A320 flight crew reported smoke and fumes in the cockpit with ECAM 'ANTI ICE F/O L STAT F/O R STAT' Illuminated. The flight crew requested priority handling and diverted to make a precautionary landing.

Date: 2022-05 · Aircraft: A320 · Phase: cruise

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-critical|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|flight-deck-cabin-aircraft-event-smoke-fire-fumes-odor

Synopsis

A320 flight crew reported smoke and fumes in the cockpit with ECAM 'ANTI ICE F/O L STAT F/O R STAT' Illuminated. The flight crew requested priority handling and diverted to make a precautionary landing.

Narrative

On the morning of DATE; NAME and I were operating Aircraft X from ZZZ to ZZZ1. NAME was the pilot flying and I was the pilot monitoring. It was an uneventful departure and climb to cruise. At cruising altitude in the low 30's we were in VMC. We received the ECAM 'ANTI ICE F/O L STAT F/O R STAT'. NAME started to perform the ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor) actions. Simultaneously I noticed a burning electrical smell. NAME then noticed the smell as well. We both don our oxygen mask then. NAME handed me the controls and we made the decision to divert. ZZZ2 was approximately 177 miles from our current position. While we were still able to smell an electrical burning there was no visible smoke coming into the cockpit and the intensity of the smell seemed to be constant. NAME called the cabin and informed the cabin crew that we were diverting; and we were code yellow. He also made a customer PA. I sent an ACARS off to Dispatch. I believe I told them Avionics Smoke and we were diverting to ZZZ2. I then requested priority handling with ATC. I informed ATC of our situation and we wanted to divert to ZZZ2. We were cleared direct ZZZ2. ATC took the standard information of SOB; and fuel. I informed ATC that it was going to be an overweight landing. I updated the FMS with a new destination and loaded the ILS XX at ZZZ2 since that was the approach in use per the current ATIS. During this time NAME was running the 'Smoke/Fumes/Avionics Smoke' QRH (Quick Reference Handbook). Name called the cabin asked them if they smelled anything or noticed anything unusual. They reported they did not. During our descent; the burning smell did dissipate. However; we stayed on our oxygen mask. NAME then ran the overweight landing QRH and landing data performance. Dispatch sent us a new flight summary and how much overweight we were predicting to be. Once NAME finished with the overweight QRH he took control. NAME briefed the approach; and we ran the descent check list. NAME also performed his 10000 foot flow. I also took a glance at the checklist and the overweight check list to back NAME up on it. About this time; we were about to check on with ZZZ2 approach. We updated ZZZ2 approach of our current situation. We were planning a negative evacuation and we wanted to stop on the runway for inspection. We also asked for direct ZZZZZ for the ILS XX. We got cleared as requested and cleared for the approach. When we were handed off to tower; I restated what our intentions were. We had a normal landing and came to a stop just prior to 'B'. NAME made the 'remain seated call' and Tower put us on another frequency. I thought this was a direct frequency to CFR (Crash Fire Rescue). But it was another tower frequency. It did lead to some confusion because I put this new frequency into radio 2 while listening to radio 1. I reached out to CFR to tell them where to inspect the aircraft. When the controller started talking to CFR I did not realize right away he was speaking on both frequencies. It caused me to unnecessary switch back to radio 1 while CFR was on radio 2. Once I figured that out; we had CFR inspect the front of the aircraft since we knew the issue was in the avionics bay. CFR reported an all clear. We then contacted ground and taxied clear of the runway. Once clear we preformed the after landing check list. I contacted ops for our gate assignment. We were cleared into C-1. We pulled into the gate. We deplaned the aircraft as normal. CFR came up to the cockpit to asked what happen. I explained to them what happen. Maintenance met the aircraft. He found one of the computers below my seat burned itself up and was still hot to the touch. He did not know why the circuit breaker did not pop. From this point forward the customers were inside the terminal. The difficulty of using the O2 mask and communication. Without the head set on it was difficult to hear. With the head set on; it was difficult to hear over your own breathing getting picked up in the microphone. We did solve this by going 'cold' mic in between sentences. However; you need to be aware of that. We did slow down to 250 knots at 10;000 feet. Should we have kept the speed up? It was not necessary at that point but; I believe we slowed down more out of habit. While we do go over the EVAS in training. It is not second nature if we had to use it. Especially since we are shown how to use it standing up.

Second reporter narrative

Enroute from ZZZ-ZZZ1 at 320 received ECAM ANTI ICE F/O STAT. We both immediately smelled a strong burning odor. We put our masks on and established communication. I passed flying duties to my FO; performed the ECAM; and initiated the QRH Smoke/Fumes/Avionics Smoke checklist. I called my Cabin Crew to determine if they could smell the odor and they could not. We coordinated with Dispatch and agreed on ZZZ2 as our divert; declared a code yellow; informing them that we would be landing in 15-20 minutes. I also made several PAs to our customers informing them of the situation and telling them exactly what we were doing and what would happen when on the ground. No visible smoke was present but the burning smell persisted so we kept the speed up in our descent and exceeded 250 knots below 10;000 feet for a brief period. We performed the overweight landing checklist and made an uneventful landing in ZZZ2. We stopped on the runway and had CRF visually inspect the aircraft prior to taxiing clear. Once on the ground the contract maintenance tech determined that a Pitot Heat Controller had malfunctioned/shorted out.

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.