was 31 percent with PL in FI (Flight Idle). Crew considered directional control loss during approach and after landing. Contacted Ops and agreed with inflight #1 engine shutdown for single engine landing. Shut down #1 engine at 4;000 feet and requested ATC vector to ILS. Safely landed and taxied to ramp. FO (First Officer) was flying pilot and started descent from 16;000 feet to 4;000 feet. FO reported CA (Captain) that #1 torque was 31 percent with PL in FI. #2 torque was zero with PL in FI. Crew had reported company several times that #1 Torque gauge indicated 20 percent higher than normal level in cruise with PL in notch. Mechanics troubleshot it and airplane returned to service. The problem happened in first flight after this troubleshooting.Crew analyzed risk and consequences to approach and land with this condition and informed company necessity for in flight #1 engine shutdown for safe landing. Then; CA took control and FO asked company whether we should land at ZZZ1 or ZZZ. Company selected ZZZ and FO requested ATC to vector to set up ILS XX and conduct all necessary checklists. Then; airplane landed on Runway X with single engine safely and taxied to hanger on its own power. Performance test should be done after troubleshooting prior to returning it to revenue flight. If a check flight or a reliability flight after the maintenance was completed; this incident might be prevented.
Second reporter narrative
I was PF (Pilot Flying) and reduced PL to FI during the descent. #1 Torque was 31 percent with PL in FI. Crew considered directional control loss during approach; landing and after landing. After a discussion; PIC and I agreed that a single engine landing would be best. PIC took over as pilot flying. I became pilot monitoring and requested vectors to deal with a mechanical issue and time to contact our company. I spoke with operations and got approval to land in ZZZ. I informed ATC that we were shutting down engine #1 and would conduct a single engine landing. I went straight to Single Engine Operations checklist. After starting the checklist; I realized that I needed to shut the engine down first. Engine #1 was shut down. Approach briefing and approach checklist was completed. Per the FOM; [priority handling] should have been requested; but was not requested by the flight crew. ATC was notified that we were prepared to land. Fire equipment was offered by ATC and accepted by flight crew. ATC issued vectors to ILS XX. Before landing checklist was completed. Flight crew landed without incident and taxied to Hangar. I was PF and started descent from 16;000 feet to 4;000 feet. I informed the PIC that #1 Torque was 31 percent with PL in FI. Crew had reported to company several times that #1 Torque was 20 percent higher than #2 Torque in climb out and cruise flight with the PL in the notch. Maintenance had just replaced a high pressure on the just hours before departure. Crew analyzed risk and consequences to approach and landing in this condition. PIC took control and I contacted company I informed company of necessity for in flight engine #1 shutdown for safe landing. Company selected ZZZ for single engine landing. ATC issued vectors until crew was ready for landing. Crew landed Runway XX without incident and taxied to Hangar. A power run up after maintenance was completed may have detected the increased torque and might have prevented this incident. A check flight or a reliability flight after the maintenance was completed may have prevented this incident.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.