Pilot reported a Right Engine Bleed problem resulted in a return to the departure airport and an aircraft change.

Narrative

This was our first flight on Aircraft X. It had one deferral - the L pack. The previous crew told us the R ENG BLEED caution message came on briefly 3 times during the flight. They had written it up. Maintenance came out and replaced the HPSOV (High Pressure Shut-Off Valve); tested the system and signed it off as fixed. After take off; passing though about 800 ft. AGL we received the R ENG BLEED caution message (I believe it is suppressed during take-off). Since we were in a critical stage of flight I acknowledged the message but did not address it until the airplane was re-configured and the after takeoff checklist was complete. We were talking to ZZZ Departure. I told them we had an issue and were running a checklist and we needed to stop the climb. We leveled off at 5;000 ft. and were given vectors to keep us circling south of ZZZ. There is no QRC procedure. I ran the R ENG BLEED QRH. This had us turn the R pack off and included some notes about single pack operation. However; since the L pack was already deferred we now had no packs; and therefore no pressurization or air conditioning. We ran the QRH PRESSURIZATION - UNPRESSURIZED FLIGHT PROCEDURE. We obviously could not continue the flight to ZZZ1 in this condition and chose to return to ZZZ. However; we were about 2;000 lbs. over max landing weight so had to hold to burn off fuel. We slowed to 210kts so we could lower the gear and flaps 20 while still keeping above the 200kts recommended as a minimum for ram air flow. I told ATC of our intent to return to ZZZ and our need to hold to burn fuel. I did not declare an emergency. Although we needed non-normal handling; I did not feel that being unpressurized at 5000 ft. was an emergency condition. The cabin and cockpit temps were increasing but; while airborne; were not excessive so I did not feel an immediate overweight landing was warranted. I notified Dispatch and Maintenance. I informed the FAs (Flight Attendants) of the situation and the RTF (Return To Field). I made a PA to let the passengers know we had a mechanical issue; that we would have little air flow in the cabin and it would likely get hot. I informed them of the RTF (Return to Field) but made it clear that the airplane was still in a safe; flyable state. The flight back to the airport and during the approach were normal except for using a reduced descent rate for passenger comfort; and the need to keep 200kts as long as possible. We informed [Approach Control] of both needs and were given extra spacing on the preceding aircraft.On the ground; with no airflow; the cockpit and cabin quickly heated up; eventually reaching 32C (90F). Our gate was open but there were no ramp personnel to park us. We called Ops three times. I could see people working on other airplanes and standing around but they were obviously unaware of our situation. After about 7 mins waiting (estimated - we were on the ground 12 mins total) we were parked.The passengers were visibly hot and uncomfortable. One younger passenger was sick. The airplane switch was a mess. We were given a different airplane at Gate XX; a couple of gates away. However; with no release we could not verify the tail number. When I called Dispatch; they had just had a shift change and did not know what was going on. It took a couple of calls to get confirmation that we were on the right airplane. A [coordinator] called to let me know we needed a paper release due to computer issues with a RTF; however; the gate agent could not pull it up. In the meantime; adding to the confusion; the passengers were sent to Gate XY; in a different terminal. I called Dispatch again and they reconfirmed we were still operating the flight on Aircraft X. It took about an hour; a gate manager and multiple calls to Dispatch to assemble the passengers; the airplane and the release together in one place.