Air Carrier Captain and First Officer reported that 3 spoilers on the left outer wing deployed during rotation and climb. The pilot crew had difficulty in maintaining aircraft control and returned to the departure airport. The pilots reported a similar event had been recently reported and MEL'ed on this aircraft.
Synopsis
Air Carrier Captain and First Officer reported that 3 spoilers on the left outer wing deployed during rotation and climb. The pilot crew had difficulty in maintaining aircraft control and returned to the departure airport. The pilots reported a similar event had been recently reported and MEL'ed on this aircraft.
Narrative
Immediately after rotation we noticed a vibration that both the CA (Captain) and I thought was a typical nosewheel vibration; however in a matter of seconds it greatly worsened to a point that we realized it was something worse. The CA called for autopilot engagement. Immediately upon autopilot engagement the aircraft started tracking right of course. The Captain disengaged the autopilot and auto thrust so as to maintain directional control and airspeed as the aircraft seemed to be having difficulty with direction and speed. Tower handed us off to Departure and upon checking in with departure the vibration had dramatically worsened into what I would call more of a severe shake than a vibration so we [advised ATC] and requested a return to the field on the initial check in. Departure gave us vectors for a right hand pattern back to Runway XX. We were assigned an altitude of 5;000 ft. We made it to 5;000 ft. but we had difficulty maintaining altitude. The Captain kept control of the aircraft and had me cycle though the doors; wheels; and flight control pages to try and identify the problem. We found that the flight control page showed the left 3 outboard spoilers were deployed. The FA (Flight Attendant) called twice; first to tell us about the vibration in the back and the second time to tell us that 2 rows of O2 masks had dropped. The Captain made the decision to land flaps 3. We landed on Runway XX and the vibration continued until touchdown. Upon arrival at the gate we found that spoilers on the left had closed however there was a spoiler deployed on the right wing. There was an apparent issue with SEC 3 and it's control of the spoilers as SEC 3 was on an MEL due to the same issue on a previous flight. If there is an issue with a flight control maybe the aircraft should be out of service until the repair is made instead of the MEL.
Second reporter narrative
High terrain environment. During the takeoff roll; the aircraft felt difficult (heavy) to rotate. I did not rotate forcefully. I picked the nose up and let the airplane fly off the ground. Vibration started with gear retraction and grew worse. Like nose wheel shimmy multiplied. Excessive and severe vibration was apparent and increasing in intensity. I called for the autopilot to limit distraction. The autopilot instantly rolled right. Autothrust was accelerating beyond SID speeds and the trend vector beyond 250 kts. I switched the autopilot off then switched autothrust off. I had the FO (First Officer) turn flight directors off and engage Track/FPA to help hold attitude. At this point we had been switched to Departure frequency and we checked on [advising ATC] and requesting return to the field. ATC provided vectors. Severe vibration was felt throughout the aircraft. FA's (Flight Attendants) called me shortly after takeoff about the vibration (we informed them we were aware) and then they called again on the downwind to tell me O2 masks had fallen in 2 rows (we informed them we returning for landing and would deal with that later). It was difficult to hold altitude and airspeed. Any turn resulted in a descent requiring power to recover. Any distraction pulling me away from the PFD caused a change in heading and altitude. VLS and V alpha prot were very high. I had the FO cycle through the Doors; Wheels; and F/CTL ECAM pages to find out what was causing the vibration. The F/CTL page indicated the left outboard 3 spoilers were deployed (un-commanded). The high VLS and V alpha prot plus the handling characteristics were consistent with having spoilers extended. (I checked the position of the spoiler handle - it was in the retracted position).We circled back to land on Runway XX. I stated to the FO that we would have to land flaps 3 due to the spoilers being extended and had the FO look for an airframe vibration QRH checklist. (After action review indicated that this checklist would not have helped.) The approach was difficult due to the high V alpha prot. I had to choose between slowing down or maintaining the descent profile to get flaps out. I had very little margin between Flap extension speed and VLS; and coincidentally VLS was maybe 2 kts. above V alpha prot. I considered overspeeding the flaps if necessary to slow down. It wasn't necessary; but just barely. We landed Flaps 3 intentionally; however; we did not select flaps 3. Time issue. The FO was task saturated. I used selected speed and manual thrust to landing.I made no PA's until after landing. I had my hands full and the FO was too new on the aircraft to turn over control. The FO did a good job and I was issuing very fast commands. He handled it well. SEC 3 was deferred per an MEL. We were unable to see the position of the number 1 and 2 spoilers on both wings. I read and complied with the 'O' procedures of the MEL. When we arrived at the gate after returning to the field we found the Right #1 spoiler full extended. I have been told that a passenger saw the spoiler extended prior to takeoff (this is here say and I have no proof if it's true or false). When and how that spoiler was extended is unknown to me. The deferral results in amber X's being displayed in that spoiler position on the ECAM page. In addition to that; we had 3 outboard spoilers deployed (un-commanded) on the left wing. This was the second event involving vibration and poor handling characteristics including the autopilot roll that I know of-- the first was clearly not as severe. Obviously; this was a serious problem with the spoilers and the aircraft should not have been in service. Aircraft should be removed from service if there is sufficient vibration to result in a loss of control. This aircraft had diverted once already because of this. We did not have enough information available to know what to expect. If we had been aware of what had occurred before; I would most likely have refused the airplane.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.