CRJ-200 flight crew reported incorrect FMS altitude entry; tuning out radar altimeter aural warning and failure to noticed low altitude; resulted in evasive action.
Synopsis
CRJ-200 flight crew reported incorrect FMS altitude entry; tuning out radar altimeter aural warning and failure to noticed low altitude; resulted in evasive action.
Narrative
I was pilot monitoring (PM) and Captain was pilot flying (PF). This was a through flight and as such was fairly short; we were also delayed due to crew rest and this put some inherent pressure on us to be quick. The runway we were heading to had no instrument approach so the Captain selected visual approach and put in 1700 ft. at 5 mile final as a reference. He mentioned this in his pre-flight briefing and I concurred that it seemed correct. We chose this runway since VMC conditions prevailed; and the wind was directly down that runway as well as gusting conditions. The other runways would have been a direct crosswind as well as shorter. The flight was normal up until about 6 mile final; as we selected flaps 8 we received a continuous gear warning horn that was not silenced by adding power. At this point we noticed our altitude being extremely low; about 800 ft. AGL. Captain disconnected the Autopilot and initiated a climb back to normal altitude; about 2500 MSL. We continued with the approach and landed as normal. Cause: Complacency on both myself and the Captain's part. We talked about the altitude during the preflight and the approach briefing and neither of us noted it as seeming off. During approach before the gear horn I had the mental thought of 'we seem rather low' but did not make the connection as that being wrong; due to my inherent complacency and relative comfort with the airport as a whole. Additional factors were rushing; since the flight was delayed and it was a short flight we didn't have time to relax and consider all angles. I as PM was busy with my duties until final and even then was looking outside to ensure we were clear of obstacles.Suggestions: Since this runway did not have any approach as reference; we could (and should) have used approaches to the other runways as a reference and a way to back up our approach; including referencing the MSA as well as final approach fix altitudes at similar distances. Considering the flight was so short; we should have briefed more in depth and not allowed ourselves to be rushed by being delayed. Ideally; airports that operate part 121 flights should have some sort of approach to every runway that is available for an airliner to use.
Second reporter narrative
I was pilot flying (PF) and First Officer (FO) was pilot monitoring (PM). During preflight I was planning the use of landing XX at ZZZ due to excessive current and forecast winds. I noticed XX did not have an instrument approach; but that did not preclude us from using a visual as conditions were VMC. I planned on the recommended 3 degree glide path for the approach; and determined 1500 AGL at 5 miles was what we should use; and this was similar to the other approaches at the airport. I typed in what I thought was 2730 in the altitude restriction on the FMS and did not notice I had actually typed 1730 instead. This was not caught until approach. I tried to stay up at 3000 MSL thinking that was well above what I was supposed to be at and did not noticed the 'Radar Altimeter' aural that is easy to tune out when you have 5 flights a day. On our way down to 1730 I asked for Flaps 8 and when the FO selected them; immediately got a gear up aural. There was a little confusion as to why; as in our minds we were stable and this was a normal procedure. It was then I noticed the radar altimeter was at 780 at about 6 miles away from the runway; and have missed the '1000' aural as well; as again; it's easy to tune out at what was in our minds; well before that point in the flight. I immediately disconnected the Autopilot; added thrust; and climbed up to 2500 MSL to correct. After becoming stable again; I elected to continue the approach; which in hindsight was the wrong decision; the correct decision being a full go-around. The rest of the approach and landing continued uneventfully.Cause: There was a lack of cross checking done by the other crew member; as well as my confidence that I programmed the FMS correctly. I relied too much on the automation and my expectancy of what phase of flight we were at and the progression to come. I made the wrong decision for not going around due to a false sense of security of how close we we're still to the airport; my reading of the charts for the airport; visual conditions; lack of extra fuel for go-arounds; and that every other portion of a 'stable approach' was technically met. These are not valid excuses and a go-around was the necessary procedure. In addition; although we did brief about the expected landing; the pressure to complete an already delayed flight caused us to rush and just accept what the other had mentioned or programmed in; as we are both experienced with the flights and our positions.Suggestions: We are trained on go-arounds; stable approach criteria; and to back up visuals with instrument approaches. However; there are many times when a backup is not practical or available; and there's very little training in terms of a pure visual approach. So in this regard; it was an unusual procedure and was easy to incorrectly conduct. Due to this; it was very easy for me to incorrectly program the FMS and for it not to be caught. Extra care in monitoring and cross checking is required; as well as actual simulator; not computer based training; needs to be implemented for unusual procedures. Pilots are trained on go-around during specific sections of flight; and easy to revert to training during that time. It's the times that you never expect a go-around to occur; that you feel like it's not necessary and make incorrect choices. Additionally; we fly into rural airports that may not have the necessary support available. In this case; it was the lack of an approach to our desired; and required; runway. We are a scheduled Part 121 operation and should always have the ability to have resources readily available; as we carry many lives on board. The lack of being able to back up with a GPS or VOR or any sort of approach is detrimental to these kinds of operations; and like this case; can cause an incident when pilot error is a big factor.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.