A320 flight crew reported non standard phraseology with ground personnel resulted in aircraft uncommanded movement due to brake failure; and the aircraft pushed wrong direction.
Synopsis
A320 flight crew reported non standard phraseology with ground personnel resulted in aircraft uncommanded movement due to brake failure; and the aircraft pushed wrong direction.
Narrative
New Captain on OE with Check Pilot operating as First Officer (hereafter referred to as the FO) and myself on the jumpseat conducting FAA New Captain check. The Company pages note not to start engines until pushback complete in MSY and from experience I am aware that they will push you tail north into the alley to the east while remaining on the ramp side of the taxiway line or will push you tail north on the west side of the terminal by the holding pad so as to not block the taxiways. Received an initial clearance from Ground to push tail east into the alley. As pushback commenced Company called for push in the alley and Ground amended the clearance to a tail west. The Tug Driver began a rapid push as the FO read back the clearance. By the time the FO acknowledged the clearance; advised the CA (Captain) and he was able to have the Ground Crew stop the push we were 90 degrees to the gate line with our tail west.At this point the crew asked the Tug Driver if he could pull us forward to the east alley and swing the tail in. The driver was becoming agitated at this time and advised that he couldn't due to Company A baggage carts blocking the ramp east of the gate. The Captain asked the FO to see if ground was okay with disconnecting where we were. As the FO began to work on that the CA advised the Ground Crew that we're 'good this way.' It appeared that his intent was to convey that disconnecting here would be okay but the Tug Driver interpreted it to mean that he was good to continue to push to the west as a few seconds later the aircraft began to move again; the tail began to swing south toward the taxiway to continue westerly around the terminal. Looking out the window there was a Company 737 coming around the taxiway to the west. I pointed out to the CA that this was an uncommanded push and it took two or three tries of him saying 'Stop' on the interphone to stop the pushback.At this point we were tail south facing the terminal possibly protruding on the taxiway. The Tug Driver was very frustrated at this point and directed the Captain to set brakes. The Captain did so and replied brakes set; cleared to disconnect interphone. Meanwhile the FO was on the radio trying to advise ground we were disconnecting in place so that the Company 737 would be aware.While this was going on the tug was disconnected but still on headset when the Tug Driver yells 'set brakes; set brakes.' I looked inside from monitoring the Company aircraft and see we are slowly rolling forward. The CA and FO are both standing on the brakes; PARK BRK is on the ECAM and the CA reaches over to turn of the Anti-Skid/NW Steering switch (Part of the loss of all braking procedure - not appropriate here) and then rapidly turns it back on. I quickly reached up and turn on the ELEC HYD Pump on the overhead and the aircraft jolts to a stop.Once the push crew was clear the crew started both engines and discussed the event. The brakes were carefully checked and no anomalies had presented themselves throughout the event. With no faults present and all systems normal the flight continued to ZZZ.Standard phraseology. 'Stop Pushback' is the term in the AOM (Aircraft Operations Manual). We discussed the importance of using this in communication with Ground Crew rather than 'stop'.Being in positive command of the push as the Captain. The Tug Driver was assertive in advocating for the way he felt the push needed to go. Ground was clearing the crew differently. Emphasized with the Captain that the aircraft should not move anywhere until and when he was satisfied and ready.It is always a challenge on the jumpseat to strike the appropriate balance between not interfering with the operation and watching out for safety of flight items. The interactions during the initial push were discomforting but not unsafe. It was when the aircraft began the second push without the Captain's approval that it appeared necessary to speak up. When the aircraft began rolling it wasapparent that it was necessary to intervene. We spent a good portion of the debrief discussing all the appropriate barriers the crew could utilize fully during push operations to mitigate the distractions and threats.Standard Phraseology/CA more assertive with push crew. Had CA set brake after the first stop; (While directing Ground Crew to remain connected); it would have created a barrier to the ensuing events and confusion.
Second reporter narrative
Second leg of turn for Captain upgrade OE. Upgrade CA (Captain) left seat; I was Check Pilot right seat; [FAA Check Pilot] in jump seat. Gate at MSY for return flight to ZZZ. All checklists complete; called for push from ground. Ground initially cleared us to push tail west onto Taxiway G for Runway 20 departure. As push was beginning; ground changed clearance to tail east into alley between B and C terminals. Captain advised Guideman of change; but Guideman/Driver began to push us tail west. CA began conversation with Guideman that they were pushing wrong direction; and directed him to stop a couple of times. He finally stopped push; and was told by CA that he needed to take us to other alley per ground instructions. What I could tell he refused due to some baggage carts [in the vicinity]. The decision was made to end push there. I was on ground frequency; trying to get a word in to advise of intentions; and looked to right to see if a taxi out from there was feasible. During that time; the Guideman disconnected. While I was looking to right; I heard loud voices from CA and Guideman. I looked forward and in; and saw we were rolling forward. I saw CA pressing on brake pedals; I simultaneously stepped on my pedals and glanced down at Park Brk lever; saw it was on; as well as Park Brk annunciation on E/WD panel. There were no abnormal or fault messages. Did not have time to look at Triple Indicator; as then Check Pilot jumpseater reached up and turned on Y electric hydraulic pump. Aircraft came to stop. No damage or injuries; thankfully; as Push Crew were already moving clear with tug and tow bar. We started engines; checked all systems; did a brake check; all systems normal; we decided to continue to ZZZ. No repeat occurrence. Debriefed in ZZZ; possible future prevention would entail making sure at least one engine is started before any disconnect. As a Check Pilot; I will also direct more of my attention to CA during push.Poor communication between CA and Guideman and Guideman not listening to CA instructions.Start at least one engine prior to disconnect. Monitor pushback better as Check Pilot in right seat.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.