B757 flight instructor Captain and Pilot Not Flying IRO First officer reported a loss of aircraft control due to improper FMS and hand flying techniques by a new Pilot flying First Officer. The Captain stated that the First Officer should not have been released from OE due to inadequate aircraft experience while on OE.
Synopsis
B757 flight instructor Captain and Pilot Not Flying IRO First officer reported a loss of aircraft control due to improper FMS and hand flying techniques by a new Pilot flying First Officer. The Captain stated that the First Officer should not have been released from OE due to inadequate aircraft experience while on OE.
Narrative
On takeoff from ZZZ; at approximately 10-20 feet; new hire FO released back pressure. The nose dropped and the aircraft initiated a turn towards the left. I intervened and established the correct pitch and bank attitude.On arrival into ZZZZ; the new hire FO was stabilized. At 20 feet; he reduced the thrust to idle and the nose began to drop. I added back pressure to prevent a nose-first touchdown.The event was thoroughly debriefed. The new hire is requesting supervised line flying.Background - I saw that he pick up the trip from the scheduled pilot a few days in advance. Previous experience told me that ZZZ in the summer can be challenging for people new to the airplane and airline. ZZZZ is a long; flat piece of pavement and typically a little wet for a nice landing. So I emailed the FO and told him to prepare for the flying leg to ZZZZ.He showed up ready to go and well-prepared. Exceptional attitude. He advised me that this was either his second or third trip off OE. On the taxi-out; we were #6 in line and stopped. I asked him to take me through the takeoff. He verbalized everything to perfection. I was confident that he was ahead of the game.When we broke ground and he released back pressure; I was shocked and intervened immediately.During the debrief; he said that he flew C17s prior to Air Carrier X and that was fly-by-wire. He said with that airplane; you set the nose where you want it and it stays. We talked about the 757s differences.What caught my attention was that he flew only 1 trip on OE with a 757 and he said that he almost didn't get signed off because of 3-point landings." One trip was a 767-400 (ZZZ-ZZZZ1) and one trip was a 767-300. This is inadequate in my opinion. And it is not exaggeration that we were close to a catastrophic event.Overall; he is great. Above average international knowledge and studies. But the first 100 feet and the last 30 feet need some work. From what I saw; he should not have been released from OE.In my opinion; this was not his fault; he was let down by us."
Second reporter narrative
A new; consolidating First Officer was Pilot Flying on flight XX; ZZZ to ZZZZ. The Captain was skeptical of his skill level and had the first officer explain exactly how he was going to perform the takeoff and ZZZ departure. The Captain also explained that a lot of new-hires have been tail striking on takeoff and warned the PF not to rotate too quickly. The FO gave a pretty textbook answer of how he was going to fly the departure and it set both the Captain and myself (relief pilot) at ease. ATIS showed a right crosswind for departure at ZZZ; gusting to 15 knots. On the takeoff roll the PF called for 'Auto-throttles' at the appropriate 1.10 EPR and the Captain erroneously pushed the VNAV button. I caught the error and told her it was the incorrect button and she immediately de-selected VNAV and pushed the auto-throttles button. This was a non-event. The takeoff roll was uneventful but as soon as the aircraft became airborne it went into a moderately steep left bank. This was immediately concerning to me and as I opened my mouth to say something; I felt the nose of the aircraft drop. It is my belief the PF released all back pressure on the yoke. I estimate we leveled off at approximately 20 feet AGL. My disbelief turned to sheer terror as I thought about the glideslope antenna; aircraft holding short of the active; the airport fence; or any number of things we could crash into at such a low altitude. As soon as I went to say something the captain had taken command of the aircraft; corrected the bank from the crosswind; and got the aircraft properly climbing again. Some time after this she gave control back over to the FO. During our climbout he repeatedly used incorrect techniques both in hand flying the aircraft and managing the FMS. The most egregious of these errors was repeatedly pulling back on the throttles (with auto-throttles engaged) during climbout (around 4000 feet) and in EPR climb mode so that he wouldn't overspeed 250 knots. The Captain again had to tell him to stop and that it wasn't correct technique. After 10;000 feet the Captain demanded he turn the autopilot on and the rest of the flight was mostly uneventful. We debriefed the takeoff as a crew at FL180 and after the flight was completed in ZZZZ in thorough detail.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.