Air carrier flight crew reported left engine failed during cruise resulting in smoke and odor throughout the aircraft. Flight crew commenced the QRH procedures and requested special handling to a close diversionary airport where a safe landing was executed and was met by airport support personnel.
Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported left engine failed during cruise resulting in smoke and odor throughout the aircraft. Flight crew commenced the QRH procedures and requested special handling to a close diversionary airport where a safe landing was executed and was met by airport support personnel.
Narrative
FL360 N2 Vibe indication and noise. Reduced left engine idle. A couple of belches of smoke from the Gaspers. Shut off left pack. FO (First Officer) started descent. Made PA FA (Flight Attendant) 3 chimed to report noise and smoke. Gave assurance and promised to call back. Donned O2 and requested vectors ZZZ. FA called back wanting the basics. Gave red and 10 minutes as we [had to consider all possibilities]. Engine oil pressure warning. Secured engine. FO got us redispatched and set up the approach as I took care of checklist; cabin and ATC. FO and I came together on base to see where we were situationally. I did a quick check of Aircraft status and his math. He had managed to gather necessary landing data and set up for the approach. Excellent landing. Rolled to a stop on runway and made the announcement to remain seated. We had CFR inspect the left engine and follow us to the gate. Engine failure. Cause yet to be determined. The O2 mask mic/interphone proved to be difficult. Hot mics made it nearly impossible to hear over the breathing. The FAs said they could not hear me. I think my habit of keeping the hot mike on to as needed.
Second reporter narrative
Possible inadvertent deviations from company SOP/policies during [event] caused by left engine failure in cruise flight. Communication on flight deck and with Flight Attendants/Passengers impaired by smoke in cockpit and difficulties turning oxygen mask microphones on/off in coordinated manner. Successful diversion and landing with one engine inoperative.In cruise at FL360 high N2 vibes on left engine followed by loud noise. Reduced left engine to idle; FO (First Officer) called for non-EICAS QRH procedure for high vibes. FAs (Flight Attendants) called CA (Captain) to report unusual loud noises from left engine. FO smelled burning odor in cockpit; CA inhaled smoke from his side gasper. CA secured left pack and both CA and FO donned O2 masks. FO called for Emergency card; smoke/fume removal. While establishing communication via masks; FAs called again. FO noticed airspeed was decaying and announced selection of lower altitude and VS down to aid in airspeed recovery. CA notified ATC of [event] and immediate descent due to smoke/fumes. CA saw ZZZ as closest airport and asked FO to take radios and begin coordinating with ATC for diversion to ZZZ while he talked with FAs and ran the checklists. FO sent ACARS to Dispatch to update with likely diversion to ZZZ; Dispatcher asked if [we advised ATC] and FO texted back yes. ATC said ZZZ was landing west; FO sent for landing numbers noting estimated fuel on landing would place aircraft slightly under MLGW. During descent through low 20's; left engine low oil pressure EICAS illuminated. FO announced shutoff of left thrust lever IAW emergency card and started APU. CA began running what FO initially thought was severe engine damage emergency checklist (arm/blow bottles) and later incorrectly reported left engine bottle blown to ARFF. FO setup vectors to final for [Runway] XXR; using speeds on 75;000# card as ACARS landing data was not received. CA resumed radio calls under 10;000 ft. during vectors to final and FO briefed the single engine flaps 20 approach. Do not recall if descent/approach checklists were fully completed; and several of the QRH procedures were likely incomplete. Landing checklist was completed. Landing was uneventful; aircraft came to a stop using normal braking and minimal right thrust reverser between B7 and G; using about 7;500 ft. of the 10;500 ft. available runway. After the parking brake was set; CA and FO removed oxygen masks and normal communication was reestablished with FAs and the CA made a passenger announcement. FO established communication with ARFF then CA monitored their inspection of our aircraft on the runway while FO called Dispatch on cellphone to report on ground in ZZZ and coordinate next steps.Both CA and FO were surprised how challenging extended communication with each other; Flight Attendants; and ATC was while wearing oxygen masks. In retrospect; it was probably safe to remove the masks once left engine was secure but we weren't sure how much residual smoke was in cockpit. It's possible that recurrent training could emphasize a scenario using the masks for an extended period of time rather than just practice taking them on/off. And perhaps a 'pause/reset' at 10;000 ft. would have helped the CA and FO decide to safely remove masks and re-establish communication with FAs and passengers prior to continuing to landing. Neither of us appreciated until on the ground how much confusion and fear remained in the cabin during the abnormal situation.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.