CRJ-200 Captain reported a right bleed duct warning message during climb out while operating a training flight. The Captain performed the checklist procedure and returned to the departure airport for a safe landing.

Narrative

This event took place during First Officer (FO) new hire IOE. The Captain/Check Airman Person A was Pilot Flying and the FO Person B was Pilot Monitoring. We also had a Company pilot jump seating in the flight deck who was commuting. During climb out on the ZZZZZ SID; the R BLEED DUCT warning message occurred around 12000 ft. MSL. The Captain said cancel/identify. FO responded and read EICAS. Captain stated 'I have the radios and controls; reference the QRH.' We were not able to run the QRH fast enough and because the R BLEED DUCT warning stayed on for more than 30 seconds; the pressurization system automatically shut off both L/R bleed valves which resulted in a loss of pressurization capabilities. We were around 14000 ft. MSL when both Pressure (Regulating Shut Off Valve) PRSOVs L/R shut off. The Captain [requested priority handling] immediately following this event and initiated a descent to 10000 ft. MSL. The FO completed the QRH at 10000 ft. MSL; which following the QRH the airplane was then configured with EMER DEPRESS SWITCH engaged and PACKS OFF and ram air valve opened for unpressurized flight. We asked for a little lower to 8000 ft. and the cabin altitude caution message appeared because the cabin altitude was between 8500 - 10000 ft. This was associated and FO canceled the cabin altitude message which extinguished upon reaching 8000 ft. The passenger masks never dropped because the cabin altitude never went above 10000 ft. (masks drop automatically at 14000 +- 500 ). Captain told ATC 'we need to go back to ZZZ and that the checklists were done and the airplane was in a safe configuration but had no pressurization. We do not need assistance at this time other than returning back to ZZZ' Captain told FO to set up the cockpit for visual XXL backed up by ILS. Captain called (Flight Attendant 1) (FA1) Person C and told them the airplane was safe and that landing would be normal but couldn't continue to destination. Captain informed passengers 'Airplane is safe and all checklists are completed. We lost pressurization and we were not high enough where we would need masks; this altitude is safe without pressurization but we are going to return to ZZZ for a normal landing. Talk to you soon with an update; thanks.' ATC gave us a quick vector and Captain informed ATC we need to get a revector to finish our normal checklists and briefings for approach. After completing a revector and finishing approach briefings (during which we discovered the fuel gauges were dashed out; after taking off at 73400 lbs. we concluded that the 72000 lb. speed cards would be adequate and based on distances and speeds at that weight) we then proceeded to land and taxi to the gate. ATC had fire trucks ready per their protocols which followed Aircraft X back to the gate. After the shutdown checklist was complete; the Captain went into the cabin and made an announcement to passengers with further details and they seemed appreciative and comfortable. It was not until after the flight had ended where I saw 2 things I should have done differently. The first thing I should have done differently is to call for the checklist; I failed to realize this was an item on the checklist and only ran the QRH. As Captain/Check Airman I should have also recognized the need to transfer controls and perhaps run the QRH myself; especially because it was my FOs second time doing Pilot Monitoring (PM) duties during IOE. The QRH is a difficult checklist because it needs to be completed within 30 seconds otherwise this situation occurs with automatic complete shutdown of pressurization. I still believe that altogether the situation was handled safely but I do see areas for improvement for the QRH. I feel like I learned a valuable lesson myself. Suggestions are the L/R bleed duct item is the only item that is not transferred verbatim and boxed inside the QRH as well. Every other item has the same language verbatim (copied in the QRH) and then is elaborated in the QRH as well. However; the L/R Bleed Duct does not have this necessary detail in the QRH. The L/R Bleed Duct QRH item is a special item and situation because it is time limited (only 30 seconds to correct or else both PRSOVs shut off automatically). I have 2 very important suggestions. First and I believe most important; the L/R bleed duct should be copied verbatim and boxed like every other electrical item inside the QRH and then elaborated thereafter. The QRH version is highly unlikely to be able to finish in 30 seconds and it does not read as easily as the electrical checklist. If this was changed; future pilots in similar situations who call for the QRH by mistake; would still have the exact wording and reference as the electrical checklist; boxed and easy to read and should be able to finish in a timely manner. Second; this item should honestly be a required memory item and an immediate action item and boxed in on the electrical checklist as well because of the timely nature. But the QRH should be fixed first in my opinion to match the way every other electrical checklist is written and copied into the QRH.