Air Carrier Captain reported the First Officer did not comply with ATC speed assignments and an altitude assignment. The Captain reported he did not monitor the flying pilot close enough and became distracted with side conversations and set the flaps improperly.

Narrative

This was a flight with 3 different ATC clearance errors that were not all immediately trapped. I was Pilot Monitoring (PM) and the First Officer (FO) was Pilot Flying (PF). We were flying ZZZ1 [to] ZZZ on the ZZZZZ arrival. The first was to cross ZZZZZ at 250 knots then descend via the ZZZZZ arrival. With the first restriction; the 250 knots at ZZZZZ; we were getting close to it; and I queried the FO about slowing to 250 for ZZZZZ. He slowed down and we crossed it at 250 knots. Then we stayed level at our last captured altitude; I think it was 12;000 ft.; when I noticed that we had passed our TOD for 8;000 ft. at ZZZZZ1. I told the FO we need to descend best rate immediately; and I quickly saw we weren't going to make the restriction. I advised; ATC; and they said roger; and to just do best rate down and fly heading 360; and we complied. Next we were getting set up for a visual to 28. ATC said to maintain 180 knots to the FAF. When we were still 3 to 4 miles from the fix; the FO began slowing down and asked for flaps 30. Without thinking; I glanced at the speed; and selected flaps 30. Immediately after; I realized what I had done; and told the FO to keep the speed up just under 180. The FO kept the speed mostly in the 175 to 180 range; but initially the speed had dropped almost to 160. I elected not to raise the flaps; because we were already so close we would have to immediately extend them again; and it would complicate the profile. We then finished configured at the FAF. Meanwhile tower gave a 737 instructions to do S-turns. And despite my best effort to vacate the runway quickly; [the aircraft] had to go around.The FO was struggling to remember ATC instructions; and I was not monitoring closely enough to catch the mistakes early enough. I also need to think more before extending flaps when asked. Regarding the 250 knots at ZZZZZ I successfully identified the error and called it out. After that the FO was talking about their previous non-flying job in law enforcement; and some of the remarkable things that he did. While technically we were above 10;000 ft. in the most critical section of an RNAV arrival is not a good time to be talking about anything of any significance. I didn't want to egg him on; and I just nodded and said that's interesting; but I didn't say 'hey lets talk about this on the ground or on a longer flight; we gotta work on this descend via'; like I should have. Because of this; I didn't notice that we had passed the TOD soon enough. Then; on the Visual Approach; I should have given it 1 more second of thought before complying with the FO's request for flaps 30. I de-briefed the FO on all of this. We talked about how I should have been PM more closely; that he needs to be more aware of ATC instructions; and that descending via an RNAV is not a good time to talk about heavy topics. This was a sloppy flight and we need to better.I need to PM more closely. Especially in an 'easy' day in clear VMC when the airspace isn't busy. It is when everything is easy and quiet and not a lot is going on when I get most complacent and my attention drifts. I need to do something active; like keeping a scanning loop going; checking something; or talking about the descent profile; to help keep focus. This is something I've been working on. I've been working on thinking more before extending flaps. I need to pause [for] 1 Mississippi and verbalize the flap speed; before extending flaps to check speed and check if extending flaps makes sense in that point in time. This will help me catch a poor decision to extend flaps.